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

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# MONTHLY MESSENGER;

A REPOSITORY OF INFORMATION.

COMPRISING

ORIGINAL ARTICLES ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS,

And Select and Elegant Extracts

FROM THE WRITINGS OF BOTH ANCIENT AND MODERN AUTHORS.

INTERSPERSED WITH

REMARKS CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY.

BY J. N. BAILEY.

SOCIAL MISSIONARY.

"Nihil est homini veritatis luce dulcius."—CICERO.
"There is nothing sweeter to man than the light of truth."

LONDON:

J. WATSON, 15, CITY ROAD, FINSBURY.

1840.

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Mouth'



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

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causes of vice and suffering would be removed, and as a consequence their effects would proportionably cease. Society would no longer exhibit those glaring inequalities of condition observable at present. There would not be a proud and pampered class of aristocrats, bloated with the most fantastic ideas of their dignity and grandeur, to trample on the rights and liberties of their fellows; nor would there be any poor to repine at their own lot, or envy the condition of their more fortunate brethren. Each would labour to produce his due proportion of wealth, and all would enjoy the advantages of co-operative measures. Thus, kindness and affection would thrill through every bosom, and waves of delighted sensibility undulate from heart to heart.

This system is in accordance with nature, because it is capable of affording man a degree of felicity commensurate with his power of enjoyment. The whole constitution of nature declares that man was intended to be happy. The ear is fitted to receive sound, and there is the chorus of the universe to regale it. The eye is adapted to receive light, and the human being so organized as to be capable of experiencing pleasure upon beholding a beauteous prospect; and many bright and lovely landscapes are pencilled on the ample bosom of nature, on which the "poet's eye delights to linger," and which, when seen, excite the most pleasing emotions. The organs of touch, taste, and smell, possess susceptibilities to action, and there are agencies in nature capable of exciting them so as to enlarge the sum of human happiness. In short, nature is a mighty storehouse, from whence our intellectual, moral, and corporeal wants may be supplied.

To whatever department of inanimate nature we turn our attention, we behold little but scenes of loveliness and grandeur. This terraqueous globe, which, (to use the language of a French poet,) "*human vanity hath divided into climates and regions*," appears to be stocked with a diversity of wonders. The river rolls along in silent pomp, pouring its majestic volume of waters through a world of forests, forming at once the emblem of human life, the talisman of poetry, the dispenser of happiness, and the parent of vegetation. The

mountain rears its gigantic bosom towards the clouds, gathers round its summit the vapours of heaven, and scans the vale below with an air of superiority. The forest, attired in the efflorescence of summer, mocks the sunlight to which it is almost impervious. The fields are garnished with the richest verdure, the flowers enamelled with the most gorgeous colours, the landscape, varied with hill and dale, lake and woodland, the world an immense repository of beauty. Nor is the magnificence of nature confined to this earth. Beautiful and glorious as our globe is, it dwindles into a mere speck when contrasted with those suns and worlds which sparkle on the bosom of the midnight heaven. In the wide fields of immensity Jupiter travels his course and *Uranus* walks his round. There planets roll and systems rise in endless gradations of magnificence: whilst the *galaxy—the manufactory of worlds*, moves around with solemn but unobtrusive grandeur. What cultivated intellect can behold the splendours of midnight scenery with apathy? What philosopher can reflect on the dimensions, densities, and velocities of the heavenly bodies without experiencing the purest delight? Do not these phenomena declare the beauty, the dignity, and the grandeur of the universe?

But in the midst of all this magnificence we find one race of beings degraded and unhappy. "The lord of the creation," "the paragon of animals," the being "who is in form and movement so express and admirable," who is "in action so like an angel, in apprehension so like a god," is frequently found in a state of moral and physical indigence, a prey to the worst evils that can lay desolate the heart. Though the earth has an immense productive power, equal, yea more than equal, to the supply of his wants, yet his corporeal desires often remain unsatisfied. The sources of knowledge lie scattered around him in boundless profusion, but he remains comparatively ignorant. Though we have laws innumerable embodied in our codes of criminal and political jurisprudence for the proper regulation of the affairs of the commonwealth and the repression of crime—though we have many thousands of well-paid

priests, whose labours were originally intended to promote morality, yet moral turpitude prevails to a frightful extent; the calendars in our courts of justice are lengthy and well filled, and the legislature of the country is embarrassed. Why are these things so? Because our politico-economical arrangements are defective, and because society, having the power to train up the rising generation in knowledge, virtue, and happiness, neglects to fulfil its natural obligations.

But, thank heaven, the reign of superstition, tyranny, and falsehood, is drawing to a close. "*Coming events* cast their shadows before," and the shadows of the coming change already hover around us. The beams of truth have begun to irradiate the world, and soon their benign influence will dissipate the mists which have been gathering for ages on the human understanding. *Knowledge will then shine forth pre-eminently lovely*, and socialism will teach mankind that, to perform a kind office for a fellow-being—to smooth the rugged pathway of life, so that it may be more easily trodden by him, is more truly honourable than to sit an enthroned despot, or be the conqueror of nations.

## FRAGMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF DIFFERENT NATIONS.

### DANCING.

#### *Definition.*

DANCE, or dancing, as at present practised, may be defined an agreeable motion of the body, adjusted by art to the measures or tones of instruments, or of the voice. But, according to what some reckon more agreeable to the true genius of the art, dancing is the art of expressing the sentiments of the mind, or of the

passions, by measured steps, or bounds, that are made in cadence, by regulated motions of the body, and by graceful gestures; all performed to the sound of musical instruments or of voice.—*Encyclopædia Britannica, article on dancing.*

### *Probable Origin of the Custom.*

"Dancing is looked on by philosophers at the present day with contempt; but I have no doubt that the dance was among the ancients esteemed of much greater importance than has been suspected. It was generally accompanied with both music and poetry, and the original intention was to keep in recollection the sacred mythoses before the invention of writing; and surely nothing could be better contrived for this purpose. All early sacred books were poetical. For the same purpose, festivals equally accompanied with dancing, and poetry set to music and sung to the dancing, were established to keep in recollection victories or other celebrated events. When this view is taken of those apparently frivolous acts, how surprisingly are they changed! Instead of sciences contemptible and demoralising, as they became after the art of writing was made public, we see that, when under the supervision of the first priesthood, they were originally most important, and must have been the firmest supports to patriotism, morality, and every generous virtue. We now see why they were patronised by the Socrateses and Pythagorases of antiquity."—*Anacalypsis, by Godfrey Higgins*, vol. ii., b. v., c. iv., s. 16, p. 424.

"I some time ago made an observation on the attachment of Pythagoras and the ancients to music. I have no doubt that music was closely connected with religion. All the ancient unwritten mysteries (and all mysteries were once unwritten), were originally preserved in rhythm or metre, and set to music, or preserved by or contained in music. Rhythm, metre, and music, were all invented for the purpose of aiding the memory—of assisting it more correctly to retain the sacred numbers. For many generations after the

use of letters became public, there were no writings in prose: all were in poetry or rhythm. All the stone pillars in the temples, erected or placed according to the numbers of the cycles, were partly for this same purpose.

"The sacred dances and scenic representations were for the double purpose of doing honour to the god and aiding the memory; precisely as the scenic representations of the acts of Jesus Christ by the romish church originally were, or perhaps are at this day; and of which the plays called mysteries in Elizabeth's time were a remnant. The bards were an order to preserve and regulate the choirs, the salii to preserve and regulate the dances." The salii were probably priests of Sol, the Sun.—*Ibid.*, b. iii., c. ii., s. 16, p. 233.

Priests, pietists, methodists, and all who professionally belong to the "unco gude," look upon dancing as a sinful amusement, but in ancient times it was deemed more important. We read of David dancing before the ark, and of the daughter of Jeptha going out to meet him with timbrels and dances. Calmet informs us that there were dancing-girls in the temple at Jerusalem; which the good father should by no means have made known, as it strengthens the proof of the identity between Jewism and the pagan superstitions. It appears from some passages in the Psalms, that dancing, though not enjoined by a positive precept, formed a part of the Jewish worship. A writer in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* observes, "In the christian churches mentioned in the New Testament, there is no account of dancing being introduced as an act of worship, though it is certain that it was used as such in after ages." Mr. Gallini tells us, that, "at Limoges, not long ago, the people used to dance the round in the choir of the church, which is under the invocation of their patron saint; and at the end of each psalm, instead of the *Gloria Patria*, they sung, *St. Marcel, pray for us*, and we shall dance in honour of you."

According to Gallini, the spirit of dancing prevails to a wonderful extent in Africa. "The Mexicans," the same author says, "have their dances and music, but in the most uncouth and barbarous style." The ancient Greeks

had dances, which were divided by Plato into three classes: First, The military dances, which tended to make the body robust, active, and well disposed for all the exercises of war; Secondly, The domestic dances, which had for their object an agreeable and innocent relaxation; and Thirdly, The mediatorial dances, which were in use in expiations and sacrifices."* "Let it be also recollected," says Higgins, "that Diodorus informs us, that Apollo was adored with dances."†

Most of the religious ceremonies amongst the ancients were accompanied with dances, and amongst the most ancient of these was the Bacchic. This was consecrated to Bacchus and all the deities, and was celebrated with the greatest enthusiasm. Theseus, after his return from Crete, assisted, at the head of a band of youths, in the celebration of the *Hyporchematic* dance round the altar of Apollo. Mr. Henry O'Brien, in page 227 of the Phenician Island, as quoted by Godfrey Higgins, says, "that the Christians of St. Thomas, till a very late day, celebrated their christian worship with songs and dances."

Thus, to whatever department of the globe we turn our attention, whether it be the continent of Africa, the immense regions of Hindostan, or the wild and uncultivated regions of America, we behold the prevalency of this custom. That it is a healthful and agreeable relaxation few will deny, and that it may be abused is indubitably certain.

### *Dancing Girls.*

"Dancing girls are employed all over the East, as affording great diversion at all public entertainments."

These dancing girls are trained up to the arts of pleasing and of love by some superannuated female who has followed the same profession. They possess great powers to please and captivate the other sex; and the native princes, we are told, often expend large sums upon them, even though their harems should be stocked with beauties. The dancing-girls are made use of in religious ceremonies in eastern countries.

* Encyclopædia Britannica. † Anacalypsis, vol. ii. p. 262.

The priests, when they bring forth the images of their gods, cause the girls to dance before the images. It is said, that then they are selected for their beauty, and their bodies prostituted for hire, which of course goes into the pockets of the clergy. The priests in all countries are found to bear a close resemblance to each other.

## EXTRACTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE BONES.

"If we set ourselves to examine with an unbiassed judgment the process of nature in forming the bones, as in the chick, or in restoring them, as in broken limbs, a succession of phenomena present themselves, the most orderly, beautiful, and simple of any that are recorded in the philosophy of the animal body: for if bones were but condensed, gluten, coagulated blood, or a mere deposition from the periosteum, they were then inorganized and out of the system, not subject to change, nor open to disease; liable, indeed, to be broken, but without any means of being healed again; while they are, in truth, as fully organized, as permeable to the blood, as easily hurt and as easily healed, as sensible to pain in some cases and as regularly changed, as the softer parts are. We are not to refer the generation and growth of bone to any one part. It is not formed by that jelly in which the bone is laid, nor by the blood which is circulating in it, nor by the periosteum which covers it, nor by the medullary membrane with which it is lined; but the whole system of the bone, of which these are parts only, is designed and planned, is laid out in the very elements of the body, and goes on to ripeness by the concurring action of all its parts. The arteries, by a determined action, deposit the bone, which is formed commonly in a bed of cartilage, as the bones of the leg or arm are; sometimes betwixt two layers of membrane, like the bones of the skull, where true cartilage

is never seen. Often the secretion of the bony matter is performed in a distinct bag, and there it grows into form, as in the teeth; for each tooth is formed in its little bag, which, by injection, can be filled and covered with vessels; the bone of the tooth being formed in a different manner from common bone. Any artery of the body may assume this action and deposit bone, which is formed also where it should not be, in the tendons and in the joints, in the great arteries and in their valves, in the flesh of the heart itself, or even in the soft and pulpy substance of the brain." When such bony concretions are found in the vessels or membranes of the body, they may be styled preternatural, and their structure is different from that of true and natural bone.

"In the human *fœtus*, and in other animals before the time of birth, instead of bones there are only cartilages of the form of the future bone. The whole *fœtus* appears to the eye like a mere jelly: the bones are a pure, almost transparent and tremulous jelly; they are flexible, so that a long bone can be bended into a complete ring; and no opacity nor spot of ossification is seen.

"This cartilage is never hardened into bone; but from the first, is in itself an organized mass. It has its vessels, which are at first transparent, but which soon dilate; and whenever the red colour of the blood begins to appear in them, ossification very quickly follows, the arteries being so far enlarged as to carry the coarser parts of the blood. The first mark of ossification is an artery, which is seen running into the centre of the jelly, in which the bone is to be formed. Other arteries soon appear, overtake the first, mix with it, and form a net work of vessels; then a centre of ossification begins stretching its rays according to the length of the bone, and then the cartilage begins to grow opaque, yellow, brittle; it will no longer bend, and the small nucleus of ossification is felt in the centre of the bone, and when touched with a sharp point is easily known by its gritty feel. Other points of ossification are successively formed; always the ossification is foretold by the spreading of the artery, and by the arrival of red blood. Every point of ossification has its little arteries,

and each ossifying nucleus has so little dependence on the cartilage in which it is formed, that it is held to it by vessels only; and when the ossifying cartilage is cut into thin slices, and steeped in water till its arteries rot, the nucleus of ossification drops spontaneously from the cartilage, leaving the cartilage like a ring, with a smooth and regular hole where the bone lay."—*Bell's Anatomy*, vol. i., c. i., p. 6.

### *Composition of Bone.*

"Bone consists of animal and of earthy particles, which, according to some physiologists, are supplied by two distinct sets of vessels: the former, or animal particles, being secreted by the blood vessels, which supply the internal or medullary membrane of the bone; whilst the latter, or earthy particles, are deposited by those of the periosteum or external investing membrane of bone. These two distinct constituents of bony substance may be easily demonstrated. For this purpose, if a portion of bone be exposed to a great heat, its animal particles will be consumed, leaving only an earthy residium; whilst, on the other hand, if a bone be submitted to the action of dilute (nitric) acid, its earthy particles will be removed, and with them the hardness and density of the bone, although the remaining animal matter will be sufficient to retain the original form of the bone. Of course it is according to the preponderance of the earthy over the animal particles, that constitutes the relative hardness of bones; whilst their deficiency proves a cause of morbid softness. It ought, however, to be observed, that the bones of the *fœtus* are naturally soft, from a preponderance of animal matter. The following is the analysis of bone as given by Berzelius:

| | |
|---|---|
| Cartilage | 34.17 |
| Fluate of lime | 2.00 |
| Phosphate of lime | 51.04 |
| Carbonate of lime | 11.30 |
| Phosphate of magnesia | 1.16 |
| Soda, muriate of soda, and water | 1.20 |

Messrs. Fourcroy and Vanquelin state, that phosphate of magnesia, which is found in the bones of the lower animals, does not exist in the bones of the human subject; whilst, on the other hand, this salt is found in human urine, but not in that of brutes."—*Lectures on Anatomy, by B. B. Cooper, F.R.S.*, vol. i., part 1, lect. 1, p. 13.

## FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

"A SOUND mind in a sound body, is a short but full description of a happy state in this life. He that has these two, has little more to wish for; and he that wants either of them, will be little the better for anything else. Men's happiness or misery is most part of their own making. He whose mind directs not wisely, will never take the right way; and he whose mind is crazy and feeble, will never be able to advance in it. I confess there are some men's constitutions of body and mind so vigorous and well-framed by nature, that they need not much assistance from others, but by the strength of their natural genius they are from their cradles carried towards what is excellent, and by the privilege of their happy constitutions are able to do wonders. But examples of this kind are but few; and I think I may say that, of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by education. 'Tis that which makes the great difference in mankind. The little or almost insensible impressions on our tender infancies have very important and lasting consequences: and there 'tis as in the fountains of some rivers, where a gentle application of the hand turns the flexible waters into channels, that make them take quite contrary courses; and by this little direction given them at first in the source, they receive different tendencies, and arrive at last in very remote and distant places. *I imagine the minds of children as easily turned this or that way as water itself; and though this be the principal*

*part, and our main care should be about the inside, yet the clay cottage is not to be neglected."—Locke on Education*, s. 1, 2, p. 1.

The opponents of socialism frequently adduce the authority of Locke in favour of their peculiar systems of faith and mysticism. Gregory, in his historical and moral essays, observes, "If Socrates, if Plato, if Zeno, or if Tully had been educated under the influence of Christianity, would they, can we suppose, have rejected its truths for the blindness of Paganism? Would they have ranked with the Bolingbrokes and Voltaires, with that nameless herd of triflers who affect to despise or ridicule revelation? Would they not rather have embraced the philosophy and imitated the conduct of a Milton, a Newton, an Addison, and a *Locke?*"

Here we perceive the name and authority of Locke dragged forward to counteract the authority of Voltaire. His name is also often bandied about by the opponents of social missionaries—the pseudo-philosophers of the day, as if the authority of Locke could make that which is true more true, or that which is false become genuine philosophy. This adducing of names, this leaning to authority, in some cases is the result of defective mental powers, and in others is a mere artifice *ad captandum vulgus*, a veil flung over a system to hide its deformity from observation. Indeed, it has been easy for the preisthood to collect the testimonies of great men in favour of Christianity, or what is called Christianity; for I apprehend no philosopher would object to religion when it is properly explained. But this term Christianity has been made a watchword, a bugbear amongst the priests, wherewith to frighten people into a compliance with their ghostly wishes. They have built a system of doctrine of their own, and dubbed and dignified it with the name of Christianity; whereas it is essentially opposed to the spirit and precepts of Christ. In past ages, philosophers knew very well that if they did not subscribe to the popular theology of the time, they would feel the malevolence of superstition. The rack,* the gibbet,

* Witness, the Inquisition.

the faggot,* and the prison,† the prohibition‡ or burning of their works,§ they were well aware would have been the results of dissenting from the received opinions of the day. Under such circumstances, it was easy for the priesthood to extort from philosophers testimonies favourable to their system.

But, to return to Mr. Locke. I by no means wish to place his authority, especially in questions of mental philosophy, on a parallel with that of Voltaire: nor do I wish to detract one iota from the splendour which encircles the character of the former writer. Locke was a great man, and a profound thinker. But great as he was, his authority can never make that which is false true, or that which is true erroneous. Great minds have often great failings. Locke had his. "Locke," observes Reid, "starts a doubt upon personal identity; and, in order to resolve it, gravely determines that personal identity consists in consciousness; that is, if you are conscious that you did such a thing, twelve months ago, this consciousness makes you to be the very person who did it. Now, consciousness of what is past can signify nothing else but the remembrance that I did it: so that Mr. Locke's principle must be, that identity consists in remembrance: and consequently a man must lose his personal identity with regard to everything he forgets:"‖

Now the failings and puerilities of otherwise great men should never be adduced as evidence in favour of a doctrinal or preceptive system. In perusing their volumes we should attend to their arguments and not to their authority. If Lord Chief Justice Hale believed in witchcraft—if Doctor Samuel Johnson credited the story of the Cock-lane ghost, does the belief of these celebrated men prove the correctness of the things they believed? No! The world has grown too wise to adopt such an hypothesis for a moment, and he who

* Witness, Servetus. † Witness, Taylor, Galileo, and Carlile.

‡ Rise, ghosts of Celsus and Paine.

§ Witness the volumes of Porphyry.

‖ Inquiry into the Human Mind, Introd. p. 11.

would advance it would be scouted as an incipient philosopher.

But if the abettors of priestism have reason to adduce the authority of Locke in favour of their system, the disciples of Owen have equal reason to adduce his authority in favour of their fundamental principle, "the formation of character." "The little," observes he, "and almost insensible impressions made on our tender infancies have very important and lasting consequences;" again, "nine parts of ten are what they are, good or bad, useful or not, by education;" and again, "I imagine the minds of children as easily turned this way or that as water itself." Bravo, Mr. Locke! Why this is socialism! Do not these extracts prove, that whatever might be Locke's private opinions on religious subjects, his ideas on the formation of character closely approximated to those of Robert Owen?

## FORMATION OF NATIONAL CHARACTER.

National Character may result from a few of the following causes, or from all of them in a state of combination:

First, Soil and climate; Second, Local circumstances; Third, Those events which are styled casual; Fourth, Commerce; and, Fifth, The genius of the government under which people live.

Various writers have favoured the world with ponderous volumes on the influence which soil, climate, and food, exercise over the formation of national character. It appears to me absurd to attribute the formation of national character solely to the influence of food and climate. The influence of food and climate is not immediate but indirect. An excess or scarcity of food, a warm or cold climate, may derange the health of an individual, and thereby produce consequences of

a moral kind, which will re-act upon the individual's organization, and thereby modify his character.

"The physical principles already enumerated," observes Gregory, "can only be considered as predisposing causes at most. They cannot give ideas; now, ideas are, as it were, the parents of each other, all our reasoning consists in comparing, all our fancy in combining ideas. The most potent of the passions, ambition and avarice, depend on these combinations of ideas, and these are directed by education and fashion."* Physical causes can have but an indirect influence over the formation of character, when not accompanied with other combinations of circumstances. If the doctrine of some of the disciples of Montesquieu be correct, it proves that man always changes his character upon removal into a different climate; for if food and climate produce the character, why should not the native of England upon removing into Asiatic Turkey acquire the manners, the habits, and the dispositions, of the disciples of Mahomet?

The character of the Turks is thus drawn by Bell: "The Turks still retain the same character which the historians of the fifteenth century attributed to them. They are indolent in a time of peace, but when war rouses them they become infuriated; they rob and oppress the *rayahs* or infidels, but are friendly towards strangers; they devastate villages, but they found and endow hospitals; they keep their oaths, but they trample upon every principle of public law; they are susceptible of feelings of honour, but compassion is a stranger to their breasts; they dethrone and strangle their sultans, but are great advocates for monarchy; although unrefined and sensual in their ideas of pleasure, they are moderate in their enjoyment; and, starting from the lap of luxuriousness, they submit to the severest privations, without grumbling; they are *(in general)*, good relatives and husbands, and polygamy is far from being common amongst them. A harem is, to most of them, only an object of ostentation and luxury. Inhuman in their vindictiveness, they fre-

* Historical and Moral Essays; essay ii., p. 54.

quently carry their friendship to an exalted pitch of heroism. Their courage manifests itself in a chivalrous heroism, and sometimes in a stoical indifference. Here they are seen courageously precipitating themselves on the enemies' ranks, without regard to numbers, and there they suffer themselves to be strangled with a pipe in their mouth. They change exile for a palace, with the most perfect carelessness, and consider themselves, on all occasions, the slaves of an immutable necessity."* Another writer, who, on account of residing amongst them, was well qualified to speak on the subject, thus points out the difference between a Turk and an Englishman:

An Englishman considers Turkish
courage to be.....ferocity
religion .....fanaticism
wisdom .....craftiness
policy .....perfidy
tactics .....treachery
philosophy .....taciturnity
beauty.....obesity
dignity .....arrogance
love.....concupiscence
sentiment .....sensuality

A Turk considers European
morality to be .....infidelity
science .....witchcraft
precaution .....impiety
liberty .....licentiousness
modesty .....indecorum
matrimony .....solitary confinement
gallantry .....debauchery
politeness.....frivolity
gaiety .....imbecility
genius.....pen-knife making†

These portraits of Turkish character, so admirable for the happy vein of antithesis which prevails throughout, are corroborated by almost every English traveller

* Bell's Geography, vol. ii. p. 617.

† Madden's Travels, vol. ii., letter xxx., p. 113.

who has visited Turkey. Now, if food and climate be the sole agents in the formation of the character, may we not reasonably infer that the Swede, the Norwegian, the Englishman, or the Savoyard, would acquire a character similar to the Turk's, if placed under the influence of the same sort of food and climate. But no person possessed of common sense would attempt to defend such an opinion; as, therefore, the inference is false, there must be some radical defect in the premises from which it is legitimately deducible.

*(To be continued.)*

## SOCIALISM CONSIDERED AS THE MORAL REGENERATOR OF MODERN SOCIETY.

Oh, how canst thou renounce the boundless store
Of charms which Nature to her votary yields!
The warbling woodland, the resounding shore,
The pomp of groves, and garniture of fields;
All that the genial ray of morning gilds,
And all that echoes to the song of even,
All that the mountain's sheltering bosom shields,
And all the dread magnificence of heaven—
Oh! how canst thou renounce, and hope to be forgiven?

BEATTIE.

WHEN we turn an intellectual glance on the aspect of modern society, our attention becomes rivetted by the glaring anomalies which appear on every hand. A thousand evils start into notice when the talisman of *reason* is applied to the present system. We behold the earth possessed of an illimitable power of production, adequate to the supply of human necessities, and at the same time perceive many of its sons languishing in indigence, ignorance, and woe. Though the fair fields of nature are open for the inspection of all, though the most beautiful phenomena lie scattered in every direction, and though the ocean of knowledge spreads before us, in rich and ample perspective, its placid billows, illumined by the sunlight of heaven, inviting us to the voyage, yet it remains unnavigated,

except by a favoured few; the fields of nature remain unexplored, except by the votary of science; and the loveliest phenomena are born but to perish unnoticed by the mass of the population.

A great change, it is true, has taken place in the condition of the operative classes. The barbarism of the dark ages has been superseded by what is called "modern refinement and civilization," and the "pacific march of improvement" has swept from our borders a few of the superstitions which formerly prevailed. "The labourers of the present day," observes Chalmers, "work harder than they did before, and fare better than they did before. They put forth more strength, and receive more sustenance, than they were wont to do. There has been an increase on both of these terms; or, such has been the change of habit among workmen, that, while greatly more industrious, they, at the same time, have become greatly more luxurious. They at once toil more strenuously, and live more plentifully—putting forth more strength, but withal drawing the remuneration of a larger and more liberal sustenance. This we apprehend to be the actual change of habit and condition which has taken place with artizans and labourers, in all the countries of civilized Europe; so that while, on the one hand, we behold a harder-working peasantry, we, on the other hand, behold them more richly upholden, both in the first and second necessaries of life.

"Now this may be either a deterioration or an improvement in their circumstances. One can imagine a day of slavish fatigue, followed by an evening of gross and loathsome sensuality, as is often exemplified in the life of a London coalheaver, whose enormous wage is absorbed in the enormous consumption by which he repairs the waste and the weariness of an excessive labour. This surely is not a desirable habitude for the commonalty of any land; nor do we read the characteristics of a high or a well-conditioned peasantry in a state of existence made up, first, of drudgery to the utmost of their strength, and then of grovelling dissipation to the uttermost of their means. They spend one part of their revolving day in the exercise of

powers which are merely animal, and the other part in the indulgence of enjoyments which also are merely animal—like beasts of burden, who are better wrought than before, and, in return for this, are better fed, and lodged, and littered than before. They are now in better keep than their forefathers; and this puts them into heart for the greater work that is extracted out of them. Still it is conceivable of the work, that it may be so very extreme, as, on the whole, to degrade and to depress those overdone children of modern industry —and that, in spite of the greater abundance wherewith their senses and their spirits are coarsely regaled, during the intervals of their sore bondage."*

Any person acquainted with the condition of modern society, will at once perceive the truth and beauty of the foregoing remarks. The labouring population of England fare more luxuriously and work harder than their Anglo-Saxon ancestors. The log of wood has become displaced by the soft-pillow, and the smoky rush-strewed cottages of former days have given way to more commodious habitations. But though the condition of the labourer has changed for the better, does that by any means warrant the inference that it is absolutely impossible for it to become better still? I think there are few, except those who are steeped up to the lips in brute-ignorance and fanaticism, who will have the temerity to hazard such an assertion. The evils of the present time are numerous and cry aloud for reform. Where are those arrangements and principles to be found which are qualified to produce such a reformation? They are to be found in that system, the technical cognomen of which is *socialism.*

Socialism is destined to become the great moral regenerator of modern society for the following reasons:

First, Because it tends to subvert "peacefully and by reason alone" the system of individualism and private property.

Second, Because it is calculated to remedy the defectiveness of our educational institutes.

Third, Because it proposes plans for the more enlarged production and equalized distribution of wealth.

* Chalmers on Political Economy, c. i. p. 18.

And Fourth, Because it is qualified to call into active exercise the benevolent, the moral, and the intellectual feelings of society.

The origin of the system of private property, like the origin of man, is a subject that is involved in great obscurity. The most commonly received hypothesis is, that in a dark and barbarous age, some men, renowned for their physical strength and adventurous daring, would begin to lord it over their fellows, and to trample on the rights and liberties of their weaker brethren. If this hypothesis is correct, it is reasonable to suppose that they would bequeath to their posterity the wealth and power they had so unjustly acquired; and that their successors, having once tasted the sweets of dominion, would endeavour to perpetuate a system so advantageous to their interests. In process of time, as men multiplied upon the face of the earth, the private-property system would become expanded. The injustice of acknowledging the rights of property in the case of the rich and denying it to the poor would be so glaring, that those who wished to perpetuate the system would be in some measure compelled to universalize it, i. e. acknowledge it in all cases. The employment of a tract of land for a great length of time, either for pastoral or agricultural purposes by an individual or a family, would doubtless, in the early ages of society, constitute a sufficient claim to it as an inheritance. The history of the patriarchal times as given in the Pentateuch confirms the truth of this remark. The evil character given to the population by the defective arrangements then in existence would, in all probability, have an influence in the formation of those laws which were enacted for the purpose of regulating the rights of property. Under the circumstances in which men were then placed, these laws were both necessary and useful, but have now become, in consequence of the tremendous increase of mankind, both defective and pernicious.

This may have been the manner in which the rights of property originated; at least, the hypothesis is as plausible as any other that can be advanced.

But though we cannot determinately trace the origin

of the system, it is sufficient for us to know that it is now in existence, and of vast importance that we should ascertain whether it be in accordance with nature, and whether its workings are beneficial to society. The laws of nature, and especially that department of nature we denominate *human*, should be the test of all our reasonings on important speculations of this sort.

Now I unhesitatingly affirm, that the system of private property is neither in accordance with nature nor calculated to promote the diffusion of human happiness.

The author of the *Constitution of Society as designed by God* remarks, page 7, "All the obligations and rights of men, then, emanate from the divine law, and none being able to live but in association, and the constitution of human nature, confirmed by divine revelation, *equally obliging* every individual of the human race to do all that lies in him to promote the well-being of all his associates, it is obviously necessary for the purpose, that he should have an equality of rights with all of them; *for, if the rights differ, the obligation must;* as it is not for a moment supposable, that God, who is infinitely wise, powerful, and benevolent, would have laid all men under the same obligation, and yet have assigned to some a less measure of rights than to others, thereby abridging the means of performing such obligations. Such a procedure would prejudice, not only the particular members from whom such rights are abstracted, but in a less or greater degree the whole association, its welfare being, as has been seen, dependent on all its members having the greatest plenitude of means, and exerting those means for the general good. It is, therefore, derogatory to the wisdom and goodness of God to affirm, that though he has placed all men under the divine law (the law of love)—therefore, under an obligation to perform it, rendered them liable to the same penalties for the non-performance of it, and appointed the same ransom for penitent offenders against it, yet he has abstracted from any the means, or a portion of the means, of doing it. If, therefore, such means are or have been withheld from any one or more members of any nation, in any age, it is

manifestly against the will of God. Nature, says Vattel, in his Law of Nations, imposes no obligations on men, without giving them the means of fulfilling them. They have an absolute right to the use of those means—nothing can deprive them of that right—as nothing can dispense with their fulfilling their natural obligations."

The above argument, if divested of the peculiar air of mysticism interwoven with it by its author, is conclusive against the system of private property. Nature or God has imposed on man certain obligations. It is absurd to suppose that man is placed under obligations, whilst the means of performing them is not afforded. But so long as the system of private property continues, society, as a whole, is deprived of those means; therefore, the system is inconsistent with nature, and derogatory to the deity.

We here anticipate an objection, which may be urged against the argument which has led us to the foregoing conclusions: viz. that, although it is easy to collect and exhibit an immense mass of evil, and then attribute it to the system of private property—though it is easy to assert that the system of individualism abstracts from the population the means of fulfilling their natural obligations, and of calling into exercise the holiest sympathies of their nature, yet it is much more difficult to prove the truth of these assertions. In reply to this objection we observe, that any political arrangements which lay an embargo on the developement of those faculties which are necessary to enable men to fulfil their obligations, must proportionately abstract from them the means we have alluded to; and in addition to this, when these arrangements absolutely prohibit them from gratifying, to any considerable extent, the benevolent feelings of their nature; it is obvious that such arrangements are of a pernicious character. That the system of private property prevents men from doing all the good, they, in the amplitude of their benevolence, might wish to do, appears evident to all, who attentively consider the circumstances of competitive society.

*(To be continued.)*

## THE UNITY OF THE SUPREME BEING WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS.

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Ισις εγω ειμι παντο γεγονος, και ον και
εσομενον, και το εμον πεπλον
ουδεις των θνη
θων απε
καλυ
ψε
ν.*

I Isis am all that has
been, that is, or shall
be; no mortal man
hath ever
me un-
vei-
le
d.

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Some of the most canting members of the Christian priesthood frequently assure their deluded followers, both in their oral ministrations and written discourses, that the ancient heathens were in a most deplorable condition, as it regards a belief in theological abstractions. They point with affected sorrow to the numerous deities of Greece and Rome, and endeavour to exhibit the superiority of their views, by contrasting them with the idolatries of the ancient Egyptians. In their writings you find them eternally ringing changes on the satires of Juvenal, as if the ebullitions of satirical malignancy were tantamount to historical proof. It may be admitted that in ancient times, the ignorant part of the Egyptian populace were so far sunk in ignorance and superstition, as to worship the crocodile, and fall "prostrate adoring" before their garden vegetables. But an admission of this nature by no means involves the inference, which some of our "Christian evidence manufacturers" generally deduce from it: viz. that the

* Vide Plutarch on the inscription on the Temple of Isis.

philosophers of Egypt were characterized by similar stupidity. The ancient philosophers had one set of opinions for themselves, and another for the vulgar. They no doubt secretly laughed at the folly of the fanatical multitude, even while resorting to the temples to shield themselves from persecution. What the classic Gibbon says of the religion of the ancient Romans is applicable to that of the Egyptians. "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the" *Egyptian* "world, were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful."*

Juvenal thus ridicules the superstitious character of the Egyptian populace:—

Quis nescit, Volusi Bithynice qualia demens
Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat
Pars hæc: illa pavet saturam serpentibus ibin.
Effigies sacri nitet aurea cercopitheci,
Dimidio magicæ resonant ubi Memnone chordæ,
Atque vetus Thebe centum jacet obruta portis.
Illic cæruleos, hic piscem fluminis, illic
Oppida tota canem venerantur, nemo Dianam.
Porrum et cæpe nefas violare, et frangere morsu.
O sanctas gentes, quibus hæc nascunter in hortis
Numina!†

All know that Egypt's frantic vows are paid
To monstrous godheads, whom herself has made;
That temples here to crocodiles are rais'd,
And there the snake-fed Ibis madly praised.
Where broken Memnon's magic strings resound,
And ancient Thebes lies ruined on the ground,
With all her hundred gates in dust around,
The golden image of a monkey there
Demands mock worship, and insensate pray'r:
Fish of the sea, or of the river, here
Are by whole cities viewed with pious fear:
While others to the dog in rev'rence bow,
Though poor Diana never shares a vow.
Hunger is sacrilege in these abodes,
Where onions are adored, and leeks are gods.
O holy nations! in whose gardens rise
The host of heav'n, the mob of deities.

*Hodgson.: Trans. Juv.*

* Dec. Fall Rom. Emp., vol. i., c. ii., p. 35, Ed. Lond. 1789.
† Satire xv., v. 1.

These lines are characteristic of the Egyptian superstitions; but it is presuming too much upon human credulity, to assert that the philosophers of antiquity accredited such monstrous absurdities. Partly from choice, and partly from a fear of the popular vengeance, they were induced either to conceal their real sentiments, or deliver them to the people under the mask of allegory. "In their writings," observes Gibbon, "and conversation, the philosophers of antiquity asserted the independent dignity of reason; but they resigned their actions to the commands of law and of custom. Viewing, with a smile of pity and indulgence, the various errors of the vulgar, they diligently practised the ceremonies of their fathers, devoutly frequented the temples of the gods; and sometimes condescending to act a part on the theatre of superstition, they concealed the sentiments of an Atheist under the sacerdotal robe. Reasoners of such a temper were scarcely inclined to wrangle about their respective modes of faith, or of worship. It was indifferent to them what shape the folly of the multitude might choose to assume; and they approached with the same inward contempt, and the same external reverence, the altars of the Lybian, the Olympian, and the Capitoline Jupiter."*

There can be little dependence placed on the authority of ancient writers, relative to the opinions which prevailed in Egypt, in remote ages. The Greeks were too fond of exalting the glory of their own nation at the expense of others, whom they denominated barbarous, to give an impartial account of the opinions of Egyptian philosophers. Besides, the destruction of the Alexandrian library, in A.D. 642, by the command of the superstitious Omar, caliph of the Saracens, prevents us from arriving at accurate conclusions concerning the philosophy of Egypt. The difficulty, too, of settling with precision the sense in which the allegorical language of the ancient philosophers should be interpreted, is another appalling circumstance which meets the student in every stage

* Dec. Fall Rom. Emp., vol. i., c. ii., p. 37, Ed Lond. 1789.

of an historical inquiry into the theology of ancient times. "It has been often said," says Sir William Drummond, "that fiction is the soul of poetry." It may be asserted with equal truth, that among the ancient oriental nations, fiction was the organ of philosophy. In Asia as well as in Egypt, the learned class was separated from all the rest. The priests were accustomed to speak in the language of mystery; and when they communicated their knowledge to the initated, it was generally by types, enigmas, and allegories."

"It may appear singular that the discoveries of science should thus have been shrouded from public view; that the lessons of philosophy should have been expressed in tropes and figures; and that important truths should have been hidden under the semblance of fabulous narrations. But the institutions, both political and religious, of the ancient nations of the East, required that knowledge should be confined to the few; and whether this system of government were good or bad, it accounts, in great measure, for the obscurity in which the learned enveloped their opinions."*

Howitt, in his Popular History of Priestcraft, and Hodgson, in his notes on the fifteenth satire of Juvenal, appended to his inelegant poetical translation of that caustic writer, have given very unfair descriptions of the mythology of Egypt. If these writers had drawn a line of distinction between the priests and the people—if they had shown how the mass were ignorant, and the philosophers in a measure compelled to countenance the dominant superstitions—if they had intended their descriptions to apply to the common people in the fullest sense, and to the philosophers but partially—then their validity of their statements might be admitted. But attributing all the evils which afflicted Egypt to the priesthood (as is done by Mr. Howitt), is too bad—nay, more, it is downright falsehood.

The people in ancient times exercised an influence over the priesthood, as well as that which the priesthood exercised over them. The force of popular

* Origines, vol. i., c. iii., p. 15.

opinion, the fear of popular vengeance, and the political institutions and arrangements then in existence, would tend to render the priests cautious in the delivery of their sentiments, from whence would result their allegorical language, and the delusion of the multitude. "As the science and knowledge," says Drummond, "of the learned increased, their opinions, with respect to religion and philosophy, differed in proportion from those of the vulgar. In many countries of Asia, the people had become the slaves of the vilest superstitions; while there were at least some among the priests who, in the secret recesses of their colleges, taught the purest doctrines of natural religion, and made various discoveries in science. To have published those doctrines, or those discoveries, would have been to turn against themselves the prejudices which their predecessors " (in some instances)," had taught the ignorant to revere, and would have ranged in hostile array against them those very classes of society which it had always been the object of their profession rather to govern than instruct."*

The unity of the Deity is a theological opinion which is considered by the priesthood to be of primary importance in religion. It being admitted among all civilized nations that the acknowledgment of one God is more rational than the acknowledgment of many, the priests (ever crafty) have built on this admission an argument in favour of their system. Because Polytheism was embraced by the vulgar in remote ages—because the ancient philosophers (using the language of allegory) alluded to the heathen gods and goddesses in their writings, they at once conclude that all the ancients were rank idolaters, and that a divine revelation was absolutely necessary to teach men that there is but one Supreme—" the first, the greatest, the only Lord of all." Now, if it can be shewn from the testimonies of both ancient and modern authors, that the unity of the Deity was held by the ancient philosophers, it follows as a consequence, that so far as this tenet is concerned, a revelation from the Creator to the created

* Origines, vol. i., c. iii., p. 17.

was unnecessary. And here I think the numerous admissions of ecclesiastical writers are amply sufficient to upset the argument in question ; supported as those admissions are by an immense mass of historical proof, derivable from other sources.

Enfield, in his History of Philosophy, observes, "Besides the material principle, it seems capable of satisfactory proof that the Egyptians admitted an active principle, or intelligent power, eternally united with the chaotic mass, by whose energy the elements were separated, and bodies were formed, and who continually presides over the universe, and is the efficient cause of all effects. For this we have not only the authority of Plutarch, who may be suspected of having exhibited the Egyptian philosophy in a Grecian dress, but the united testimony of many writers, who give such accounts of the Egyptian gods, *Pthas* or *Vulcan*, and *Cneph* or *Agathodæmon*, as render it probable that these were only different names expressing different attributes of the Supreme Divinity. 'The Egyptians,' says Eusebius, 'call the maker of the universe by the name of *Cneph*, and relate, that he sent forth an egg from his mouth; which, in their symbolical language, denotes that he produced the universe.' Diodorus Siculus speaks of the Egyptian Vulcan as first king among the gods; and Manetho ascribes to him unlimited duration, and perpetual splendour. The name itself, *Pthas*, in the Coptic language, denotes one by whom events are ordained. When the Egyptians meant to represent the ruler of the world as good, they called him by the appellation *Cneph;* a word which denotes a good genius. They represented him under the symbol of a serpent. Upon a temple dedicated to Neitha, at Sais, the chief town in Lower Egypt, was this inscription: 'I am whatever is, or has been, or will be, and no mortal has hitherto drawn aside my veil; my offspring is the sun.' Both *Plutarch* and *Proclus* mention this inscription, though with some difference of language; and it is so consonant to the mythological spirit of the Egyptians, that notwithstanding the silence of the more ancient writers who treat of their theology, its authenticity may be easily admitted.

If this be allowed, and if at the same time it be granted, (as the learned Jablonski, in his Egyptian Pantheon, maintains,) that Neitha and Pthas were only different names for the same divinity, this inscription will be a strong confirmation of the opinion, that the Egyptians acknowledged the existence of an active intelligence, the cause of all things, whose nature is incomprehensible. On the whole, notwithstanding what has been advanced in support of the contrary opinion by Porphyry and others, it appears highly probable that the ancient Egyptians acknowledged an active as well as a passive principle in nature, and as Plutarch asserts, *worshipped* τῷ πρώτῳ θεῷ, *the supreme* Deity."*

"Now it is certain," observes the learned Cudworth, "that the Egyptians, besides their vulgar and fabulous theology, (which is for the most part that which Diodorus Siculus describes,) had another arcane and recondite theology, that was concealed from the vulgar, and communicated only to the kings and such priests and others as were thought capable thereof; these two theologies of theirs differing, as Aristotle's Exotericks and Acroamaticks. Thus much is plainly declared by Origen, whose very name was Egyptian, it being interpreted *Horo-genitus*, (which Horus was an Egyptian god,) upon the occasion of Celsus boasting that he thoroughly understood all that belonged to Christianity.

"Celsus (saith he) seemeth here to me to do just as if a man travelling into Egypt, where the wise men of the Egyptians, according to their country learning, philosophize much about those things that are accounted by them divine, whilst the idiots, in the meantime, hearing only certain fables, which they know not the meaning of, are very much pleased therewith: *Celsus*, I say, doth as if such a sojourner in Egypt, who had conversed only with these idiots, and not been at all instructed by any of the priests in their arcane and recondite mysteries, should boast that he knew all that belonged to the Egyptian theology.

"The same Origen also adds, that this was not a

* Enfield's Brucker, b. i., c. viii., p. 44, Lond. 1837.

thing proper to the Egyptians only, to have such an arcane and true theology, distinct from their vulgar and fabulous one, but common with them to the Persians, Syrians, and other barbarian Pagans.

"What we have now affirmed (saith he) concerning the difference betwixt the wise men and the idiots among the Egyptians, the same may be said also of the Persians, among whom the religious rites are performed rationally by those that are ingenious, whilst the superficial vulgar look no further in the observation of them than the external symbol or ceremony. And the same is true, likewise, concerning the Syrians and Indians, and all those other nations who have, besides their religious fables, a learning and doctrine."*

"Now, as it is reasonable to think, that in all those Pagan nations where there was another theology besides the vulgar, the principal part thereof was the doctrine of *one supreme and universal Deity, the* maker of the whole world, so can it not well be conceived what this arcane, and mysterious, and enigmatic theology of the Egyptians, so much talked of, should be other than a kind of metaphysics concerning God, as *one perfect incorporeal Being, the* Original of all things."†

"Every nation, then, (says Mosheim,) had its respective gods, over which presided one more excellent than the rest; yet, in such a manner that this Supreme Deity was himself controlled by the rigid empire of the fates, or what the philosophers called eternal necessity."‡

Sir William Jones, speaking of the Chinese, says: "Of the religious opinions entertained by Confucius and his followers, we may glean a general notion from the fragments of their works, translated by *Couplet:* they professed a firm belief in the Supreme God, and gave a demonstration of his being, and of his providence, from the exquisite beauty and perfection of the celestial bodies, and the wonderful order observable in

* Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe, b. i., c. iv, p. 314.

† Ibid., b. i., c. iv., p. 317.

‡ Mosheim's Ecclesias. Hist., b. i., c. i., s. vii., p. 23, Lond. 1806.

the whole fabric of nature in the visible world. From this belief they deduced a system of ethics, which the philosopher sums up in a few words, at the close of the *Lun-yù*: 'He,' (says Confucius,) 'who shall be fully persuaded that the Lord of heaven governs the universe—who shall in all things choose moderation, who shall perfectly know his own species, and so act among them that his life and manners may conform to his knowledge of God and man, may be truly said to discharge all the duties of a sage, and to be far exalted above the common herd of the human race.'"*

The late learned Godfrey Higgins, in relation to this subject, observes, "Few persons have exhibited more learning or ingenuity on the subject of the ancient worship than Mr. Bryant and M. Dupuis: and whatever opinion people may entertain of different parts of their works, or of some of their hypotheses, yet they can scarcely refuse assent to their general assertions, that all the religions of antiquity, at least in their origin, are found to centre in the worship of the sun, either as God the Creator himself, or as the seat of, or as the emblem of, the Creator.

"Socrates, Pythagoras, Plato, Zoroaster or Zeradusht, &c., and all those initiated in the most secret mysteries, acknowledged one supreme God, the Lord and First Cause of all. And, perhaps, though it can never be certainly known, those who only received the lesser mysteries might confine their worship to the sun, and the host of heaven; but it was only the vulgar and ignorant who bent the knee to the stone, wood, or metal idols of the gods, perhaps only a little more numerous than the images of the Christian saints.

"It has, until lately, been the general opinion, that the gods of the ancients were nothing but the heroes or the benefactors of mankind, living in very illiterate and remote ages, to whom a grateful posterity paid divine honours. This appears at first sight to be probable; and as it has served the purpose of the Christian priests, to enable them to run down the religion of the ancients, and in exposing its absurdities, to contrast it

* Seventh Discourse on the Chinese. Asiat. Res., vol. ii., p. 377.

disadvantageously with their own, it has been, and continues to be, sedulously inculcated in every public and private seminary."

"Although the pretended worship of heroes appears at first sight plausible, very little depth of thought or learning is requisite to discover that it has not much foundation in truth. It was not in the infant state of society, that men were worshipped; it was not, on the contrary until they arrived at a very high and advanced state of civilization. It was not Moses, Zeradusht, Confucius, Socrates, Solon, Lycurgus, Plato, Pythagoras, or Numa, that were objects of worship; the benefactors of mankind in all ages have been oftener persecuted than worshipped. No, divine honours (if such they can be called) were reserved for Alexander of Macedon, the drunkard, for Augustus Cæsar, the hypocrite, or Heliogabalus, the lunatic. A species of civil adoration, despised by all persons of common understanding, and essentially different from the worship of the supreme Being, was paid to them. It was the vice of the moment, and soon passed away. How absurd to suppose that the elegant and enlightened Athenian philosopher could worship Hercules, because he killed a lion, or cleaned a stable! or Bacchus, because he made wine, or got drunk! Besides, these deified heroes can hardly be called gods, in any sense. They were more like the Christian saints. Thus we have Divus Augustus, and Divus Paulus, and Divus Petrus.*

These testimonies of learned men as to the purity of the mystical doctrine of the ancients, are founded on an immense mass of historical proof. The limits of our publication prohibit us from pursuing this inquiry much further at present. Let it suffice to observe, that the saintly advocates of superstition anathematize Robert Owen and his followers, because they assert that observed facts have not yet taught us what the Deity actually is. Now, the very men who thus rail against the Socialists, because they are candid enough to acknowledge that they cannot comprehend that which the Christians themselves acknowledge to be in-

* Anacalypsis, vol. i., c. iii., p. 43.

comprehensible,* have the temerity to assert, in defiance of historical proof, in defiance of their own most learned writers, and in defiance of the most glaring improbabilities, that the ancients were all Polytheists, and that a revelation was absolutely necessary to enable them to form adequate conceptions of the magnificence of the Deity. I subjoin a few specimens of the magnificent imagery of the heathen poets and philosophers, when speaking of the Deity, placed in juxtaposition with the degrading and localizing descriptions of the divine Being given us in that most convenient book, "the Bible."

*Ζευς κεφαλε, Ζευς μεσσα Διος δ' εκ παντα τετυκται*—Jove is the head and middle of all things; all things were made out of Jove.—*Proclus.*

"In the book De Mundo, translated by Apuleius, we have these lines:"

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέραυνος,
Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα· Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται·
Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζευς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη·
Ζεὺς πύθμην γαίης τὰ καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστρόεντος·
Ζεὺς πνοὴ πάντων· Ζεὺς ἀκάματα πυρὸς ὀρμή·
Ζεὺς πόνου ῥίζα· Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη·
Ζεὺς βασιλεύς· Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἁπάντων ἀρχιγένεθλος·
Ἓν κράτος εἷς Δαίμων γένετο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων·
Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τάδε σώματι κεῖται.

"Jupiter, the lofty thunderer, is the first, and the last, and the middle; all

בראשית ברא אלהים את השמים ואת הארץ

Berasit bara Aleim at essamim uat earej.†
Bereshith Bara Elohim eth hashamayim weth harrettz‡

In the beginning, God (produced, formed, devised, or) created the heavens and the earth.

"It would be difficult to imagine a more singular history, than that which relates to the construction of the tabernacle and of the temple, contained in the Old Testament. The Deity is represented as giving the pattern of both; as ordering the whole furniture; and as descending to the most minute details concerning the arrangement. Nothing is left unnoticed by the divine Architect, who condescends to speak with amazing precision and familiarity,

* The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible; yet there are not three incomprehensibles, but one incomprehensible.—*Athanasian Creed, alias Sheer Nonsense.*

† Parkhurst's Heb. Gram., p. 6. ‡ Lee's Bib. Sacrā Polyglotta.

things proceed from him: the immortal Jupiter is both male and female: the spacious earth and starry heavens are Jupiter: Jupiter is the breath of all things, the irresistible energy of fire, and the source of the sea: Jupiter is king: he is the parent of all: there is one power, one divinity, one ruler of all; for all things are contained within the vast body of Jupiter." — *Enfield's Hist. Phil.* b. ii., c. ii., p. 65.

"We will sacrifice," says Porphyry, "but in a manner that is proper, bringing choice victims with the choicest of our faculties; burning and offering to God, who, as a wise man observed, is above all—nothing sensual: for nothing is joined to matter which is not impure; and, therefore, incongruous to a nature free from the contagion belonging to matter; for which reason, neither speech, which is produced by the voice, nor even internal or mental language, if it be infected with any disorder of the mind, is proper to be offered to God; but we worship God with an unspotted silence, and the most pure thoughts of his nature."—*Porphyry, quoted by Vallency, in* vol. iii., p. 466, *of his Collectanea, which is quoted by Higgins, Anacalypsis,* vol. i., p. 46.

The Rev. Dr. Collyer, in both of the ornaments and of the utensils,—of lintels, curtains, fringes, rings, tongs, tables, dishes, bowls, spoons, and candlesticks.* This, however, is not all. The tabernacle and the temple were inhabited by the Deity. The God of nature and of the universe—the Creator and the Preserver of all things—the ineffable and primordial Being who called into existence all those suns and planets which roll through the boundless regions of space—the sole God fixed his residence on a box of shittim wood, overlaid and lined with gold. Upon this box, too, the Deity was carried about, by a barbarous horde of robbers, until king Solomon built a temple at Jerusalem, where the box was deposited, and where Jehovah dwelt between the cherubim. And what where these cherubim? They were whimsical and monstrous images, each with four wings and four faces; the face of a man, the face of a lion, the face of an ox, and the face of an eagle.—*Sir William Drummond's Œdipus Judaicus*, p. 119.

"The whole of this history, if taken literally, is surely very strange and astonishing."—*Ibid.*

"It may be, I admit, historically true that Moses constructed a tabernacle, and

* They ought to have represented him as giving directions for snuffing the candles; it would have been sublime.

his lectures, gives the following account of the opinions of Pythagoras, whom he makes to say, "God is neither the object of sense, nor subject to passion; but invisible, only intelligible, and supremely intelligent. In his body he is like the light, and in his soul he resembles truth. He is the universal Spirit that pervades and diffuseth itself over all nature. All beings receive their life from him. There is but one only God, who is not, as some are apt to imagine, seated above the world, beyond the orb of the universe; but being himself all in all, he sees all the beings that fill his immensity, the only Principle, the light of heaven, the Father of all. He produces everything, he orders and disposes everything; he is the reason, the life, and the motion of all beings." These are the notions which Pythagoras has left us of the Deity. How beautiful!—Lec. xii., p. 499, *as quoted by Higgins, Celtic Druids*, c. iv., s. vi., p. 126.

"Should I any longer insist upon such brutish persons as those, the wise and sober might justly condemn me, as defiling this holy oration, which I compose as a true hymn to the praise of him that made us; I conceiving true piety and religion towards God to consist in this, not that I should sacrifice many Hecatombs. or burn much incense to him, but that I should myself first acknowledge, and then declare that Solomon built a temple; but I cannot persuade myself that the Deity inhabited either the one or the other, or that God at any time ceased to be omnipresent to the world which he had made. I conceive the tabernacle and the temple to have been types of the universe, which is the true abode of the godhead. Typically speaking, then, the tabernacle and temple were the residence of the divine Majesty; and, in truth, it seems to me inconceivable, that men in an age like this should seriously believe that the sacred writers meant literally, that the God of the universe was cooped up in a temple at Jerusalem, or anywhere else."—*Ibid.*, p. 123.

"Who indeed that has any just notions of the supreme Being, can believe that the Deity did in fact either sit down to breakfast with Abraham, or talk to Moses about pans and shovels, and flesh-hooks and fire-pans? Who can believe that the eternal and unchangeable God did that in anger one day, for which he was sorry the next? If these things be taken literally, there can be nothing more inconsistent with true theology; and most surely we should be the first to laugh, if an Indian were tell us that his God was so very apt to change his mind."—*Ibid.*, p. 125.

"And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man

clare to others, how great his power, and how great his goodness. For that he would adorn the whole world after this manner, envying to nothing that good which it was capable of, I conclude to be a demonstration of most absolute goodness, and thus let him be praised by us as good. And that he was able to find out, how all things might be adorned after the best manner, is a sign of the greatest wisdom in him. And lastly, to be able to effect and bring to pass all those things which he had thus decreed, argues an insuperable power.—*Galen De Usa Partium*, lib. iii., p. 402.

It will be too bad for any one to argue that Galen was a Christian. Claudius Galen was born at Pergamus, in Asia, in 131, during the reign of Adrian.

Esse præstantem aliquam, Æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam Admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri;—that there is some most excellent and eternal nature, which is to be admired and honoured by mankind, the beauty of the world and the order of the heavenly bodies compel us to confess.—*Cicero De Divin.*, b. ii.

That Anaxogoras maintained an infinite mind to be the author of all motion and life, is attested by many an-

speaketh unto his friend."—*Exodus* c. xxxiii., v. 11.

And he said, thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me and live.

And the Lord said, behold, there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock.

And it shall come to pass, while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in a cleft of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by:

And I will take away mine hand, and thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall not be seen.*—*Ib.*, ver. 20, 21, 22, and 23.

In my distress I called upon the Lord, and cried unto my God: he heard my voice out of his temple, and my cry came before him, even into his ears.

Then the earth shook and trembled: the foundations also of the hills moved and were shaken, because he was wroth.

There went up a smoke out of his nostrils, and fire out of his mouth devoured: coals were kindled by it.

He bowed the heavens also, and came down: and darkness was under his feet.

And he rode upon a cherub, and did fly; yea, he did fly upon the wings of the wind.—*Psalm* xviii., ver. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

This has been thought very fine; the very beau ideal of poetic composition. But reflect a moment on its sublimity. Think of the infinite Deity that pervades the uni-

* How monstrous to suppose that the God of heaven has buttocks, and how impious to suppose he exhibited them to man!

cient authorities. Plato expressly asserts, that Anaxagoras taught the existence of "a disposing mind, the cause of all things." Aristotle gives it as his doctrine that mind is the first principle of all things, pure, simple, and unmixed; that it possesses within itself the united powers of thought and motion; and that it gives motion to the universe, and is the cause of whatever is fair and good. Plutarch confirms this account of the doctrine of Anaxagoras, and shows wherein it differed from that of his predecessors. "The Ionic philosophers," says he, "who appeared before Anaxagoras, made fortune, or blind necessity—that is, the fortuitous or necessary motion of the particles of matter—the first principle in nature; but Anaxagoras affirmed that a pure mind, perfectly free from all material concretions, governs the universe."—*Enf. Hist. Phil.*, b. ii., c. iii., p. 87.

Socrates acknowledged a Deity, not in the manner the multitude acknowledge. "He taught that the supreme Being, though invisible, is clearly seen in his works, which at once demonstrate his existence, and his wise and benevolent providence." In addition to the supreme Being whose existence was admitted by almost all the heathen philosophers, Socrates believed or pretended to believe in the minor deities. "Socrates," says Xenophon, "considered that gods know all things. The things which

verse—the unchangeable—the everlasting—the I am—astride on a cherub, (a monstrous animal,) flying over the surface of this little globe, which dwindles into insignificance, when contrasted with the mighty worlds which revolve through immensity. Think of his nostrils breathing out smoke—his mouth fire, and then say whether David's portrait of the Divinity or that of Pythagoras be the most sublime.

And they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God amongst the trees of the garden.—*Gen.* chap. iii. ver. 8. It is difficult to ascertain whether the foregoing passage means that the voice of the Lord God was walking, or that the Lord God was walking himself, and that Adam and Eve heard his voice. If the former, it is singular enough; and if the latter, the passage derogates from the dignity of an omnipresent Being. The voice of the Lord walking. Prodigious! Just taking a trip among the shady bowers of Paradise, to give it an appetite for its dinner. How wonderful! It is evident that the writers of the blessed Scriptures imagined the Deity to be such an one as themselves; and though in many instances they give us exalted descriptions of the divine Power, they disfigure those

are spoken and done, and the things which are meditated in silence. That they are present everywhere, and give signs to men concerning human affairs."*

"Though in compliance with the popular opinion, and in a vulgar way, the great men of antiquity spoke of the Godhead in the plural number; yet, upon all solemn occasions, when they mentioned the Godhead with any gravity and emphasis, it was by the name of τὸ Δαιμόνιον ὁ Θέος; or *Deus* Optimus Mamimus." God is the greatest and best. "Though the unity of the Godhead be as demonstrable as its existence, and though this principle was embraced not only by many private men and sects of philosophers, but by whole nations of antiquity; yet flattery to the memories of their benefactors, the interest of priests, the ignorance of mankind, and many other causes had introduced Polytheism into the national religion of the greatest part of the world."—*Moyle's Works*, vol. i., *Essay, Rom. Gov.*, part I, p. 14.

descriptions by a profusion of absurd images. If the writers of the Bible intended their narrations to be understood literally, they were, (as are all who understand them literally,) anthropomorphites. How ridiculous to be told in one place, that "God is a spirit," and in other places to have him represented as "a lion" and "a bear," a "jealous God" and "a consuming fire;" or, to use the language of Dr. Watts:

"His nostrils breathe out fiery streams,
He's a consuming fire;
His jealous eye his wrath inflames,
And raise his vengeance high'r."

In Genesis xviii. we are informed that the Lord appeared to Abraham, and that the patriarch invited the Almighty to eat some veal and cakes, and butter and milk, which was certainly very hospitable on the part of the old Gentleman. And we are informed that the Lord or the three men replied, "So do as thou hast said." If this be understood literally, it needs no comment.

These testimonies warrant us in asserting that the philosophers of antiquity believed that "*Deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus immistum*,"† God is a spirit mingled with and diffused through all parts of the world. We may therefore justly infer that they believed in the unity of the supreme Being; that they have left upon record the most sublime descriptions of his character, and that there was no necessity for a revelation to afford them further information on the subject.

* Xenoph. Mem., lib. i., c. i. † M. Fabius Quintil. l. vii., c. iii.

# FRAGMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF DIFFERENT NATIONS.

## *Marriage among the Hebrews.*

MARRIAGE signifies a wedding, a nuptial feast, or when combined with other words, the state of matrimony. Among the Hebrews, the word משתה *mishtheh*, derived probably from שתה *shathah*, to drink, and among the Latins the phrase *nuptiæ convivium*, signified a marriage feast in particular, or a feast in general. The Greeks used Γαμος *gamos* in the same sense to signify a wedding, and the festivities which usually accompany it.

"The Hebrews," says Calmet, "generally married young. Whoever is not married at eighteen or twenty, say the rabbins, offends against the commandment given by God, to increase and multiply and replenish the earth. They may anticipate this age, but not exceed it. After thirteen years they may marry, and they think a man cannot live in celibacy without sin, or at least without great danger of sin. The virgins are contracted very early; but are not married till they complete their twelfth year; whence come those expressions, *the spouse of one's youth*, Prov. ii. 17; or, one espoused in early life; also *the guide of one's youth*, expressing a husband married young."*

"Maids, before their marriage, seldom appeared in public. They were called *Almah*, virgin, secret, shut up. Often they were sought in marriage without having seen the persons who desired them. Jesus, son of Sirach, says, Eccles. xlii., 2, "The father waketh for a daughter, when no man knoweth, and care for her taketh away sleep; when she is young, lest she pass away the flower of her age; and being married, lest she should be hated."†

Probably St. Paul had something like the foregoing in view, when he wrote the 7th chapter of his 1st

* Calmet's Dictionary, vol. ii., article, Marriage. † Ibid.

Epistle to the Corinthians. The 36th, 37th, and 38th verses in the original run thus:

Εἰ δέ τις ἀσχημονεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν παρθένον αὐτοῦ νομίζει, ἐὰν ᾖ ὑπέρακμος, καὶ οὕτως ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι· ὃ θέλει ποιείτω, οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει· γαμείτωσαν.

Ὃς δὲ ἕστηκεν ἑδραῖος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, μὴ ἔχων ἀνάγκην, ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἔχει περὶ τοῦ ἰδίου θελήματος, καὶ τοῦτο κέκρικεν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ τηρεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παρθένον, καλῶς ποιεῖ.

Ὥστε καὶ ὁ ἐκγαμίζων καλῶς ποιεῖ ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐκγαμίζων κρεῖσσον ποιεῖ.*

Thus rendered by Daniel Mace:†—"If any man thinks it would be a reflexion upon his manhood to be a stale bachelor, and so ought to marry; let him follow his bent, he is at liberty, let such marry."

"But he that has been steady in his purpose, and finds no necessity to alter it; if he is master of his passion, and is heartily determined to keep his virginity, it is well."

"So that he who marries does well; but he who lives single, may have less trouble."

The original is differently rendered in our English version. The 36th verse runs:—"But if any man think that he behaveth uncomely toward his virgin, if she pass the flower of her age, and need so require, let him do what he will, he sinneth not: let them marry."‡

I cannot school my mind to think that Paul displayed either good taste, or superhuman wisdom, in representing the Deity as stooping from the throne of his beneficence, to inform mankind, that if they did not wish to be "*stale, old* bachelors," they were not under any obligation to lead a life of celibacy.

Women were purchased among the Hebrews, or rather, the husband gave a dowry to the woman he desired to marry. This custom is frequently alluded to in the Jewish scriptures. Jacob, we are told,

* Vide Bloomfield's Greek Testament.

† Greek and English Testament, by Daniel Mace, Lond. 1729.

‡ Halloo! old bachelors, hear this. It has been announced from heaven that if any of you think you cannot do without a wife, you are at liberty to take one. This is of great importance, and the very quintessence of sublimity. What queer things have been revealed!

served seven years for Leah, and seven years more for her sister Rachael, (Gen. chap. xxix.) "And the sisters complain some years after, that their father Laban had applied their portions to his own use," (Gen. chap. xxxi. ver. 15) "The rabbins," says Calmet, "assure us, that the father was used to give his daughter certain presents for clothes and other necessaries. This was fixed at fifty *zuzim*, which was a piece of money of one fourth part of a shekel."

The Israelitish women were betrothed either by a piece of silver given to the bride, or by a writing, or by cohabitation. I copy from Calmet's Dictionary the form of the writing: "On such a day, of such a month, in such a year, ——— the son of ——— have said to ——— the daughter of ——— be thou my spouse according to the law of Moses and the Israelites, and I will give thee for the portion of thy virginity, the sum of two hundred *zuzim*, as is ordained by the law. And the said ——— has consented to become his spouse upon these conditions, which the said ——— has promised to perform on the day of marriage. To this the said ——— obliges himself, and for this he engages all his goods, even as far as the cloak that he wears upon his shoulder. Moreover, he promises to perform all that is generally intended in contracts of marriage, in favour of the Israelitish women."

Witnesses, — — —

When a young woman was betrothed by a piece of silver and without writing, the young man said to the young woman, in the presence of witnesses, "Receive this piece of silver as a pledge that you shall become my spouse." After the young couple were betrothed, they were allowed to see each other, which was not permitted before; and if, during the time elapsing from the betrothment to the consummation of the marriage, the female should violate the marriage laws, she was treated as an adulteress.* "The Jewish doctors teach that if those who are betrothed should make an ill use

* Selden, Uxor. Heb., lib. ii., cap. i.

of their liberty of seeing each other, they are condemned to the punishment of the whip." A considerable interval often elapsed between the time of being espoused and that of being married." But when the parties were agreed on, the terms of marriage and the time was fitting to complete it, they drew up a contract in the following manner, which I copy from Calmet.

*Form of the Contract of Marriage among the Hebrews.*

On such a day, of such a month, in such a year, and upon the banks of such a river, (for they commonly married in the open air, and by the side of some river,) N., son of N., said to N., daughter of N., be thou my wife according to the rites of Moses and the Israelites. And with the help of God I will honour thee, maintain thee, clothe thee, and feed thee, according to the custom of other husbands of our nation; who honour, maintain, clothe, and feed their wives, as they ought to do. I give thee for a portion and for the price of thy virginity, two hundred zuzim of silver, (these two hundred zuzim make about fifty shekels of silver,) which are due to thee according to the law. Besides which, I engage myself to provide thee with clothes, and convenient food, as also to discharge that conjugal duty which is due to thee, according to the custom of all nations.

And the said N. has consented to become his spouse. Moreover, the said bridegroom has proposed by way of augmentation of dowry, that besides the principal sum he will give ——. And what the said bride has brought with her is estimated at the value of ——, which the said bridegroom acknowledges to have received and to charge himself with, and has made us the declaration following. "I accept and receive under my care and keeping all that is above-mentioned, as well for dowry as on any other account; and oblige myself and my heirs, under the security of all my goods, whether moveable or not, present or to come, even to the cloak that I wear upon my shoulders, to give a true and faithful account to my said spouse, of

all that she has brought me as a dowry, or on any other account during my life, or at my death. All which I promise to put in execution, according to the form and tenor of the usual contracts of marriage in use among the children of Israel, and according to the rules of our rabbins of pious memory, in testimony of which we have signed these presents," &c. &c.

"Leo of Modena says, that the Jews marry on a Wednesday or a Friday if the spouse be a maid, on a Thursday if she be a widow. The evening before the solemnity, several women lead the bride to the bath with music. There is some disagreement between Selden, Buxtorf, and Leo of Modena, on the subject of marriage ceremonies; which shews that customs vary according to persons and places. The bride is adorned with everything rich and splendid, and is led into the open air, either on the banks of a river, into a court or a garden. Sometimes this is performed in a hall prepared on purpose. The bridegroom and bride are placed under a canopy, each covered with a black veil. On their heads is put another square veil, having four tufts hanging at the four corners. This veil the Hebrews call *Jaled.*"

"Then the rabbin of the place, or the chanter of the synagogue, or the nearest relation of the husband, takes a cup of wine, and having pronounced this benediction, *Blessed be thou, O Lord, who has created man and woman, and ordained marriage, &c.*, he presents the cup to the bridegroom, and then to the bride, who taste it. Afterwards the bridegroom puts a ring on the finger of his bride, in presence of two witnesses, saying, *By this ring thou art my spouse, according to the custom of Moses and the children of Israel.* Buxtorf says that this ring ought to be of plain gold; and that the bridegroom takes the company to witness, that it is good gold, and of a due value. After this they read the contract of marriage, which the bridegroom delivers to the bride's relations. Then they bring wine again in some brittle vessel, (a wine glass;) they rehearse six blessings, they make the married couple drink, (to each other,) and they throw the rest on the ground in token of cheerfulness. The

bridegroom, (or priest,) takes the vessel, and throws it with violence against the ground, or against the wall, and breaks it in pieces, in memory, they say, of the destruction of the temple, (or perhaps imprecating a similar destruction on whoever disturbs the harmony of this married pair.)"

According to the Jewish rabbins, both thebridegroom and bride wore crowns at their marriage before the destruction of the temple of Jerusalem; but since that event the custom has ceased. "The head-dress of the women was not the most convenient for wearing a crown," if we believe the words of Calmet. These customs are alluded to in Isa. chap. lxi. ver. 10.

Καὶ εὐφροσύνη εὐφρανθήσονται ἐπὶ κύριον. Αγαλλιάθω ἡ ψυχή μου ἐπὶ τῷ κυρίῳ· ἐνέδυσε γάρ με ἱμάτιον σωτηρίου, καὶ χιτῶνα εὐφροσύνης ὡς νυμφίῳ περίθηκέ μοι μίτραν, καὶ ὡς νύμφην κατεκόσμησέ με κόσμῳ.

Gaudens gaudebo in Domino, et exultibat anima mea in Deo meo: quia induit me vestimentis salutis: et indumento justitiæ circumdedit me, quasi sponsum decoratum corona et quasi sponsam ornatum monilibus suis.*

I will greatly rejoice in the Lord, my soul shall be joyful in my God: for he hath clothed me with the garments of salvation, he hath covered me with the robe of righteousness, as a bridegroom decketh himself with ornaments, and as a bride adorneth herself with jewels.†

In the book of Canticles the same custom is alluded to.

Egredimini et videte filiæ Sion regem Salomonem in diademate, quo coronavit illum mater sua in die desponsationis illius et in die lætitiæ cordis ejus.‡

Go forth, ye daughters of Sion, and see king Solomon with the crown which his mother crowned him with, on the day of his marriage contract, on the day of his heart's rejoicing.§

* See the Vulgate.

† Authorized version.

‡ Vulgate, (canticum canticorum,) c. iii., v. 11.

§ Purver's translation, London, 1764.

"I understand," says Calmet, "that in token of the captive state of the Jews, the Jewish brides have much of their hair cut off, which is a very painful ceremony to the young women. The modern Jews, in some places, throw handsful of wheat on the newly married couple, particularly on the bride, saying, *increase and multiply*. In other places they mingle pieces of money with the wheat, which are gathered up by the poor."*

The nuptial ceremonies generally lasted three days for a widow and seven days for a maid. Probably, in allusion to this custom, *Laban* said to Jacob, respecting Leah, "Fulfil her week of this, and we will give to thee also this for the service which thou shalt serve with me yet other seven years."†

This conjecture may be correct, provided the history of Jacob be interpreted literally, but incorrect if it be considered an astronomical allegory, which latter opinion is extremely probable.‡

"The rabbins say that the term of seven days was of indispensable obligation to all married men; and that they were to allow seven days for the marriage of every wife they took, though they should marry several the same day. In this case they made so many wedding weeks successively, as they married wives. These seven days of rejoicing were commonly spent in the house of the woman's father, after which they conducted the bride to her husband's home."

This part of the ceremony was celebrated with great splendour; and when the married couple and their relations had arrived at the house, they sat down at table, and the bridegroom (according to Buxtorf) began to sing a long blessing in Hebrew, in as good style as his vocal abilities would allow.§ "After supper the most esteemed person took the bridegroom by the

* Calmet's Dictionary, article, Marriage.

† Vide Greenfield's literal translation of Genesis.

‡ See Sir William Drummond's dissertation on the forty ninth chapter of Genesis, in the Œdipus Judaicus, or in the sixth number of the Classical Journal.

§ Synag Jud., c. xxviii.

hand, and the rest all round, and they began to dance together. The women likewise did the same, but separately from the men. This dancing is a very ancient tradition among them; they call it the dance of the commandment; pretending that God himself commanded it in the ceremony of marriage."

"The leading the bride into the marrige chamber is, in the opinion of the rabbins, what completes the marriage. The woman is then a complete bride, as soon as she is entered into the chamber, even though the marriage has not been consummated: as it happens when the woman is under the inconveniencies attending her sex. Before the leading of the bride into the marriage chamber, they rehearse the following blessing, in the presence of ten persons of age sufficient, and free. *Be thou blessed, O Lord our God, king of the world, who hast created all things for thy glory. Be thou blessed, O Lord our God, creator of man. Be thou blessed, O Lord our God, who hast created man in thy own image and likeness, and hast provided him a companion for ever. Be thou blessed, O Lord our God, creator of man. She that was barren shall rejoice in gathering her children into her bosom. Be thou blessed, O Lord our God, who makest Sion rejoice in the multitude of her children. Replenish with joy these two spouses, as thou didst replenish man and woman in the Garden of Eden. Be thou blessed, O Lord our God, who heapest pleasure on the bridegroom and the bride, and hast prepared for them joy, songs, gladness, dancing, love, friendship, peace, and brotherly kindness. Grant, O Lord, as soon as may be, that in the cities of Judah and in the places of Jerusalem may be heard songs of joy, the voice of the bridegroom and the voice of the bride, the voice of the mutual love of spouses, and the voice of singing children. Be thou blessed, O Lord our God, who replenishest with joy the bridegroom and the bride."**

* Calmet's Dictionary, vol. ii., article, Marriage.

# PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

## ESSAY I.

### *On Metaphysical Inquiries, and the Spirit in which they should be conducted.*

Wherefore, bidding farewell to the honours of the multitude, and having my eye upon truth, I will really endeavour, as far as I am able, to live in the best manner I can, and, when I die, to die so.—PLATO.

*Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, magis tamen amica veritas.*
I respect Plato, and I respect Socrates, but I respect truth still more.—ARISTOTLE.

A DISPASSIONATE turn of mind is indispensably requisite to enable the philosopher to discover truth. If passion, interest, or prejudice exercise dominion over him, his faculties are liable to become confused, his conceptions to grow misty, and the conclusions at which he arrives to be false. If his conclusions, in such a case, should be correct, it must be attributed more to chance than to patient examination. It is an exception to a general rule, the realization of which we are not warranted to expect in every instance. Attachment to a theory or a system, unless that attachment be founded on previous research and elaborate investigation, is a bad disposition to start with in the pursuit of abstract truth. Such unphilosophical partiality to our own opinions tends to bias our judgments in their favour, and perhaps insensibly inclines us to pass by, without much examination, the arguments which may be urged against them, or to condemn those arguments as invalid and worthless. A passage which occurs in Arnobius is both exceedingly judicious in itself and appropriate to this subject. It runs thus:

Quid est enim quod humana ingenia labefactare studio contradictionis non audeant? Quamvis illud quod infirmare moliuntur, sit purum, et liquidum

et veritatis obsignatione munitum? Aut quid rursus asserere verisimilibus argumentis non queunt, quamvis sit apertissimè falsum, quamvis evidens, manifestumque mendacium? Cum enim sibi persuaserit quis esse aliquid, aut non esse, amat quod opinatur asserere, et acumine alios anteire, maximè si agatur res summota, et abdita, et caligine involuta naturæ.*

"Where," (saith he,) "is the opinion, so rational, and so plausible, that the spirit of controversy cannot shake it? Can any position be so absurd, as to render specious arguments incapable of supporting it? When a person is once convinced either of the truth or of the falsity of anything, he immediately, from a passion for disputation, becomes attached to his own idea, and soon seeks solely to acquire a superiority over his adversary, by dint of the powers of the imagination, and by subtlety; especially when some obscure question, involved by its nature in darkness, is the point in debate."†

The sentiments advanced by Arnobius in this passage are excellent, and characteristic of their author's good sense. Controversial writers and oral disputants, whilst they appear to be animated solely by the love of truth, are but too frequently stimulated to action by the desire of obtaining a victory over their opponent. Yet how paltry a thing does a triumph of this nature appear to the philosopher! The sincere inquirer after truth, the patient examiner of nature, esteems it but of secondary importance, and regards with a smile of pity and indulgence those children of vanity and affectation who pique themselves on the acquirement of such ephemeral and contemptible honours. A discussional triumph alters not the nature of the principles or doctrines which may have been discussed. It only shews that the victor is more shrewd, more talented, or more learned than his antagonist; that he is able to bewilder him in the mazes of sophistry, or overwhelm him with a torrent of rhetorical declamation. But this affects not truth in its vital parts, nor does it alter the doctrines which may have been the subject of debate.

* Arnobius, l. ii. † Vide Ess. Pub. Happ., vol. i., p. 344.

It is true that truth may suffer, and frequently does, through the incapacity of its advocate; but it only suffers relatively to those who hear the discussion, or who peruse the controversy. A principle that is true can never be rendered false by the sophistry of a shrewd and subtle disputant, nor can a principle that is false ever be rendered true by ever so great a multitude of ingenious reasonings. We can only observe appearances, and from the data thus collected deduce conclusions; but these conclusions by no means alter the doctrines to which they relate—they are only satisfactory to us as it regards the truth or falsity of our principles.

How frequently do we hear individuals boasting, in strains of the most fulsome self-complacency, of having obtained a discussional triumph, when, in all probability, that triumph derived its principal lustre from the incapacity of the opponent, or from collateral circumstances over which he had no control. Such individuals are more to be pitied than condemned. Desirous of distinction, they adopt wrong methods of obtaining it; and, wreathing their brows with fancied laurels, they are subsequently made unhappy by having those laurels torn from them by the grasp of superior talent, or by beholding them wither and perish before the first rude breath of wind or touch of sultry sunbeam.

In every historical and philosophical investigation, a love of truth is indispensably requisite. Unless we be influenced by this holy and divine passion, our barks are liable to be wrecked on some of the numerous rocks and quicksands of error with which the ocean of knowledge abounds. Cool and sober reasoning, and an ardent desire to avoid what is false, are more especially requisite in metaphysical inquiries. These, by their very nature, are obscure to the generality of people. The very exility of the subjects to which metaphysical reasoning is applicable, renders them difficult of comprehension; from whence, perhaps, it results, that the science of mind is at present involved in more obscurity than any other branch of speculative philosophy.

Some individuals assure us, that metaphysical reasoning is of little importance to mankind. Such persons are generally smatterers and dabblers in philosophy, who, not having judgment to discriminate between the abuse of the science and the science itself, reject it altogether. In a work recently published, the title-page is disfigured with the sentence, "Let us have conviction from facts, but no more metaphysics," as if it was possible for the mental process, the ultimate result of which is the being convinced of the truth or untruth of anything, to occur without the objects to which metaphysics relate being in existence.

"Metaphysics is that science," observes a modern writer, "which treats of objects that are inaccessible to the senses; in contradistinction to physics, which precisely comprehend all objects that can in any way manifest themselves to the senses. The former is derived from the Greek words, μετα, *above*, and φυσικα, *natural;* while the latter originates from the single word φυσικα, natural."

"Physics take into consideration all bodies in time and space, together with their properties, and the effects produced by them on each other, which includes motion, action, and reaction. Metaphysics takes into consideration all objects that are supersensible, or that are out of the sphere of time and space, but yet obtrude themselves on the human mind: for instance, the soul, the Deity, a future state, religion and morality, and, indeed, all objects about which human reason is conversant, but which can never address the senses."*

"Now, as it is of importance that man should be satisfied on these points—that he should know whether there be a Deity, a future state of being, an immaterial and immortal soul, or not; and, as these things can only be determined relatively to our own satisfaction by metaphysical reasonings, the importance of such a mode of inquiry becomes evident. Indeed, a contempt of the science generally springs from an overweening conceit, and, as far as it predominates,

* Encyc. Lond., vol. xv., p. 198.

tends to foster innumerable errors. "Every man is born a metaphysician." For who is there who has not, at some time, reflected on his moral duties, his own nature, his future destination in this world, as well as a supposed residence in the next? But these are objects, or abstractions. which do not present themselves to the senses, and which metaphysics alone investigates. It is evident, therefore, that whoever gives himself up to the contemplation of these things, plunges at once into the very depth of metaphysics. What right, then, has any man, much less an author, who either is or ought to be superior to the common herd, to condemn the science? Suppose he affirms that these things do not exist—that they are mere abstractions, existing only in the imagination: I ask him, how came he to be convinced of that? If he is a reasonable man, he must have some data or reasonings from which he deduces such a conclusion. But, can an abstraction strike upon his senses? No; it is impossible. He must, then, have reasoned on the subject, and that metaphysically, in order to arrive at such an opinion. When, therefore, the science has enabled him to discover truth, he ungratefully flings it aside as useless lumber, as a mode of reasoning that commences with supposition, and terminates in confusion.

How much more reasonable to say, with a modern philosopher, "The philosophy of the human mind teaches man to know himself, and to improve, direct, and exert his intellectual faculties in a manner the most beneficial to himself and others.

"In particular, it impresses a just sense of the dignity of our rational nature, and the great end of intellectual existence; it directs to the best method of cultivating the mental powers, of preventing or correcting prejudice and error, and of enlarging the stock of useful knowledge. By analysing the principles of action, and tracing the origin and process of affection, habit, and character, it leads to the proper discipline of the heart, and supplies the most efficacious means of correcting all undue bias of self-love, of resisting the motives to vice, of restraining the exorbitance of

the passions, of cultivating virtuous principles, and of attaining that just and beautiful symmetry of the affections, that elevation of mind and disinterestedness of character, which, when combined with vigour of intellect and comprehension of views, constitute the true dignity and happiness of man.

"A correct knowledge of the structure of the mind, as far as it can be attained, is also of great use in social life. It necessarily lies at the foundation of every just theory of morals. It is especially essential to the conduct of education upon a rational, liberal, and useful plan; both as it leads to the most easy and impressive mode of communicating instruction, and as, by exposing to view the various springs of action in the breast, it directs the intelligent observer to that mode of conduct and of discipline by which the tender and susceptible mind may be preserved from the aberrations of folly, and the pollution of vice; may be formed to wisdom, honour, and virtue; and may be led to the acquisition of those habits by which it may be qualified to appear with the most distinguished lustre and advantage in that sphere, whether of public or of private life, in which it may be destined afterwards to move."*

The science of metaphysics has been, in past ages, divided into six principal parts, which have been denominated according to the objects which the science considers. These are—first, ontology; second, cosmology; third, anthroposophy; fourth, psychology; fifth, pneumatology; and, sixth, metaphysical theology.

Ontology examines the nature and essence of all beings, as well as the qualities which may essentially belong to them. Cosmology investigates the nature of the world, and "and all that it inhabit;" examines its external laws, the nature of motion and matter, the essence of tangible bodies, their properties and adjuncts; in short, all that can be known respecting terrestrial affairs. Anthroposophy is divided into two parts: the first part belongs not to metaphysical science, but to anatomy and physiology; the second

* Belsham's Phil. Hum. Mind, p. 2.

consists in a knowledge of those powers by which all the motions essential to life are produced. "Psychology," observes a writer in the Encyclopædia Britannica, "consists in the knowledge of the intellectual part of man in particular; concerning which the most profound, the most subtile, and most abstract researches have been made that human reason is capable of; and concerning the substance of which, in spite of all these efforts, it is yet extremely difficult to support any positive opinion with conclusive or probable arguments."

The fifth branch of metaphysics is, according to the same writer, involved in still greater confusion. "By the term pneumatology metaphysicians mean the knowledge of all spirits, angels, &c. It is easy to conceive what infinite art is necessary to give an account of that of which nothing positive can ever be known in the present state of human existence. But the metaphysician of this school readily offers to shew us what is the idea of a spirit, and the effective existence of a spirit; what are its general qualities and properties; that there are rational spirits, and that these rational spirits have qualities which are founded in the moral attributes of God;"* along with a variety of other matters, which must ever remain inscrutable to the loftiest intellect.

Now, it appears to me that these six divisions of the science are not only superfluous, but also well adapted to lead the mind into a chaos of uncertainty. Nature is simple in her operations, and the student of nature ought not to perplex his memory with a variety of words and divisions which are comparatively useless. The only classes of phenomena with which we can become acquainted are either of a corporeal or mental description. Of the former we know but little; of the latter we know less. We cannot tell what an immaterial spirit is; we cannot prove that such beings exist. That branch of metaphysics, therefore, which relates to spirits, angels, &c., should be abolished, because such things are inscrutable to the human under-

* Encyc. Brit., vol. xiv., Art. Metaphys.

standing. But because metaphysical science has been abused in past times, the smatterer in philosophy sighs for its destruction. But this is absolutely impossible. There is now and ever will be metaphysicians. We cannot inquire into the connection subsisting between us and the external world, nor ask ourselves whether we are subject to the same laws which govern it, or to laws altogether different—in short, we cannot reason about morality, the passions, or the operations of the intellect, without plunging headlong into metaphysical philosophy.

## DISHONEST CONDUCT OF THE TRANSLATORS OF THE BIBLE.

Behold how ecclesiastics manufacture evidence!

In the original scriptures, God is called by a variety of names, after the same as those applied to the heathen deities by the ancients. Our translators, to screen this fact as much as possible, have adopted a very disingenuous artifice, which they have borrowed from the Jews; who, in rendering Hebrew into Greek, render the word יהוה, *Ieue*, and other names by which God is called in the Bible, by the word Κυριος, *Kurios*, or Lord, one that has authority—a sovereign. "In this," observes Higgins, "the Jews were justified by the commandment, which forbids the use of the name *Ieue*. But not so the Christians, who do not admit the true and evident meaning adopted by the Jews, '*Thou shalt not take the name of* יהוה, *Ieue, thy God, in vain.*" And, therefore, they have no right, when pretending to give a translation, to call God by any other name than that in the original, whether it be *Adonis*, or Ie, or Ieue, or any other. This the reader will immediately see is of the first importance in obtaining a correct understanding of the book. The

fact of the names of God being disguised in all the translations, tends to prove that no dependence can be placed on any of them. The fact shews very clearly the temper or state of mind with which the translators have undertaken their task. God is called by several names. How is the reader of a translation to discover this, if he find them all rendered by one name? He is evidently deceived. It is no justification of a translator, to say it is of little consequence. Little or great, he has no right to exercise any discretion of this kind. When he finds God called *Adonai*, he has no business to call him Jehovah or Elohim.

"The fact that Abraham worshipped several gods, who were, in reality, the same as those of the Persians, namely—the creator, preserver, and the destroyer, has long been asserted, and the assertion has been very unpalatable both to Jews and many Christians; and to obviate or disguise what they could not account for, they have had recourse, in numerous instances, to the mistranslation of the original, as will presently be shewn.

"The following texts will clearly prove this assertion. The Rev. Dr. Shuckford pointed out the fact long ago, so that this is nothing new."

"In the second book of Genesis, the creation is described not to have been made by *Aleim*, or the Aleim, but by a god of a double name, יהוה אלהים, *Ieue Aleim*, which the priests have translated Lord God. By using the word lord, their object evidently is to conceal from their readers several difficulties which arise afterward respecting the names of God and this word, and which shew clearly that the books of the Pentateuch are the writings of different persons."

"Dr. Shuckford has observed, that in Genesis xii. 7, 8, Abraham did not call upon the name of the Lord, as we improperly translate it; but invoked God in the name of the lord (i. e. Ieue) whom he worshipped, and who appeared to him; and that this was the same God to whom Jacob prayed, when he vowed that the Lord should be his God.* Again Shuckford says,

* Shuckford, b. vii., p p. 130, 131.

that in Genesis xxvi. 25, Isaac invoked God, as Abraham did, in the name of this lord, יהוה, Ieue, or Jehovah. On this he observes, 'It is very evident that Abraham and his descendants worshipped not only the true and living God, but they invoked him in the name of the Lord, and they worshipped the Lord in whose name they invoked, so that two persons were the object of this worship, God and this Lord: and the scripture has distinguished these two persons from one another by this circumstance, that God no man hath seen at any time, or can see; but the Lord whom Abraham and his descendants worshipped, was the person who appeared to them.'*

"In the above I need scarcely remind my readers that the name Ieue, or Jehovah, must be inserted in the place of *the Lord.*"†

Now, if translators thus disguise and pervert facts, what dependence can be placed in them by the unlearned? But it is no wonder that they should translate the name of the twofold deity Lord God. If it had been properly rendered, it might have led individuals to inquire whether there was not an identity between the Biblical Mythos and the Persian, and thus the cheat might have been discovered. Ecclesiastics are always politic.

## DISINGENUOUS CONDUCT OF SIR WILLIAM JONES.

"About the beginning of the French revolution, the celebrated philosopher Baillie published his History of Ancient Astronomy, in which he endeavoured to prove that the first race of men after the flood had been

* Shuckford, b. xi., p. 378, Ed. 3, also p. 400.

† Anacalypsis, vol. i., b. ii., c. i., s. iv., p. 63.

situated on the east of the Caspian sea, and thence had extended towards the south. This he defended with so much talent, that it raised an outcry from the bigots in all quarters, who spared no exertion to run down and misrepresent what they could not refute; and to this end, some men, who ought to have been above such unworthy proceedings, lent themselves.

"The following is a passage of Sir William Jones', quoted with approbation by the Rev. Mr. Maurice. Speaking of the doctrine of M. Baillie, Sir William Jones says, 'Great learning and great acuteness, together with the charms of a most engaging style, were indeed necessary to render even tolerable a system which places an earthly paradise, the gardens of Hesperus, the islands of the Macares, the groves of Elysium, if not of Eden, the heaven of Indra, the Peristan, or fairy land, of the Persian poets, with its city of diamonds, and its country of Shadcam, (so named from pleasure and love,) not in any climate which the common sense of mankind considers as the seat of delights, but beyond the mouth of the Oby, in the frozen sea, in a region equalled only by that where the wild imagination of *Dante* led him to fix the worst of criminals in a state of punishment after death, and which he could not, he says, even think of without shivering.' I have scarcely ever met with a more wilful misrepresentation than this. Most uncandidly Sir William Jones conceals from his readers, that M. Baillie spoke of a time previous to the flood, and founded his doctrine upon a supposition that, before that event, in consequence of the axis of the earth being placed in a different direction from that in which it now is, and other causes, the climate of the polar regions must have been mild and temperate."—*Higgins, Celtic Druids*, c. ii., s. ix., p. 45.

The above extract may serve to shew to what degrading shifts a theologian will stoop for the advancement of his cause. The quotations which Sir William Jones makes from Baillie's works, attest that he was acquainted with the hypothesis which that celebrated but unfortunate philosopher proposed and defended. His partizans, the clergy, cannot therefore plead ignorance as

an excuse in his behalf. His misrepresentation of Baillie must be attributed to his ardent zeal for the suppression of infidelity, and the advancement of pure and undefiled religion. He might have addressed his unlearned readers on this subject with great propriety, in the language of Paul, "*Being crafty, I caught you with guile ! ! !*"

## THE HARMONIES OF BIBLICAL CHRONOLOGY.

St. Pierre wrote three trashy volumes on the harmonies of nature,—why should not I write three pages on the harmonies of Biblical chronology?

"THE nations of the east," observes Sir William Drummond,* "with the exception of the Jews and Arabians, appear always to have vied with each other in their extravagant claims to a remote antiquity. The pretensions of the Chaldeans were more modest than those of the Persians and the Indians; and yet we know that *Berosus*, according to some,† reckoned a period of one hundred and fifty thousand years from the establishment of the Babylonian monarchy to the time of Alexander the Great; and that this writer, according to others, extended the period in question to four hundred and thirty-two thousand years. We may also observe, without referring to a disputed passage in Pliny, that Cicero reprehended, and Diodorus Siculus rejected, the claims of the Chaldeans to an antiquity of four hundred and seventy thousand or four hundred and seventy-three thousand years."

The Christian priesthood oppose the claims of eastern nations to such a remote antiquity, because their chronology does not accord with the chronology

* Origines, vol. i., p. 1. † Euseb. Chron., lib. i.

of Moses. Chronology is the eye and soul of history, and ought to be in a state of perfection, at least in the blessed scriptures. Surely the Deity could not err, neither could people under his influence; yet, strange to say, the chronology of the Bible is in terrible confusion. This is absolutely inexplicable on the supposition that it is the word of God; but on any other hypothesis the anachronisms may be got rid of by criticism. If it be said that the prophets, writing under the influence of inspiration, could not err, but that copyists may have done so—I ask, what reason have we to suppose that they have not erred in other respects—in matters affecting the most prominent doctrines? "Chronology itself," observes Hales, "ought to be correct and accurate, otherwise it will fail to discharge properly its important functions. It will propagate error, and render confusion worse confounded; it will form strongholds and fortresses of scepticism and infidelity: and some of the most specious weapons, the most mischievous shafts, that have been levelled against the veracity and credibility of sacred history, have been supplied from this quarter to Voltaire, Baillie, and their associates; *and those misregulators of time, the Bible chronologists*, are subjects of the pointed ridicule of that witling, Paine."

Very well, Mr. Hales; and here goes to launch another shaft, drawn from your own quiver, against the credibility of the sacred book. To quote your own words—"In every system of chronology, sacred and profane, the two grand eras of the creation of the world and of the nativity of Christ have been usually adopted as standards by reference to which all subordinate epochs, eras, and periods, have been adjusted; such as the exode of the Israelites from Egypt, the reign of Sesostris, the destruction of Troy, the foundation of Solomon's Temple, the foundation of Rome, the era of the Olympiads, the eclipse of Thales, the time of Cyrus," the voyage of the Argonauts, &c. &c. But the confusion which reigns among chronologers relative to the time when the world was created will best appear by the following list, taken from Hales' chronology, vol. i., p. 3.

## *Epochs of the Creation.*

| | According to the following Authorities. | B.C. |
|---|---|---|
| *Alphonsus*, King of Castile, A.D. 1252 | Muller | 6984 |
| | Strauchius | 6484 |
| Onuphrius Panvinius | | 6310 |
| Indian chronology | Gentil | 6204 |
| | Arab records | 6174 |
| Babylonian chronology | Baillie | 6158 |
| Chinese chronology | Ibid. | 6157 |
| Diogenes Laertius, B.C. 222 | Playfair | 6138 |
| Egyptian chronology | Baillie | 6128 |
| Diodorus Siculus, B.C. 80, according to some 63 | Playfair | 6081 |
| Suidas, A.D. 1090 | Ibid. | 6000 |
| Sulpitius Severus, A.D. 420 | Ibid. | 5469 |
| Manetho, B.C. 304 | Ibid. | 5877 |
| Pezron | Ibid. | 5872 |
| Lactantius, A.D. 306 | Univ. Hist. | 5801 |
| Cary | Playfair | 5708 |
| Nicephorus, A.D. 758 | Univ. Hist. | 5700 |
| Riccioli | Playfair | 5634 |
| Clemens Alexandrinus, A.D. 194 | Univ. Hist. | 5624 |
| Fasti Siculi | Ibid. | 5608 |
| Vossius | Ibid. | 5598 |
| Septuagint computation | Abulfaragi | 5586 |
| Septuagint Alexandrine, used by Constantinopolitan, Abyssinian, and Russian churches | Scaliger | 5508 |
| Persian chronology | Baillie | 5507 |
| Cedrenus, A.D. 1060 | Chevreau | 5506 |
| | Strauchius | 5493 |
| Maximus Martyr, A.D. 196 | | 5501 |
| Julius Africanus, A.D. 218<br>Syncellus, A.D. 792<br>Eutychius, A.D. 937 | Univ. Hist. | 5500 |
| Chronicle of Axum in Abyssinia | Bruce | 5500 |
| Q. Julius Hilarion | Playfair | 5497 |
| Demetrius, B.C. 220 | Hales | 5487 |
| | Jackson | 5444 |
| Eupolemus, B.C. 174 | Jackson | 5443 |
| Jackson | | 5426 |
| Josephus, A.D. 94 | Playfair | 5555 |
| | Jackson | 5481 |
| | Hales | 5402 |
| | Univ. Hist. | 4698 |
| Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, A.D. 168 | Gregory | 5626 |
| | Petavius | 5515 |
| | Kennicott | 5507 |
| | Abulfaragi | 5409 |

| | According to the following Authorities. | B.C. |
|---|---|---|
| Hales | | 5411 |
| Indian computation | Megasthenes .. | 5369 |
| Augustin, A.D. 354 | Genebrard .... | 5351 |
| Talmudists | Petrus Aliacens | 5344 |
| Isidore, A.D. 412 | Univ. Hist..... | 5336 |
| Albumazar, A.D. 540 | Ibid. ..... | 5328 |
| Rabanus Maurus, A.D. 778 | Ibid. ..... | 5296 |
| Septuagint Vatican | | 5270 |
| Isidorus Hispalensis, A.D. 304 | Strauchius .... | 5210 |
| Paulus de Fossembrona | Univ. Hist..... | 5201 |
| Eusebius, A.D. 315 | Ibid. ..... | 5200 |
| Martyrologium Romanum | Playfair ..... | |
| Bede, A.D. 673 | Strauchius .... | 5199 |
| Orosius, A.D. 430 | Univ. Hist..... | 5198 |
| Philo Judæus, A.D. 40 | Playfair ..... | 5196 |
| Sigibertus, A.D. 1100 | | |
| Epiphanius, A.D. 368 | Univ. Hist..... | 5049 |
| Justin Martyr, A.D. 140 | Playfair ..... | 5000 |
| Metrodorus, B.C. 170 | | |
| Ado B. of Vienne, A.D. 860 | Ibid. ..... | 4832 |
| Origen, A.D. 230 | | 4830 |
| Fresnoy | Univ. Hist..... | 4700 |
| Aurelius Cassiodorius | Playfair ..... | 4697 |
| Samaritan computation | Scaliger ..... | 4427 |
| Seder Olam Sutha | Ganz ..... | 4359 |
| Odeatan Astrologus | Playfair ..... | 4320 |
| Samaritan text | Univ. Hist..... | 4305 |
| Hebrew text | | 4161 |
| Jewish computation | Abulfaragi .... | 4220 |
| Marianus Scotus, A.D. 1080 | Univ. Hist..... | 4192 |
| Jewish computation | Riccioli ..... | 4184 |
| Laurentius Codomannus | Univ. Hist..... | 4141 |
| | Chevreau .... | 4140 |
| Nicholas Vignier | | 4128 |
| Thomas Lidyat | | 4103 |
| Ribera | Univ. Hist..... | 4095 |
| Genebrard | Ibid. ..... | 4090 |
| Arnold de Pontac | Ibid. ..... | 4088 |
| Chinese Jews | Brotier .... | 4079 |
| Michael Mœstlinus | Univ. Hist... | |
| Ricciolus | Univ. Hist..... | 4062 |
| Maimonides | Univ. Hist..... | 4058 |
| Blancanus | | |
| Salianus | Strauchius .... | 4053 |
| Labbæus | Chevreau .... | 4052 |
| Spondanus | | 4051 |
| Torniellus | | |
| Langius | Strauchius .... | 4041 |
| | Chevreau .... | 4040 |

## SOCIALISM CONSIDERED AS THE MORAL REGENERATOR OF MODERN SOCIETY.

*(Continued from page 24.)*

It may be further objected that the inferences we have drawn do not flow from the premises,—that though the reasoning is sound, it by no means involves the conclusions at which we have arrived; in short, that the system of individualism does not produce the deplorable effects we have mentioned. To all which we answer, Man is a being formed for associating with his kind. He is only happy when gregariousness constitutes one of the most striking characteristics of his condition. He is also endowed with lofty powers and capacious desires. He can ascend on the wings of contemplation far beyond the extreme verge of the eagle's most adventurous flight, and scan with philosophic eye the mighty orbs which roll through immensity. He can climb with untiring footstep mountains of difficulty, and wander in thought over the arid waste, the snow-clad mountain, and the sleepless waste of waters. The desire of knowledge, the aspiration after the "sublime, the beautiful, and the true," forms one of the component principles of his mental constitution. This desire urges him onward in the pursuit of truth, and would form a noble stimulant to action were the arrangements under which he exists of an elevating character. Now, if man be the production of an infinitely wise, benevolent, and powerful being, can it be supposed, for a moment, that his Creator would endow him with powers which he intended to lie dormant, and create in him desires which were not to be gratified? But the principle of individualism, by the party distinctions and inequality of circumstances which it has originated, controls the operations of men in this respect, and prevents the majority of the population from properly expanding their intellectual powers.

It has also been frequently asserted, by dabblers in

philosophy and politics, that the evils which are inseparably connected with the system of private property, are favourable to the expansion of a refined benevolence, and that if there were no poor, no objects of commisseration, no moral or physical evil in the world, there would be nothing to excite the philanthropic feelings of those who are enabled, by their riches, to ameliorate the condition of the unfortunate. We are further assured, by these would-be-wise men, that in the event of arrangements being devised and thrown into operation which might be calculated to impart to the whole population a high degree of felicitous healthfulness, the moral feelings of humanity would be reduced to a state of stagnancy, the spirit of philanthropy become annihilated, and a frigid insensibility usurp the throne of that dignified warm-heartedness which, like the dew of heaven, refreshes where it falls. That collision with evil, especially when it occurs not too frequently, has a tendency to excite in the bosom the benevolent desire of its removal, is a truth evidenced by our experience; but that the present system is better calculated than any other to excite such feelings, and (when they are excited,) to enable us to gratify them, is an opinion as repugnant to the philosophy of the human mind as it is inconsistent with the circumstances of society. If nothing more was requisite than the presence of evil, to enable men to body forth into deed and reality the holiest sympathies of charity, then we would concede at once that our argument is fallacious; but so long as our political arrangements tend to produce the objects which excite the feelings of compassion, whilst they, at the same time, deprive the majority of mankind of the means of gratifying it, we must raise our voice against them, and proclaim to the world that they exercise an unhallowed influence over the morals of the people.

The system of private property deprives a large part of mankind of their rights. The rights of every man relate to the means of exercising his faculties in a manner most advantageous to himself, and best adapted to promote the well-being of the community. This implies an equality of rights to property in the soil; for

so long as a few individuals are enabled or permitted to appropriate large tracts of land to their own use, thus comparatively excluding all others from the possession or enjoyment of their products, the millions must labour under serious disadvantages. It forms but a poor apology for the injustice of such arrangements, to say that the rich proprietor cannot and does not consume the whole produce of his lands, but exchanges his superfluous wealth for an equivalent in the shape of money. The exchange alters not the disparity of circumstances between the parties. The rich man loses not one iota of his wealth, nor does the poor man gain much by the bargain. The rich man only exchanges a portion of his real wealth for that which, under the present system of jurisprudence, ranks as its equivalent; and the poor man only gains one portion of wealth by parting with another. The same inequality of condition subsists between them, and the injustice of those arrangements which produce such distinctions still continues to stand forth, broadly and prominently, as a foul, a dark and a deep blot on the annals of civilized, *alias* uncivilized, nations.

To enable men, under the present system, to gratify their thirst for knowledge, and cultivate their mental powers, a portion of the medium of exchange is indispensably requisite. Without this, (in the generality of instances,) neither books, philosophical apparatus, or the companionship of the learned can be procured. But so long as the system of private property exists—so long some men will naturally and necessarily be put in possession of a larger amount of the medium of exchange than others; from whence it results, that the more money they have, the greater will be their facilities for gaining knowledge. Now, will any person, who is not plunged deep in the mire of ignorance, have the temerity to assert, that the poor man has not as stable a right to the possession of those means which are requisite for the expansion of his faculties, as the minions of a despot, or the favourites of fortune? But we have seen that the principle of individualism debars the major portion of society from possessing those means, which fully warrants us in denouncing it as evil, repug-

nant to sound philosophy, and contrary to natural justice.

The present arrangements of society not only compel a large number of human beings to remain in ignorance, but they also prevent the full gratification of the benevolent feelings of humanity. The philanthropist cannot relieve the mercantile embarrassment of a hunger-bitten population, because his means are inadequate to the bodying forth of his wishes into deed and reality; nor can the operative classes gratify their benevolent dispositions, to any considerable extent, without acting unjustly towards themselves and their families. The majority of the producers of wealth obtain such a small remuneration for their labour, that if they relieve the miseries of the indigent, they subtract from their families a portion of the means which ought to be devoted to their maintenance; and if they do not relieve the children of misfortune, they cannot gratify their benevolent dispositions. The fallacy of those who maintain that the present system is calculated to cherish a spirit of philanthropy, lies in confounding the desire of doing good with the act of doing good. But it is obvious that the two things are entirely different. A man may desire to do good, but if he has not the means, his actions cannot correspond with his desires. So far then as the system of individualism retards the advancement of the general happiness, so far we are justified in condemning it as evil.

Now, socialism is destined to become a great moral regenerator of modern society, because it tends to subvert this evil. The blessings that would result to the population from such a change are thus exhibited by Godwin, in his Political Justice. "Let us, for a moment, give the reins to reflection, and endeavour accurately to conceive the state of mankind, where justice should form the public and general principle. In that case our moral feelings would assume a wholesome tone, for they would not be perpetually counteracted by examples that weakened their energy and darkened their clearness. Men would be fearless, because they would know that there were no legal snares lying in wait for their lives. They would be courageous, because no

man would be pressed to the earth that another might enjoy immoderate luxury, because every one would be sure of the just reward of his industry and prize of his exertions. Jealousy and hatred would cease, for they are the offspring of injustice. Every man would speak truth with his neighbour, for there would be no temptation to falsehood and deceit. Mind would find its level, for there would be every thing to encourage and to animate. Science would be remarkably improved, for the understanding would be converted into a real power, no longer an *ignis fatuus*, shining and expiring by turns, and leading us into sloughs of sophistry, false science, and specious mistake. All men would be disposed to avow their dispositions and actions. None would endeavour to suppress the just approval of his neighbour, for so long as there would be tongues to record, the suppression would be impossible; none fear to detect the misconduct of his neighbour, for there would be no laws converting the sincere expressions of our convictions into a libel."

*(To be continued.)*

## FORMATION OF NATIONAL CHARACTER.

*(Continued from page* 19.*)*

"THE vulgar," observes Hume, "are apt to carry all national characters to extremes; and having once established it as a principle, that any people are knavish, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no exception, but comprehend every individual under the same censure. Men of sense condemn these undistinguishing judgments: though at the same time, they allow that each nation has a peculiar set of manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people, than among their neighbours. The common people in Switzerland have

probably more honesty than those of the same rank in Ireland; and every prudent man will, from that circumstance alone, make a difference in the trust which he reposes in each. We have reason to expect greater wit and gaiety in a Frenchman than in a Spaniard; though Cervantes was born in Spain. An Englishman will naturally be supposed to have more knowledge than a Dane; though Tycho Brahe was a native of Denmark.

"Different reasons are assigned for these national characters; while some account for them from moral, others from physical causes. By moral causes I mean all circumstances which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us. Of this kind are:—the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances. By physical causes I mean those qualities of the air and climate which are supposed to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a particular complexion, which though reflection, and reason may sometimes overcome it, will yet prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners."*

Now some individuals attribute the formation of national character solely to the influence of food and climate, and others attribute it solely to moral causes. It appears to me most reasonable to steer between the two extremes—neither on the one hand to attribute too much to physical causes, nor on the other too little. Montesquieu erred by rushing into the one extreme; and the assertors of the complete and philosophical independency of the human mind, err by rushing into the other. But though Montesquieu did not attribute enough to moral causes, his arguments, and the arguments of his followers, are exceedingly specious. They may be thus exhibited, in the language of Gregory:—"Cold, say these authors, contracts the fibres, renders them rigid, and diminishes their sensibility; heat, on

* Hume's Essays, vol. i., ess. xxi., p. 213.

the contrary, relaxes and debilitates, discolours the skin, renders the body tender and obnoxious to disease. On sudden transitions from heat to cold, or from cold to heat, we experience something like these effects extended to the mind. A moist or dry atmosphere has a sensible effect upon the spirits; and the alterations produced by these in our bodily health, may contribute still further to their influence upon the intellectual faculties. The effects of diet, they add, are considerable. Not only gluttony and intemperance blunt the understanding, and destroy the finer feelings, but particular kinds of food, taken even in moderation, are said to produce this effect more than others. It has been asserted, that those who subsist on flesh, are commonly ferocious and cruel; and that those, on the contrary, whose chief support is vegetables, are of milder and less warlike dispositions."*

Certainly the Hindoos cannot be produced as evidencing the truth of the latter assertion. The mildness of their character exists only in relation to animals, and springs not from the influence of the climate, but from a moral cause,—the belief in the doctrine of the metempsychosis. They believe that the souls of men migrate at death into other bodies; from whence originates their clemency to animals. However pure the religion of Budha may have been at first, there is, nevertheless, tolerably valid proof that it became subsequently deteriorated, and that human sacrifices were offered to the black goddess *Callee*;† which, viewed in connection with the Hindoo *suttees*, and some other customs prevalent among them, is certainly far from proving that mildness forms the most srtiking characteristic of their national character.

Local circumstances commerce the genius of the government under which people live; and those occurrences which are usually styled casual, have an extensive influence in the formation of national character. The invention of a new fashion, or a new method of conducting assemblies of pleasure, frequently

* Gregory's Hist. and Mor. Essays, ess. ii., p. 51.

† Maurice's Indian Atiq., vol. ii., p. 183, 1st Edit.

becomes a stimulus to squandering and dissipation. It is true the individuals who thus spend, may have been the subjects of this disposition for extravagance before; but the evokement of the local circumstance into being, incites them to run farther riot in the pathways of prodigality. And who does not know that commerce tells on the national character of a people? Are not the Dutch proverbial for certain national characteristics, which are seldom to be met with, except in the natives of Holland, or those who have been placed under the influence of similar circumstances? When Columbus traversed the vast Atlantic, and opened the way to the western continent for future navigators, who does not perceive that the circumstance naturally tended to modify, in some respects, the character of the people of Europe? The national peculiarity of smoking, and the taste for some other American products, followed in the train of Columbus' discovery, being either generated or increased by a variety of collateral circumstances, the parent of which was the discovery of America. The genius of the government under which people live, contributes more to the formation of national character, than perhaps any other cause we have specified. The government of America is at present republican, and the majority of Americans are tinctured with republican principles. The government of England is monarchcial, and the majority of our English population are staunch advocates for monarchy. They could not do without a girl of nineteen, a queen, "*God bless her*," to keep them in subjection. The government of the Ottoman empire is despotic, and the character of the Turks is in proportion.

The enactment of new laws has often a great influence in controlling and modifying the national character. When Romulus, at the head of a colony from *Alba*, founded the Roman state, the colony was independent of a sovereign, and only chose Romulus for their leader until their new city was built, and until they could find leisure to settle their form of government.*

* Moyle's Ess. on the Rom. Gov., pt. i., p. 3.

"Monarchy was the ancient goverment of *Alba*, and continued down for many ages in a lineal snccession of princes, famous for their justice and moderation at home, and their conquests abroad. The love of their ancient constitution, (so natural to mankind,) together with the ease and plenty they enjoyed under former reigns, (which they imagined to be owing to the civil orders and institutions of the state, and not to the emulation of their particular kings,) were considerations strong enough to incline the people in favour of monarchy, which they made choice of by universal consent, and elected *Romulus* for their first king; who, immediately after his advancement, erected a frame of government, upon such admirable orders, both civil, military, and religious, that if no alteration had been made in the fundamental laws by himself or his successors, it would have been the most noble as well as most lasting constitution of limited monarchy that ever was in the world.

"His first care was to possess the people with the notion of his divine appointment over them. Before he attempted the crown, the gods were consulted in the usual forms; and all the tokens of divine approbation appeared, which left no room for pretenders to dispute his title, nor to the people to repeal their choice. This begat a reverence and a veneration for his person, added weight and authority to his laws, and strength and reputation to his government."*

The religion propounded by Romulus was brought to perfection by *Numa*.† He had great reputation for sincerity, a universal ground of persuasion among credulous people. He practised on the credulity of the Romans, by pretending to a supernatural announcement of his laws,‡ and adduced the operation of miracles as evidence in their favour.§

*(To be continued.)*

* Moyle's Ess. Rom. Gov., part 1, p. 4.

† Livy, l. ii., c. xviii. ‡ Ess. Rom. Gov., pt. 1, p. 11.

§ Dionys's Halicarn, p. 91.

# PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

## NO. II.

## *On Philosophical Necessity* versus *Philosophical Freedom.*

*Eadem necessitas et Deos alligat. Irrevocabilis divina pariter atque humana cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditur ac rector scripsit quidem fata sed sequitur semper paret semel jussit.*—SENECA.

One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on divine and human things. The very Maker and Governor of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but command once, but always obeys.

THE learned Dr. Cudworth, at the commencement of the first chapter of his Intellectual System of the Universe, observes, "They that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, do it upon one or other of these two grounds: either because they suppose that necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον, *pragma anuposaton*, a thing impossible or contradictory, which can have no existence anywhere in nature; the sense of which was thus expressed by the epicurean poet—

——— Quòd res quæque necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis, &c.—

That everything naturally labours under an intestine necessity;—or else, because, though they admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determined by the will and decrees of this Deity, as that they are thereby made necessary to us. The former of these two opinions, that contingent liberty is πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον, such a thing as can have no existence in nature, may be maintained upon two different grounds; either from such an hypothesis as this: that the universe is nothing

else but body and local motion, and, nothing moving itself, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that material and mechanical necessity must needs reign over all things: or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding."

This is a fair statement of the different modes of proving the absurdity of philosophical freedom. Any or all of them might be employed effectually against it. For the sake of clearness, however, we adopt the latter as being more in accordance with the technical terms in use at present among mental philosophers.

The question, whether man is the subject of philosophical freedom or philosophical necessity, has been discussed at large by several elaborate writers. Treatises have been written on both sides of the question which have tended considerably to its elucidation. The object I have now in view in bringing the question before the social public is, the refutation of an ingenious piece of sophistry frequently urged by one of our most unprincipled and virulent opponents against our fundamental doctrine, the "formation of character." But before we proceed to unmask the sophism alluded to, it is necessary that we should endeavour to divest the subject of ambiguity.

It may be premised that, though the socialists deny liberty to man in the philosophical sense of the term, they by no means maintain that man has not a power of acting in accordance with his determinations. I at least am as zealous an advocate of liberty, if the word be used to signify a power of acting after the volition is formed, as any man can be; which brings me to point out the precise points of difference between the socialists and their opponents.

First. The socialists believe that freedom to act in a specific line is not inconsistent with causation, and that therefore man is free to act in accordance with his determinations, but not free to act contrary to them. Their adversaries maintain the contrary.

Second. They believe that though man is free to form his determinations or volitions, he is not free to form, in the precise point of time wherein any particular determination is formed, a different determination.

Third. The socialists hold that the determinations of the man, or the decision the man comes to, result invariably from the view that he takes of the preferableness or unpreferableness of a particular line of procedure, or of the real or supposed qualities of an object or an action; and that this view the man takes necessarily produces the volition to act or not to act, which, unless counteracted by other causes, will as necessarily produce the action. Our opponents adopt the opposite opinion.

Fourth. The socialists maintain that the truth or falsehood, the soundness or unsoundness, of this view, depends on the real existence of the supposed good or bad qualities of the objects or actions themselves, and on the individual's capacity of judging; and that the expansiveness or contractedness of this capacity depends on the inferior or superior nature of the individual's organization: so that every link in the chain of mental action is according to them the necessary result of previously existing causes.

I have now stated my own views on the subject, and I believe them to be the views of the most intelligent among the socialists. It may not therefore be amiss to examine them in detail, and demonstrate their truthfulness *seriatim*.

The first proposition involved in the preceding statement is, that liberty to act in one specific line is not inconsistent with the universal law of causation. This is a truth written in such broad and legible characters on the aspect of the universe, that it is almost impossible for the meanest intellect to misunderstand it. The stream which irrigates our valleys and woodlands is free to flow in one direction, nevertheless it is compelled to flow by the sloping nature of the ground, the pressure which one drop of water exerts on that which is immediately before it, and the natural tendency of the fluid to seek its own level. The planet which rolls through the trackless wilds of ether is free to

move in an elliptical orbit, but at the same it is compelled to move in a given direction by the law of gravity. The missiles of death, when ejected from the murderous cannon, are free to move until the resistance of the atmosphere and the earth's attraction overcome the force which originally propelled them: but are they not compelled to move so long as that force continues in operation? The mighty ocean, when lashed by the power of the storm, is free to roll and dart its billows towards the clouds, but is not the agitation of its surface produced by the fitful fury of the sounding tempests? All these examples prove that, in the physical world, causation is not opposed to a certain amount of freedom; or, in other words, a thing may be free to move or act in a given line, and yet be compelled by its own nature, and the external forces which operate upon it, to pursue that particular course.

But methinks I hear it vehemently demanded, where is the analogy between inanimate substances and animate and intelligent beings? To which I answer, there may not be a complete analogy* between the cases, but there is an analogy in this respect, that neither can act contrary to the constitutions or natures

* If the opponents of socialism will persist in denying this inference, because there is not a perfect analogy between the things, then they must give up every other doctrine which is not supported by something more strong than analogy. Take for instance:—A machine exhibits design; design implies a designer: therefore a machine must have had a maker. The world exhibits design; design implies a designer: therefore the world must have had a designer. Is there a complete identity between these cases? No! A machine is formed out of previously existing materials; the world, we are told, was created out of nothing. A machine is formed by a human being, who wrought with tools; the world is supposed to have been created by God, who did not work with tools. It is obvious, then, that there is not a perfect analogy in all points between the cases; and if, because the analogy between intelligent beings and inanimate substances is not complete in all points, the inference must be given up, the principle must be extended to all other things. What, then, becomes of the argument *a posteriori* for the being of a God? And what becomes of Bishop Butler's philosophical rant in his Analogy of Religion? The oppugners of social doctrines hold principles directly subversive of theism. Yet they call us atheists, forsooth! *O tempora! O mores!*

which have been given them. If, therefore, it can be shown that man is compelled to act by his internal mechanism, as much so as the inanimate universe is compelled to act in accordance with its mechanism, man must be equally the subject of a compulsory influence.

If it be asked, what is meant by the term causation, I answer simply, *nihil fit sine causâ*, nothing is done without a cause. The universal and invariable relationship subsisting between cause and effect, has been questioned by men whose writings entitle them to respect, and who occupy distinguished places in the republic of letters. It has been said that the prior existence of a thing, even though that priority of existence be constantly observable, does not warrant us to conclude that that which is antecedent in regard to time is the cause of that phenomenon which comes into existence in a later period. For instance, night precedes day, or day precedes night, and that invariably; yet day is not the cause of night, nor night the cause of day. But there is a wide difference between the knowledge we have of a particular cause, and the notion we entertain of the abstract principle, viz., that nothing which once was not can begin to be without a cause. With all deference to the judgment of such great philosophers, I think it every way demonstrable that there must be such an invariable relation between cause and effect. We know, in the first place, that certain phenomena begin to be. For instance: there was a time when the writer of this essay was not in existence as an organized being. We know also that motion can be communicated to a body by the pressure of another body, or the force which one portion of substance may exercise on another. Here it is obvious that the motion which is denominated an effect is caused. The same remark is applicable to every other thing which begins to be. Now, if there is not a necessary and invariable relation between cause and effect, it is possible for a thing to come into existence without being caused at all, which is absurd; because, in such a case, the phenomenon must produce itself. A thing producing itself, or being the cause of itself,

is a contradiction and an absurdity. The supposition that a thing produces itself implies that it was in existence before the act of production, and consequently that it was in existence before it was in existence, which, being impossible, must be untrue. There must then be a necessary and invariable relationship between cause and effect; and however we may acquire a knowledge of it, the principle itself is as demonstrable as that two and two make four, or that the three internal angles of a right-lined triangle are equal to two right angles.

The second proposition involved in the creed of the socialists, as before stated, is, that man is free to act in accordance with his determinations, but that he is not free to act contrary to them. This is a double proposition, the first part of which will be admitted as true by all, both by the socialists and their adversaries. But with respect to the latter part there may be some cavilling. The shrewd asserter of philosophical liberty will no doubt perceive the snare into which he has been led, and struggle violently to avoid it and get free. But we may laugh at his efforts, for he is as secure as the chains of reasoning can make him. If it be admitted that man is free to act in accordance with his determinations, it follows, as a sequence, that he cannot act contrary to them. This may seem a startling announcement, but it is not more startling than true. We will suppose that an individual determines to go to America or New Zealand, and that in some subsequent period he acts inconsistent with that determination; it is obvious that this action must be the result of a new determination or volition, caused by circumstances which had not operated before. The individual therefore is still acting in accordance with the last decision of his mind. But, it will be said, the individual has power to form his determinations—power to decide on going to New Zealand, and power to revoke that decision. But is not that revokement produced by new views and feelings springing up in his mind? And can he avoid being the subject of such views and feelings?

*(To be continued.)*

## THE HARMONIES OF BIBLICAL CHRONOLOGY.

. . . .(*Continued from page* 63.)

THE Rev. John Jones, curate of Waterbeach, near Cambridge, commences his Scripture Antiquities with the following remarks. "In the perusal of ancient authors we are liable to fall into great and serious mistakes, except we keep continually in view their different and peculiar mode of computing time, which in general differs much from our present mode. This remark is particularly applicable to the sacred writers, whom deists and infidels have charged with contradictions and inconsistencies, which fall to the ground when the ancient mode of computing time is duly considered and adapted to our standard." It is very easy to assert that the arguments of deists and infidels "fall to the ground, when the ancient method of computing time is duly considered and adapted to our standard," but much more difficult to prove the truth of that assertion. Did not Hales, Calmet, Usher, the writers of the Talmud, the Jewish rabbis who have flourished in past ages, Playfair, Riccioli, Petavius, and Pezron, understand the ancient method of computing time? Yet these individuals vary in their statements, as to the precise time when the creation occurred. The different versions of the Bible also differ. How, then, I ask, is it possible for them to be all correct, and how can we discover the one that is perfect? Thus Blair and Usher state the period from the creation to Christ to be in the

| | Years. |
|---|---|
| Hebrew Version of the Bible | 4004 |
| The LXX | 5872 |
| The Samaritan | 4700 |
| Josephus states it to be | *4483 |
| And Eusebius | 5200 |

All these versions differ, which of them are right? Probably none!

* Vide Whiston on the Old Testament, p. 214.

Sir William Drummond, in his treatise on the zodiacs of Esne and Dendera, gives the following numbers:

| | | Years. |
|---|---|---|
| Received text | | 4004 |
| Samaritan text | | 4245 |
| Septuagint 2262 added to 3128 | | 5390 |
| Josephus | Jewish authorities | 5688 |
| Seder Olam Sutha | Jewish authorities | 3751 |
| Maimonides | Jewish authorities | 4058 |
| Gersom | Jewish authorities | 3754 |
| Asiatic Jews | Jewish authorities | 4180 |

Sir William Drummond adopts the LXX, and thus divides it: twenty-two hundred and sixty-two years to the deluge, and thirty-one hundred and twenty-eight from the deluge to the birth of Christ.

Hales, in the first volume of his Analysis of Chronology, s. ii., p. 63, observes, "When we survey the strange variety and discordancy of the several received systems of chronology, scarcely two of them agreeing, even in their fundamental dates, and all differing from each other, more or less, in the principles of their construction, and in the application of those principles: sometimes adjusting sacred chronology by profane, and sometimes the reverse, without any settled rule or standard; we may naturally be led to despair of any solid or scientific improvement of the subject, especially at this advanced season, after the failure of so many of the greatest *scholars*—historians, mathematicians, and astronomers; when no fresh documents can be expected; and when many valuable records, to which the earlier chronologers had access, are now lost and swallowed up in the abyss of time." Larcher, speaking of chronology says, "If it is easy to pull down the systems of chronologists, it is by no means so to build up in their room one that can support itself against all difficulties; I do not even believe it possible."* "It is indeed," continues Hales, "easy to pull down, as may appear from the foregoing section; but to build up, is most difficult; to cleanse the *Augean* stable of the mass of errors, accumulated in the course of ages, and still accumulating from the indolent practice of

* Larcher, Heredote, tom. i., p. 309, primus edit.

building upon decayed and rotten foundations, at present is a task most arduous, and truly *Herculean*. Still, however, though difficult the attempt, it is by no means '*impossible*,' in *Larcher's* desponding style, provided the work be undertaken in a right way, and pursued upon a correct plan; provided certain fixed and established principles or rules of chronologizing be laid down and steadily adhered to; and that the original records and documents, still subsisting, be more closely inspected, and more critically compared together, than has been hitherto done; and that sacred chronology be made the invariable basis and standard of profane, by reference to which the whole of ancient chronology must be adjusted, as by the only certain criterion. For, as the venerable *Theophilus*, bishop of *Antioch*, the earliest Christian chronologer, observed:

Ὁ ὡας χρονος και τα ετη δεικνυται τοις βελομενοις πειθεσθαι τῃ Αληθεια.

"The whole time (from the creation) and the years [since] are discoverable by those who are willing to obey the truth."

What Mr. Hales means by "*fixed and established rules of chronologizing*," is explained by himself in rule i., p. 65, where he says:

"The oldest records of time now extant, are unquestionably the *Mosaical*. They are much earlier than the fragments of *Sanchoniatho*, *Berosus*, and *Manetho*, and indeed exhibit internal evidence of a purer and remoter antiquity, free from those monstrous fictions and absurdities, under which these heathen records carricature the venerable features of primæval history. The only sure and certain pole-star, to guide our wandering steps through the maze, the deserts, and the quicksands of ancient and primæval chronology, in which so many adventurers have been lost or swallowed up, by following the *ignis fatuus* of their own imaginations, or the treacherous glare of hypotheses, are the *sacred scriptures*, well understood, and carefully and critically compared together; for otherwise, they also may be perverted into sources of error and confusion.

* * * * * * * * * *

* * * * The history recorded by Moses

appears like a bright but remote object, seen through the glass of an excellent optician, clear, distinct, and well-defined; but when we look back upon the accounts transmitted, concerning the Assyrians, Egyptians, Medes, and Scythians, or those of the early ages of Italy and Greece, we find nothing but a series of incredible and inconsistent events, and groups of strange beings,

> "Abortive, monstrous, and unkindly mixed,
> *Gorgons*, and *harpies*, and *chimeras* dire."

In p. 66 the same author affirms, "that if his work shall be found to have improved in any respect upon its predecessors, the improvement may be principally ascribed to the careful study of, and rigid adherence to, the ORIGINAL SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT."

After this delectable piece of eulogy on the chronology of the holy Bible, I cannot forbear quoting a few remarks from a work recently published, the author of which was profoundly learned in such matters. After mentioning a few of the contradictory statements of chronologers, respecting the time when the creation occurred, he observes: "The above is quite enough to shew the utter hopelessness of making out a system of chronology; but in Hales' treatise on this subject there may be seen, in addition to this, a list of more than one hundred systems, each proved by its author to be the true and perfect system, and varying in their extremes not less than three thousand years. Each author (as he comes in order, finishing with Dr. Hales, as confident as those who have gone before him,) succeeds in nothing but in overthrowing the doctrines of his predecessors; but in this he has no difficulty. Can anything be devised which shall raise a stronger presumption, that a system of chronology never was the leading object of the books? The whole tends to support the doctrine of nearly all the learned men of antiquity, that, like the mythological histories of the Gentile nations, a secret doctrine was concealed under the garb of history."*

* Anacalypsis, vol. i., b. v., c. ii., s. vi., p. 186.

Mr. Faber says, "There can scarcely be a doubt, I think, that we ought to adopt the longer scheme of chronology, as it is called, in preference to that curtailed one which appears in the common Hebrew Pentateuch. I am myself inclined to follow the LXX. in their antediluvian chronology, and the Samaritan Pentateuch in early postdiluvian chronology."*

Thus, by taking a little from one system of chronology, and a little from another, *ad libitum*, it is easy to build up a system which, though specious in its general outlines, may yet be false in its details. The chronology of the first ages of the world, shrouded as those ages are in mystery and fable, cannot now be accurately settled. In relation to the grand era, the creation of the world, scarcely two chronologers are found to agree. We have already given a list of these discordances, which we will now increase; they are taken from the same author as were our last, viz., Hales. *Vide his Analysis of Chronology*, vol. i., p. 5.

## *Epochs of the Creation.*

| | According to the following Authorities. | B.C. |
|---|---|---|
| Pererius | Playfair | 4021 |
| Rheinhold | | 4020 |
| Playfair | | 4008 |
| Walker | | |
| Kennedy, Bedford, Ferguson | | 4007 |
| Capellus | | 4005 |
| Usher, Lloyd, Simpson, Spauheim, Calmet, Le Chais, Blair, &c., and English Bible | | 4004 |
| Hevelius and Marsham | | 4000 |
| Kepler | Playfair | 3993 |
| Petavius | | 3984 |
| Bibliander | Univ. Hist. | 3980 |
| Krentzheim | Ibid. | 3971 |
| Bucholtzer, Mathias, | Strauchius | 3970 |
| Cluverius, Boxhornius, Jansenius | Chevreau | |
| Bullinger | | 3969 |
| Bunting, Bardius | Playfair | 3967 |
| Longomontanus | Univ. Hist. | 3966 |
| Melancthon | Playfair | 3964 |

* Pag. Idol., vol. i., p. 234.

| | According to the following Authorities. | B.C. |
|---|---|---|
| Reynoldus | Univ. Hist. | 3962 |
| Luther | | 3961 |
| Lightfoot | | 3960 |
| Salmeron, Picus Mirandula | Chevreau | 3959 |
| Lamberg | Strauchius | 3958 |
| Herwart | Univ. Hist. | 3955 |
| Cornelius a Lapide | Ibid. | 3951 |
| Scaliger, Isaacson | | 3950 |
| Strauchius | | 3949 |
| Johannes Micrelius | Univ. Hist. | 3948 |
| Helvicus | | 3947 |
| John Carrion | Playfair | 3944 |
| Jerom, A.D. 392 | Univ. Hist. | 3941 |
| Gerard Mercator, Beroaldus | Playfair | 3928 |
| James Gordon | Ibid. | 3880 |
| Arius Montanus | Univ. Hist. | 3849 |
| Helvigius | Ibid. | 3836 |
| Some Talmudists | Ibid. | 3784 |
| David Ganz | | 3761 |
| Vulgar Jewish computation | Strauchius | 3760 |
| Rabbi Gersom | Playfair | 3754 |
| Seder Olam Rabba, or "Great Chronicle of the World," A.D. 130 | Ganz | 3751 |
| Rabbi Habsom | Univ. Hist. | 3740 |
| Rabbi Nosen | Ibid. | 3734 |
| Rabbi Hillel, A.D. 358 | | 3700 |
| Rabbi Zacuth | Univ. Hist. | 3671 |
| Rabbi Lipman | Ibid. | 3616 |

"Here," observes Hales, "are upwards of one hundred and twenty different opinions, and the list might be swelled to three hundred; as we are told by Kennedy in his chronology, p. 350. This specimen, however, is abundantly sufficient to shew the disgraceful discordance of chronologers, even in relation to this prime era; the extremes, differing from each other, not by years nor by centuries, but even by chiliads; the first exceeding the last no less than thirty-two hundred and sixty-eight years!"

How easy is it for such men as Hales to impose on the credulity of the unlearned, by assuring them that the chronology of the Bible is the only true chronology; and that when the scriptures are closely examined, and critically compared, they contain more fact, and less fiction, than the writings of any heathen

philosopher. What a downright absurdity for the Rev. John Jones to say that, when "the ancient method of computing time is adapted to our standard, the objections of sceptics and infidels fall to the ground;" as if no infidel understood the matter as well and much better than himself, or as if all the learned authorities before mentioned did not know the ancient method of computing time in use among the Hebrews. Yet such men continually impose on the vulgar by their ostentatious display of learning. Their motto is *Vulgus Vult Decipi Decipiatur*. They assure their deluded followers that they will assuredly be roasted in fire and brimstone for ever, unless they gulp all the solemn nonsense they think fit to spout. Pious, and charitable, and learned men! the world is growing too wise to listen much longer to your incomprehensible jargon. The study of demonstrable facts will, ere long, demolish the structure you have contributed to rear, (and that, too, without involving you in its ruins.) and a more true and more beautiful system will, like a phœnix, arise from its ashes.

*(To be continued.)*

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*(To the Editor of the "Monthly Messenger.")*

1st November, 1839.

SIR,

If you will permit me, through the medium of your "Messenger," to address those who are fearlessly and earnestly engaged in the search after *truth*, (wherever it is to be found,) on some of those portions of moral and political economy which particularly affect the public weal, I shall be most happy to occupy a part of this and the ensuing numbers with some observations which, I hope, will be found to be neither unacceptable to your readers, or irrelevant to the purposes for which your publication is designed.

The letters I propose will not be the repertories of metaphysical disquisition, or of rhetorical beauties, they will be furnished by one who has long devoted the little of reflective faculty which she possesses, to a consideration of those things which affect the well-being of man; and who, seeking the triumph of *truth* only, knows it unnecessary to apologize either to you or the public for offering a few remarks on such subjects as those I contemplate.

I hail with pleasure the appearance of every publication which freely discusses, unshackled by preconceived prejudices, the political and social relations of mankind, inasmuch as I am quite convinced that it is only by such means that we shall eventually arrive at just conclusions and unanimous decisions; and may hope to produce, (gradually, indeed, but *certainly*,) some degree of uniformity of opinion and conduct among mankind.

These letters will not be written in the narrow and selfish desire of furthering the interests of any *system*, (however good,) but, relating to the broad principles of human action, will necessarily commend to the minds of reflecting and unprejudiced individuals, those arrangements for society which shall be best calculated to remove the evils we shall discover to exist. Not, therefore, to a sect or party only, but to every friend of human improvement, by whatever appellation distinguished, holding whatever opinions, these letters will be addressed in all faithfulness and sincerity, in the hope that, by discussing the various subjects affecting human happiness, we may be led to agree upon the most effective means of remedying existing evils, whether of a physical, moral, or mental nature.

If we would apply the cure, it will be necessary we should first inquire into the disease. I also conceive it to be of the highest importance, in order to a proper appreciation of *our* views of improving society, that we should make a fair and impartial survey of the existing state of things, in order to discover in how far present arrangements fall short of the requirements of the human race for the production of its greatest happiness.

The thousand differing opinions of mankind are ever waging an irrational hostility to all proposed ameliorations of the evils of social arrangements, and INTERESTS are perpetually clashing even where *prejudices* create no war; consequently, the disunion in effort which exists among men, and even among those who, if they perfectly understood each other, are not really widely apart in their sentiments, prevents the furtherance of the most rational schemes for the general utility. If we may ever hope for any material accordance to be created in the minds of the people, by which the *concentrated energies* of the enlightened and benevolent, the refined and thinking, the just and free, shall be united to chase ignorance and misery from the world, it can only be done by *freely discussing* all points affecting their welfare; and when men shall have thus conjointly discovered the lurking causes of their misery, it will be by no means difficult for their united efforts to effect their removal. And one grand incentive to our agitation of such questions, is the pleasing fact that Truth has never lifted her voice in vain. Prejudice has raised against her its massy shield, but the divine emanations of truth will shine *over* what it cannot momentarily beam *through*. Law has laid his iron hand upon her lips; but the still small voice has gone on the benevolent errand of human enlightenment notwithstanding. And Persecution has arrayed against her a legion of assailants; but she grows the stronger from all their attacks; and the more she is oppressed, the more will men inquire into the causes of contention, and the more readily become her proselytes.

There is not a subject, perhaps, which needs more the serious consideration of the philanthropist than that of the early *moral* culture of the human mind; and yet there are few subjects which have received less attention, and *very* few on which more definite and practical observations have not been made. From whence, I would ask, arises this strange apathy in the public mind? It must evidently be that we do not sufficiently recognize the necessity of such culture, or that we are ignorant of the means necessary for making

the impressions we are anxious to produce. The latter is the principal cause of the irrational course which the world in general are pursuing, even still,—in the light of the nineteenth century.

Men have long admitted that minds should be *trained* in the course it was desired they should pursue; but how has the practice been accordant with the theory? Ask the parent who suffers the growth of selfishness and passion in their youthful charge, unchecked by any attempt on their part to oppose to the workings of such unlovely propensities the delightful feelings of benevolence and justice. Is the early moral culture of the human mind, under existant arrangements, such as is calculated to train men to virtue? Ask the tutor who observes, among his competing pupils, the seeds of ambition, envy, revenge, or pride, generated by the very mode of their tuition, and by measures which he knows no means of rectifying.

Do we train the youthful mind so as to make it the generous, honest, benevolent creature we would have it? Ask the tradesman whose very infants are early instructed in the chicanery, the deceptions, the selfish calculations, in which he is himself so sedulously engaged.

Does the state use the measures which might be included in its operations, for securing the judicious moral culture of those who are to be its supporters or pests? Go to the purlieus of St. Giles', and see the deserted beings, for whom no heart beats, except that of its destitute, ignorant, or guilty parent, whose only inheritance is depraved appetites, whose only instructions, guilt! Are political economists mad, that they are perpetually thinking only how they may "scotch the snake," while they are leaving untouched the prolific hotbeds whence others are continually increasing?

Does the state even do its best with those entirely under its protection and government? Go to our workhouses, and see whether there is anything done for the cultivation of the *hearts* of their youthful inmates—whether the moral sentiments are sought to be properly directed, or the intellectual faculties improved. It has not, I may venture to say, as yet been *thought* of, much

more attempted to be practised; for the teaching of mere creeds, or the expression of mere moral precept, in the way in which they are ordinarily inculcated, are wholly inadequate to produce a beneficial effect upon the buoyant spirits of early youth.

Yet, after this total neglect, who bears all the blame, and much of the evil, of its product? Why, the very unfortunate creatures who have been thus cruelly deserted, in so important a point, by its natural protectors—its parents and the state; and where vice of a greater or less degree is the result, those who are the most culpable are the first accusers.

When will men become rational on this point, and fully recognize the moral importance of mental culture?

We gather no grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles: shall we expect to reap where we have not sown? Shall the fertile but fallow field of nature be expected to produce, spite of our neglect, an abundant harvest of the grain which we desire to have, but have not taken any pains to preserve? Can it be wonderful, that those who have sown nothing but the wind of wishes or precepts, should reap, to their disappointment, the whirlwind of misguided passion? Most of the vices, and all the crimes, of human nature proceed from this neglect. The term education is indefinitely used, and but seldom understood in its real extent. A due cultivation of the intellectual faculties, a proper regulation and subjugation of the animal propensities, and a right direction of the moral sentiments, is education, and nothing short of this is at all worthy the title. Point to me a spot where such an education is bestowed, and then I should admit these strictures were uncalled for, and any change in our social arrangements were unnecessary. But I must bring my present letter to a close, fearing I have already exceeded the limits of space which I may hope to be permitted to to occupy. I will, therefore, only say

I am, Sir,

THE SINCERE FRIEND OF HUMAN IMPROVEMENT.

# A DISSERTATION

## ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE CREATION AS TAUGHT BY MODERN CHRISTIANS, PRIESTS, AND THEIR ABETTORS.

Either the first eleven chapters of Genesis, all due allowances being made for a figurative Eastern style, are true, or the whole fabric of our national theology is false.—SIR WILLIAM JONES, *Asiatic Researches*, vol. i., p. 225.

### *Difficulties of the Subject.*

WE may reasonably suppose, that when nations become civilized and refined by the march of moral improvement, and the gradual developement of the arts and sciences, individuals will be found, who, having leisure to speculate, will diligently set themselves to explore the antiquities of their respective countries, and inquire how the society to which they belong originated. But on looking back into antiquity, a thick cloud seems to rest upon the horizon. The paucity or total want of written records, the barbarism from which such individuals have but lately escaped, the darkness in which preceding ages have been involved, and the difficulty of erecting an accurate system of chronology, are circumstances which render such researches extremely difficult, and often fruitless. These things bewilder the imagination and perplex the judgment, discourage inquiry and expose the antiquarian, unless he be on his guard to illusion and a waste of time. But though these things are calculated to perplex, they ought not altogether to repress inquiry. It is possible to lift, in some measure, the veil which hangs over the origin of empires and institutions. Seizing, therefore, the torch of faithful criticism, let us embark on our adventurous voyage for the purpose of exploring the dark circle of antiquity—of exhibiting the mysterious *Adyta* of the heathen temples, and of unfolding the origin of the Christian religion.

But here the notion of the absolute creation of the world, about five or six thousand years ago, arrests us in the very onset, and stops our researches. Either

this notion is not true, or, if true, certain facts and phenomena, which we shall subsequently discuss, are inexplicable. It becomes, therefore, imperatively necessary that we should afford a particular examination to this dogma, in order that we may ascertain what degree of credence it deserves. The doctrine we are about to investigate is not the formation of the world out of previously existing materials by a superintending and intelligent power, but the absolute eduction of matter from a state of nothingness some five or six thousand years ago.

### *Modes of proving the Falsehood of a Theological Dogma.*

There are two ways of proving the falsehood of a theological opinion. First, by shewing that the supposition from whence it is deduced involves a contradiction; and second, by proving that the volume received as sacred by theologians affords no countenance to the doctrine in question. Both these modes of proof are, in some measure, applicable to the notion of absolute creation, as held by the generality of modern Jews and Christians. The supposed fact on which the doctrine is founded, is in the nature of things impossible; and the writings of the Hebrew legislator afford not a shadow of proof that he either taught or accredited such a superstition. I call it a superstition, because it has been borrowed by the Christian priesthood from the heathen mythology, and because the hypothesis is self contradictory, and the occurrence to which it relates absolutely impossible. Indeed, it requires not a very brilliant imagination, nor extensive literary abilities, to enable an individual to divine the reason why the notion of creation was first borrowed in an crude state from the heathen philosophy, and afterwards modified, to suit a particular purpose, by the immaculate followers of Jesus of Bethlehem. If it be once admitted that matter was evoked from nonentity by the fiat of a supreme being, the supposition that it may cease to exist is at least rendered possible, and no sooner is this possibility acknowledged, than a variety of reasons are at hand to show the probability of its

being annihilated at some future period. These reasons, when combined into a focus, and passed off in popular and declamatory harangues—with that air of blustering and intolerant arrogance which so frequently adorns the priestly character—naturally tend to produce a wonderful sensation in those minds who are so besotted by superstition as to dread the idea of doubt with respect to their opinions. The notion of the absolute creation of the world from nothing, throws an air of plausibility over the notion of its absolute destruction by fire. The two doctrines are bound up together in the system of modern priestism, forming the Alpha and Omega of what may be not inappropriately denominated the romance of the universe, commencing with the eduction of matter from a state of nothingness, and ending with its destruction by an universal conflagration. This latter notion, as I have said before, when clothed in a popular dress and expounded to the people, has a mighty influence in producing a desire in the minds of the ignorant, the bigotted, and the fanatical, to escape the dangers of the eventful period to which it relates. But these dangers, forsooth, cannot be avoided, nor can the soul

"Stand erect"
"In all the dignity of conscious virtue,"

When "the heavens shall be on fire," and when cherubs shall display their celestial sympathy by weeping over the funeral of nature; unless there be an order of men called priests to pray for its salvation—to instruct the populace in the mysteries of religion—to say mass or repeat like an Indian parrot many times on the seventh day of the week, "Lord, have mercy on us!"—to perform one part of the Sabbath day service attired in white vestments, and the other part robed in black—to fulminate the anathemas of the church against sceptics and unbelievers—to go forth into the world preaching the gospel, "lifting up holy hands without wrath and doubting," and "roaring like the strong bulls of Bashan;"—in short, to perform a variety of things resembling more the antics of a monkey than the actions of a man, and bearing a closer affinity to

the imbecility of idiocy than the dignified conduct of a rational being. Now, this order of men receive in return for their spiritual ministrations the carnal things of the people. They also exercise a very extensive, and in many instances a very unhallowed, influence over the education of the juvenile members of society. Hence, in relation to the priesthood, two powerful springs of action are set in motion—two powerful passions of badly trained humanity are gratified, ambition and avarice, or the desire of power and love of gain. It is easy to perceive, therefore, that any opinion favourable to the principal dogma on the popular belief of which their existence as an order rests will be embraced by them with avidity, and defended with both learning and subtlety.

*The Notion of Creation first borrowed from the ancient Buddhist System of Theology, and afterwards modified by the Christian Priesthood to suit a particular purpose.*

We are gravely assured by one of those impostors called sacred writers, that Moses was skilled in all the learning of the Egyptians; and we are informed also in the narrative of the Israelites' exode from Egypt, that he was brought up at the court of Pharaoh. Now this very announcement is sufficient to awaken suspicion respecting the origin of the doctrines he inculcated. If it can be shewn that the notion of creation was prevalent among philosophers at the time Moses lived, or if it can be shown that it formed part of an ancient system of primeval theology which had been established long anterior to that time, it is highly reasonable to suppose that Moses (supposing he taught the doctrine,) derived it from this source. Educated by the magicians or priests of Osiris, he would naturally imbibe their tenets respecting the origin of the world. Nursed in the lap of royal luxury, and beholding the deference paid to royal authority, we may without violating probability suppose that he would become ambitious of being the founder of a sect, or the leader of a party. As it respects his pretensions to miraculous powers, they are too absurd to merit much attention. Pretending to miraculous powers

was the common artifice resorted to by the ancient legislators to awe the vulgar and keep them in subjection. The judicious Moyle, when speaking of the government of *Alba*, observes that the first care of Romulus "was to possess the people with the notion of his divine appointment over them: before he attempted the crown, the gods were consulted in the usual forms; and all the tokens of divine approbation appeared: which left no room for pretenders to dispute his title, nor to the people to repeal their choice. This begot a reverence and a veneration for his person, added weight and authority to his laws, and strength and reputation to his government."* Here then, we have positive proof that the legislators of antiquity pretended to miraculous powers for the purpose of subjecting the people to their authority. What proof can be adduced that Moses did not resort to the same expedient? It was easy by such means to impose on the ignorant and credulous horde of savages that swarmed out of Egypt. Their worshipping the golden calf, the emblem of Osiris, is sufficient to convince any unprejudiced mind of their stupidity and ignorance. How easy to impose on their credulity! With what facility could an artful legislator mould and adapt them to his purposes, persuade them that he was a prophet of the Lord, and that he was commissioned to lead them into the promised land! They probably considered him a prophet, a favourite of heaven. I query very much if a modern chemist had been among them, if they would not have accounted him a god.

But I have been digressing from the subject, and must now return to it. If Moses ever taught the doctrine of creation, he borrowed it most probably from the Egyptians; perhaps they borrowed it from others; indeed, there is an identity between all the mythoses of antiquity: certain points of resemblance wherein they all agree, which is extremely perplexing to Christian theologians. Maurice, in his Indian Antiquities, is so perplexed with this, that he can only solve it by supposing that an ancient system of patri-

* Moyle's Ess. Rom. Gov., Miscel. Works, vol. i., p. 5.

archal theology formerly prevailed; that this system was revealed from God to man, and that certain doctrines which are to be found in almost all countries are traceable to this common source. This is fairly conceding to philosophers all they desire. It is placing the claims of the Bible to inspiration on a very doubtful basis. What proof can be urged in favour of this uncertain hypothesis? none but the ipse dixit of a priest. If the doctrines of a trinity—of the fall of man—of an evil principle fighting against a good one—of the garden of Paradise—of sacrifices, &c.—are to be found in the different mythologies of ancient times, how do we know they were derived from an ancient system of theology? and if they were, how do we know that system was revealed from heaven? It is clear there is no proof, nothing like proof, in the case: and Mr. Maurice, by proving, in his elaborate and learned work, that these doctrines are traceable to a primæval theology, has rendered the world a service he never dreamed of performing. In Egypt, then, we are to search for the doctrine of creation. Accordingly, in the recondite philosophy of that country we find it.

*(To be continued.)*

## FORMATION OF NATIONAL CHARACTER.

*(Continued from page 72.)*

Moyle observes, that the two chief articles of Numa's religion were—

"First, That the gods were the authors of all good to mankind. And,

"Secondly, That to obtain this good, the gods were to be worshipped; in which worship the chief of all was to be innocent, good, and just."*

Now, the influence of *Numa's* religion and enactments on the national chaarcter of the Romans is thus pointed out by Moyle. "Numa also interwove his moral precepts with his religious doctrine;

* Moyle's Ess. Rom. Gov., pt. 1, p. 13.

for the great principle of his morality, *Justice*, which in a manner comprehends all other moral virtues, was grounded upon this persuassion, *that the gods were the most excellent nature, and the great examples of highest* virtue; *that they administered everything justly, and had a due care and providence over the whole; and that they never bestowed their favours upon unjust men.* From this root sprung that noble branch of their morals, the love of their country; which afterwards grew to be the fundamental article of their ethics, and the standard of all virtue and vice. This principle was passionately pursued by all the great *Romans;* at this the inexorable *Coriolanus* relented; for this the *Decii* and *Curtii* devoted themselves; to this principle *Brutus* sacrificed his son: this was improved and cultivated by the force of education, and confirmed by more generous examples than any age or nation can boast of."*

Again, when laws have been made calculated to impart military ardour and murderous enthusiasm to a population, that population has become ferocious and brutal. The gladiatorial exhibitions of the Romans, their triumphal processions, the mocking vision of military glory which was held out to them, were circumstances well calculated to nourish a military spirit. And who is not aware of the courage and address, the steady discipline and chivalrous heroism, of the Roman legions? These things are acknowledged by most writers; nevertheless, if a socialist attempts to trace those phenomena to their proper causes, and to deduce the general principles of a science from the whole, his statements are scouted as the climax of absurdity. But the day is not far distant, when men shall universally know that the generation then being, have the power to give to that which is to succeed either a superior or inferior character. When such knowledge is reduced to practice in a scientific manner, we may expect the most delightful results. The population of the globe, then, instead of having a ferocious, a sanguinary, and a brutalized character, will be superior in knowledge, and pre-eminent in virtue.

* Ess. Rom. Gov., pt. i., p. 17.

## PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

NO. II.

### *On Philosophical Necessity* versus *Philosophical Freedom.*

*(Continued from page 78.)*

It is absolutely impossible for man to avoid being the subject of new views of truth, and new feelings respecting it, provided that truth be laid open to his inspection. If an object strike upon his visual organs, he feels compelled to admit its existence; and not all the subtle speculations of Berkleyan philosophers can shake that opinion from his mind. Man in general has no power to outrage common sense so far as to discredit the evidence of his senses; and even if he had such a power, it would be traceable to a cause; and, therefore, while exercising it, he would still be the child of necessity. If it be admitted that everything which begins to be must have a cause, it follows as a sequence that everything must be produced necessarily. For nothing can be called a cause, in relation to any particular effect, until that effect be produced; and when the effect is produced, it is absolutely impossible for it not to have been in existence. It is true that the thing, or power, which produces an effect may be (and almost invariably is,) in existence before the effect is produced; but it cannot with propriety be called the cause of that effect, until the effect begins to be. Now any producing power must be adequate to the production of the effect of which it is the cause; for if it was not adequate to its production, the effect could not be produced. All causes must be necessary causes. If causes are not necessary causes, then they are indifferent to, or are not suited to, effects, and cannot therefore produce effects which they are not suited to produce. For, as Collins observes, "causes have relation to some particular effects, and not to others." A certain amount of force applied to a body may produce a change in that body—this change is the effect; and the force, with all the other circumstances which

led to its application, may be styled the cause. But it is obvious that this force, or power, can only be called a cause in relation to the particular effect produced by it, for it would be absurd to call it the cause of another effect which had been brought into existence by a power totally different. Now, if "causes be suited to some particular effects, and not to others, they can be no causes at all to those others; and, therefore, a cause not suited to the effect, and no cause, are the same thing. And if a cause not suited to the effect is no cause, then a cause suited to the effect is a necessary cause; for if it does not produce the effect, it is not suited to it, or is no cause at all of it." It results from the whole, that whatever is, must be, so long as all the circumstances concerned in its production and perpetuation continue unchanged; or, in other words, that whatever effect is produced, is produced necessarily.

Now we would ask the impugners of socialism, if the man who had at one time decided on going to New Zealand, and who had in some subsequent period revoked that determination, could have done so, unless some new feeling had arisen in his breast, or some new truth been presented to his mind. It appears *prima facie* to be as clear as the noonday sun, that the individual would never have come to the two contrary decisions, had he not in the first instance thought it most desirable to go, and in the second to stop at home. The preferableness or unpreferableness of the two contrary courses of action are sufficient to produce the two contrary decisions. These remarks are applicable to every other thing which an individual determines to do. Men invariably adopt that mode of procedure which appears to them at the time, and under all the circumstances, the best. To say that an individual prefers a course of action which appears to him unpreferable, is to say that he prefers and does not prefer, which is an absurdity.

The question now naturally arises, is man free during any part of this intellectual process? Before we attempt to give a definite answer to this question, it is necessary that we should recapitulate a few of the positions which, in the former part of this essay, we

have endeavoured to elucidate. We have shown that everything which begins to be must have a cause, and that every cause must be a necessary cause; therefore, all effects must be produced necessarily. Now the views of a man respecting going to New Zealand would be effects, and must be produced necessarily. The cause or causes of these effects would probably be an immense variety of external circumstances operating on his mind through the medium of his senses. For instance, he might have read, at some time, a glowing description of the beauty of the country, or have heard some individual depict its advantages in vivid colours. These circumstances, combined with the love of adventure, natural to some minds—the pressure of poverty, and the desire of enjoying the good things of life in greater abundance—and perhaps a thousand other things—would be quite sufficient to produce the determination to go; and the reverse of these, or a change in the aspect of the man's affairs, would be adequate to the production of the decision not to go. It is evident that the determinations of the man are produced necessarily by the causes we have specified, or others; he cannot therefore be free as it regards the production of his decisions. If, now, the individual be free at all in this case, it must be in relation to the production of his views and feelings respecting going to New Zealand, or not going to it. But these views, feelings, and desires begin to be, and are therefore effects produced necessarily. The man possesses no philosophical independency of mind in the matter—no more power to resist the force of truth when it is made evident to his understanding, than the feather possesses to resist the swell of the ever booming ocean. He is, in short, throughout the whole process, the creature of the circumstances and associations which surround him.

Having now shown that a certain amount of freedom is not inconsistent with the most rigid causation, and that the decision to act in any given instance is produced by the view the person takes of the preferableness or unpreferableness of any particular action, we come to consider the fourth proposition maintained



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by the socialists: viz., "that the individual's capacity of judging depends upon the goodness or badness of his physical organization."

This part of our subject involves a controversy respecting the immateriality of the human mind. Immaterialists affirm that man is compounded of body, which is a divisible, solid, opaque, and inert substance, curiously organized, and fitted to be the dwelling-place of mind, or spirit, which is supposed to be a percipient, active, indivisible entity, or substance.

Some immaterialists, particularly Dr. Clarke and Dr. Price, aver that mind has one property in common with material substance—viz., extension; and, consequently, that it occupies space, and has a definite locality.* Others—such as the followers of Descartes, Watts, and Andrew Baxter—maintain that it has no common property with matter—that it is not extended, does not occupy space, and, consequently, has no proper locality.†

"The materialists," as Belsham observes, "maintain that man consists of one uniform substance, the object of the senses; and that perception, with its modes, is the result, necessary or otherwise, of the organization of the brain."‡

It may be affirmed, with considerable truth, that the doctrines of materialism and necessity are closely connected: for whatever facts and reasonings tend to prove man one uniform material substance, tend also to prove that he is the creature of those physical influences which govern every other department of nature.

### *Arguments for Materialism.*

I have said above, that "perception, with its modes," was held by the materialists to be "the result of the organical structure of the brain." This has been maintained on the following grounds, which I give in the language of the author before quoted:

"First. When there is no organization, as far as our observation extends, there is no perception.

* Corresp. of Price and Priestley, pp. 54, 55.

† Ibid., pp. 370, 371. ‡ Ment. Phil., p. 331.

"Second. Wherever such an organic structure as the brain exists, perception exists.

"Third. Where this organization is imperfect, perception is imperfect.

"Fourth. Where the organization is sound, vigorous, and healthy, perception is proportionably vigorous and clear.

"Fifth. Where the organization is impaired, perception is enfeebled and obscured. And

"Sixth. When the organization ceases, perception appears to cease.

"It is generally admitted by those who have thought upon the subject, that certain states of the brain exactly correspond with certain states of mind, and every change in the state of the brain is associated with a corresponding change in the state of the mind. Disorders in the brain are accompanied with proportionable disorders in the intellect, as in drowsiness, intemperance, fever, delirium, and lunacy. If the brain remains unimpaired, intellect continues even upon the verge of dissolution, as is sometimes evidenced in consumptions, dropsies, and other diseases, which do not immediately affect the head. It is therefore as reasonable to conclude that perception is the result of organization, as that pointing the hour is the result of the mechanism of a watch, or that the colour and odour of the violet is the consequence of its peculiar structure: and we have as good reason to believe that thought is an affection, or attribute, of the brain, as that fragrance is a property of a rose, or that light and heat proceed from the sun."*

Some individuals have maintained that, because men on the verge of dissolution have in many instances retained the use of their faculties, that therefore thought could not be an attribute of the brain, but must result from the operation of an immaterial entity. Bishop Butler, in his Analogy of Religion, has urged this argument against materialism, and others, who have not possessed talents equal to his, have borrowed it from him. In short, I have frequently heard it put forth as

* Belsham's Phil. Hum. Mind, p. 333.

an irrefragable argument against socialism. The impugners of our principles assert that the fact of man retaining the use of his faculties when on the borders of the grave, proves that that which thinks is an immaterial entity, not subject to those influences which affect the corporeal structure. Socialism, say they, does not recognize the existence of this principle, and therefore socialism is defective, and ill adapted to secure the happiness of man.

There would be some plausibility in this argument, if it could be proved that the faculties are in full vigour while the brain is completely* disordered. Until this is done, the argument is not worth a rush—it is a most pitiful piece of sophistry. The brain may be in a state of comparative health, while the rest of the frame is becoming dilapidated. An asthma may affect the lungs, a mortification the pillars of the body, a cholera the bowels, while, at the same time, the brain

* I use the words "*thoroughly*" and "completely" for a particular reason. It is possible for one part of the brain to be disordered, whilst the patient retains the use of some of his intellectual faculties. Individuals have been known to retain the use of their faculties while tumours were in the brain. Persons have lived and thought and reasoned who have had a bullet in the brain. Mudie, in his revised edition of Wesley's Philosophy, gives two instances wherein individuals have lived for some time without a brain. One was the case of a child, who was born at Paris not only without a brain, but also without a head, instead of which it had a shapeless mass of flesh like liver. The other was the case of a child, who was born in 1673, and lived four days without any brain, cerebellum, or medulla oblongata. In these cases, very probably, the spinal marrow served as a substitute for the brain for a short space of time. These facts are not opposed to the argument in the text. It is possible for one portion of the brain to be injured, while the rest remains comparately sound. Unless it can be proved that the brain is completely disordered by either functional or organic disease, while the patient retains the perfect use of his faculties, the argument of Bishop Butler and his followers cannot be substantiated. If it be an immaterial spirit in man which thinks, and possesses a consciousness of personal identity, then that immaterial spirit must be impenetrable: in "other phrase," it is impossible for physical force to disturb its operations. But the fact which damns this opinion for ever is too well known to be controverted; viz. that pressure on the brain removes all consciousness of existence, and that when the pressure is removed consciousness returns.

may be in a tolerable state of health. If an instance could be found wherein an individual's brain is thoroughly disordered, while he retains the perfect use of his intellectual faculties, then the argument would be valid. But the very circumstances of the case forbid this. It is impossible to ascertain whether, in such a case, the brain is perfectly sound and healthy, or not. A *post mortem* examination of the organ will not suffice, because the process of decomposition commences very soon after death.* The laws, both of the country and of humanity, prohibit a dissection of the brain, before disease has done its work, and left the human being a corpse and a wreck. The only thing, therefore, that can be urged in favour of the position is a mere conjecture; but conjecture should never be received as serious argument. And even if the person, in such circumstances, were to be killed on the spot, and his brain dissected, the observations then made would not be sufficient to prove that it had been completely diseased. The struggles and agonies of death, and the cessation of life's throbbing pulse, might produce a change in it which, upon a *post mortem* examination, would lead the observer to conclude it had been disordered. It appears, therefore, that this much-vaunted and irrefragable argument amounts to no more than an unproved and worthless assertion; and that, even if it were true, it would prove too much—for if the retention of the faculties in the hour of dissolution prove in one case the independency of mind, the loss of those faculties in another case equally proves the dependency of mind. If from the former premises the inference be drawn that the mind is entirely distinct from the brain, in the latter instance we have equally strong reasons to infer that it is not distinct from and independent of the brain. If the fact of an individual retaining the use of his faculties at the hour of death be considered sufficient to prove that thought is not an attribute, or affection, of the material organ, the brain—then, when facts directly the reverse are presented to our view, we have reason to form a different conclu-

* This of course depends on the nature of the disease and the temperature of the climate.

sion. If the argument be considered valid at all, it can only be considered valid in those cases wherein the circumstances from which it derives its strength are to be found. Now many individuals retain the full use of their faculties up to the last moment of their existence: that which thinks in them, therefore, must be an immaterial spirit. But many individuals die in a state of delirium, insanity, and madness: that which thinks in them, therefore, cannot be an immaterial spirit. The proof of this latter assertion flows out of the former, the principle of induction being the same in both instances. All this, is on the supposition that the brain is thoroughly disordered while the man retains the perfect use of his faculties; but an accurate knowledge of the fact we have before shown to be unattainable.

The seat of the sentient or perceptive principle, whatever it may be, appears to be the brain. If the head of a man be cut off, or his brain taken out with the cerebellum, life ebbs swiftly away. The principal nerves upon which sensation and motion depend, originate in the brain. The principal organs of sense are placed in the vicinity of the brain, and all known disorders which affect the intellect are also seated in the brain. All these facts warrant the inference, that if the brain is not the perceiving power itself, it is at least the seat of the percipient principle.

Philosophers have occasionally propounded whimsical conjectures respecting the seat of the percipient principle. Van Helmont placed it in the mouth of the stomach, Descartes in the pineal gland, some of the ancients in the heart; some suppose it to be placed in the meninges, and others in the fourth ventricle of the brain, or in the *corpora striata.*

The before-going remarks respecting the brain can hardly be considered a digression from the main subject of this essay. If thought be an attribute of the brain, or, in other words, if thought and consciousness be produced by external things operating on the brain through the medium of the senses, then the man's capacity of judging must depend on the inferior or superior nature of his cerebral organization. But even if this were not true, still the judgment would be de-

pendent on a variety of circumstances. The individual's state of mind at the time of forming the judgment—the education he had received—his acquaintance with all the circumstances of the case—his prejudices, desires, and passions—ought all to be taken into account in forming an opinion respecting the freedom or dependency of his judgment. If, for example, a person's brain be affected with fever—if there be a strong determination of blood to the brain, so as to produce insanity, is it not evident that his capacity of judging will be defective, because his organization has become impaired?

The grand inference to be drawn from all the preceding remarks is, that as man is the creature of the associations which surround him, those associations should be of an elevating character. This is what every lover of his species would wish to behold. But the associations which surround men at present are of a degrading description. Competition, strife, domestic and political discord, heart-burnings, drunkenness, fraud, and perjury, along with a thousand other anomalous and degrading circumstances, surround our population. These things exert an unhallowed influence over human beings; and they will never be completely removed until the arrangements contemplated by the maligned and much misrepresented socialists are called into existence.

### *Sophistry Unmasked.*

The above essay was written as a refutation of an ingenious and sophistical argument, which has often been urged against our doctrine of necessity. The argument is simply this:—

First. External things produce in man perceptions.

Second. Reflection, which is an independent power of the mind, examines those perceptions.

Third. Judgment, which is also an independent power, decides which are right or which are wrong, or what course is most proper to be taken by the individual. And

Fourth. Volition, or willing, and acting follows.

The conclusion deduced from these positions by

their sapient author is, that man is free to act or not to act, free to decide or not to decide; in short, that he has a self-determining power within him, which is called (absurdly enough) free will.

If this argument be divested of all ambiguity, it amounts to a concession on the part of the arguer to his opponents. For assuming all his positions to be correct, they only prove that the primary cause (so far as man is concerned,) of the train of mental phenomena (the different parts of which are called *by our sophist* reflecting, judging, willing, &c.,) is the influence of external circumstances. Without external circumstances there can be no perceptions—without perceptions there can be no reflection—without reflection there can be no judgment—and without judgment there can be no volition, or acting. Here the different positions are interwoven with each other, and the different things alluded to are dependent on each other. Now, if the man cannot reflect, judge, and decide without external circumstances, how can he be free in the absolute sense of the term?—how can he be independent of the influence of circumstances?

But the judgment and reflection are not independent powers of the mind. They are wholly of a dependent nature. The judgment we have shown to be dependent on the inferior or superior nature of the cerebral organization, the education the man has received, and a variety of other circumstances. The process of reflection is induced by the intensity of the perceptions generated in the mind by the operation of external objects, and the volition to act or not to act is caused by the apparent preferableness or unpreferableness of the object or action. Now, the question is not whether man judges, reflects, and acts, for this all will acknowledge; but whether he could act differently in any given instance, all the inducing circumstances remaining the same, i. e., continuing to operate in the same way upon him. We assert that he could not; the author of the sophism before alluded to asserts that he could.

But it will be said that though, so long as a man's feelings and desires remain unchanged, he will certainly act in a specific manner, yet he has power

to determine on adequate motives, or to change his views and feelings. This is obviously false philosophy. The fact of a man beginning to change his feelings, implies that his feelings have already undergone an alteration. They must appear to him troublesome, or in some way disadvantageous, or he would never have determined to change them. He sees them mentally in another light to that which he saw them in before. The man's views, feelings, or conceptions, (you may call the operations of the thinking principle by any of these names, or any other you please,) have therefore become changed. How, then, could he have been the author of the change, when it has occurred before he deliberately set about the work of changing? It is impossible. The thing is an absurdity.

And even if the man did set about the act of changing his views and feelings, or of determining on adequate motives, he must have had a motive for that determination. Did he create that preliminary motive, he must then have had an ante-preliminary motive for the act of the preliminary motive's creation; and so on, *ad infinitum*.

But the fact of a man determining on adequate motives is an absurdity. A motive exists in the mind, and embraces those feelings, convictions, and desires which are produced in the man by the operation of circumstances on his senses. Now, for an individual to determine on the creation of any particular motive, implies that he is already aware of that motive; so that the fact of the motive's creation is rendered utterly impossible. For, if the mental conception already exists, how can the individual call it into being? The thing is impossible, and involves an absurdity, implying that the motive was in being before it was in being, a contradiction which I leave the *would-be reverend* to reconcile.

In conclusion, let it be observed, that any person who, with an unprejudiced mind, devotes his hours to the contemplation of man, will, we are persuaded, be convinced, by an evidence amounting almost to the force of a mathematical demonstration, that man is the creature of those associations which surround him.

## A DISSERTATION

### ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE CREATION AS TAUGHT BY MODERN CHRISTIANS, PRIESTS, AND THEIR ABETTORS.

*(Continued from page 95.)*

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It appears that the notion, that "*God was all, and all was God*," was the foundation of the polytheism of ancient times. The learned Cudworth declares that this is his opinion. "We conceive," says he, "it was the mistake and abuse of this one thing which was the chief ground and original of the both real and seeming polytheism, not only of the Greek and European, but also of the Egyptian and other pagans, they concluding that because *God was all things*, and consequently *all things God*, that therefore God ought to be worshipped *in all things*—that is, in all the several parts of the world, and things of nature—but especially in those animated intellectual beings which are superior to men. Consentaneously whereunto they did both Θεολογεῖν ἃ πάντα, *theologise, or deify, all things*, looking upon everything as having *something supernatural*, or a kind of divinity, in it. They also bestowed several names upon God, according to the several parts of the word and things of nature, calling him in the starry heavens and æther, *Jupiter;* in the air, *Juno;* in the winds, *Æolus;* in the sea, *Neptune;* in the earth and subterranean parts, *Pluto;* in learning, knowledge, and invention, *Minerva* and the *muses;* in war, *Mars;* in pleasure, *Venus;* in corn, *Ceres;* in wine, *Bacchus;* and the like."*

Now, this notion that *God was all, and all was God*, was associated with the notion of creation among the Egyptians. Indeed, a large part of the Greek mythology was derived from the Egyptian priests. Very probably the word Ζευς, *Jupiter*, and also the word *Neptune*, are Egyptian words, or at least derived from the language of that country. The vulgar amongst

* Intel. Syst., p. 308; folio edit.

the Egyptians worshipped leeks and onions, or probably made use of them in their religious ceremonies, in the same way as the Roman Catholics make use of images, pictures, and beads. Origen, writing against Celsus, saith, "To him that cometh to be a spectator of the Egyptian worship, there first offer themselves to his view most splendid and stately temples, sumptuously adorned, together with solemn groves, and many pompous rites and mystical ceremonies: but, as soon as he enters in, he perceives that it was either a cat, or an ape, or a crocodile, or a goat, or a dog, that was the object of this religious worship."

Cudworth, after quoting the above passage from Origen, observes that, "notwithstanding this multiform polytheism and idolatry of the Egyptians, they did nevertheless acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, and that this can be proved from the great fame which they anciently had over the whole world for their wisdom. The Egyptians are called by the *Elei*, in Herodotus, σοφώταροι ανθρωπων, the wisest of men; and it is a commendation that is given to one in the same writer, *that he excelled the Egyptians in wisdom*, who excelled all other mortals. Thus the encomium of *Moses* in the scripture runs, *that he* was learned in all the learning of the Egyptians; and the transcendency of Solomon's wisdom is likewise thus expressed by the writer of the book of Kings, that it excelled *the wisdom of all the children of the east country, and all the wisdom of Egypt;* where, by the children of the east, are chiefly meant the Persian magi and the Chaldeans: and there seems to be a climax here, that Solomon's wisdom did not only excel the wisdom of the magi and of the Chaldeans, but also that of the Egyptians themselves. From whence it appears, that in Solomon's time, Egypt was the chief school of literature in the whole world, and that the Greeks were then but little or not at all taken notice of, nor had any considerable fame for learning. For which cause, we can by no means give credit to that of *Philo*, in the life of Moses, that besides the Egyptian priests, learned men were sent for by Pharaoh's daughter, out of Greece, to instruct Moses. Whereas it is manifest

from the Greek monuments themselves, that for many ages after Solomon's time, the most famous of the Greeks travelled into Egypt to receive culture and literature, as *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, *Thales*, and many others, amongst whom were Pythagoras and Plato. Concerning the former of which Isocrates writes, that coming into Egypt, and being there instructed by the priests, he was the first that brought philosophy into Greece; and of the latter it is said, that not contented with that simple philosophy of Socrates, (which was little else besides morality,) *he was in love with* Egypt, and that monstrous wisdom of Pythagoras. Now, as it is not probable that the Egyptians, who were so famous for wisdom and learning, should be ignorant of one supreme deity, so is it no small argument to the contrary, that they were had in so great esteem by those two divine philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato. We grant, indeed, that after the Greeks began to flourish in all manner of literature, the fame of the Egyptians was not only much eclipsed, (so that we hear no more of the Greeks travelling into Egypt, upon the former account,) but also that their ardour towards the liberal sciences did by degrees languish and abate; so that Strabo, in his time, could find little more in Egypt besides the empty houses and palaces in which priests, famous for astronomy and philosophy, had dwelt. Nevertheless their *arcane* theology remained more or less unextinct to the last, as appears from what Origen, Porphyry, and Jamblichus, have written concerning them."*

This extract from Cudworth may be depended upon for correctness in relation to two points, which, as will presently be seen, are of peculiar importance. These are, first, that the ancient Egyptians were celebrated for their wisdom; and, second, that the Grecian philosophers travelled into Egypt for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. If, therefore, we find the doctrine of creation among the Greeks, we have reason to suppose they borrowed it from the Egyptians, from whom they borrowed so many other things; and if we find the

* Intel. Syst., b. i., c. iv., p. 312.

Grecian philosophers who had been in Egypt advocating this opinion most strenuously, we have still stronger reason to suppose it of Egyptian origin.

Pythagoras and Plato both travelled into Egypt, and both taught the doctrine of creation; not, perhaps, in the same way as modern Jews and Christians, but explicitly enough for subsequent writers to borrow the doctrine and improve on it. That Pythagoras borrowed some part of his knowledge from the Egyptians, may be argued from the method he adopted of teaching his exoteric disciples: namely, by symbols and images. Plato enriched his stores from the magazine of Pythagoras: in short, both were believers in the cosmogonia. The world, according to Pythagoras, was produced by the energy of divine intelligence.* It is supposed by him to be an animated sphere, beyond which is a perfect vacuum. In short, the great body of the heathen philosophers believed in a *theogonia*, which was the same thing as the cosmogonia; i.e., the notion of the generation of the gods implied, or was tantamount to, that of the generation of the world. This opinion can boast the authority of great names in its support. We might produce many quotations from the works of esteemed authors, tending to show that the notion is not fantastic, but, on the contrary, has been embraced and defended by the profoundest scholars. We prefer however giving a few extracts from *Cudworth*, on account of his vast erudition, and his acknowledged correctness as a writer on the opinions of the ancient philosophers. "To the end," observes he, "that we may now render this business yet something more easy to be believed, that the intelligent pagans did thus suppose all their gods, save *one*, to have been *made* or *generated*, and consequently acknowledged only one *unproduced and self-existent deity*, we shall, in this place, further observe, that the *theogonia* of those ancient pagans, their *genesis and generation of gods*, was really one and the same thing with the *cosmogonia*, the *genesis*, or *generation* of the world, and indeed both of them understood of a temporary production both of these gods and of the world. And this

* Stobæus Ecl. Phys., lib. i., c. xxv.

we shall first prove from *Plato* in his *Timæus;* where he, being to treat of the *cosmogonia*, premiseth this distinction concerning two heads of being: that some were eternal, and never made, and some made or generated, the former he calls *essence*, the latter *generation:* adding also this difference between them, that the eternal and immutable things were the proper objects of science and demonstration, but the other generated things of faith and opinion only; 'for what essence is to generation,' says he, 'the same is certainty of truth or knowledge to faith.' And thereupon he declares that his reader was not to expect the same evidence and certainty of truth from him, where he was now to treat of things generated, (namely, the gods and the visible world,) as if he had been to discourse about things immutable and eternal. Here are his words: 'If, therefore, O Socrates, many things having been spoken by many men concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us, but on the contrary to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities.' Where the gods are by Plato plainly referred to generation, and not σσία, essence, as they are also joined with the generation of the world, as being but a part thereof."*

This was also the notion of Hesid, of the Persian magi, and of almost all the Greeks. Diogenes Laertius hath recorded, according to Cudworth, concerning the Persian magi, "that they did both assert the being and generation of gods, and also that these gods were fire and earth and water; that is, that the animated elements were gods, (as Proclus before declared,) and that these, together with the world, were generated, or had a beginning. And both Laertius and Diodorus represent it as the opinion of the ancient Egyptians, that the world was generated, or had a temporary production, as also that the sun and moon, and other parts of the world, were gods. But whereas the same Diodorus writes of certain Egyptian gods, οἱ γένεσιν ἀΐδιον ἐχκοτες, which had an eternal generation: he seems to mean thereby

* Intel. Syst., p. 235; folio edit.

only the celestial gods, the sun, moon, and stars, as distinct from those other heroes and men-gods which are again thus described by him, who, though naturally mortal, yet by reason of their wisdom, virtue, and beneficence toward mankind, had been advanced to immortality."

Thus we perceive that the ancients believed in the doctrine of the cosmogonia. Their generation of the deified principles and powers of nature was the same thing as the doctrine of creation. The notion, therefore, is not peculiar to the Jews and Christians; indeed, it prevailed over all the heathen world, in the most remote periods of which we have any record. The maxim of the ancients, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, out of nothing nothing can be made, is perfectly reconcileable with this opinion, as most of the ancient philosophers believed the world to have been produced by way of emanation. This doctrine of emanation, which prevailed extensively in oriental countries, produced many fantastic opinions in theology. The learned Hyde observes, that Sharistan, an Arabian writer, gives the following account of the doctrine of Zerdusht, or Zoroaster: "Zerdusht affirmed light and darkness, Yezdan and Ahriman, to be two contrary principles, which were the origin of everything subsisting in the world, the forms of nature being produced from the combination of these principles; but maintained that the existence of darkness is not to be referred to the one supreme deity, who is without companion or equal, but must be considered as the unavoidable consequence of his determination to create the world, in which light can no more subsist without darkness, than a visible body can exist without its shadow." Theodorus Mopsuestenus, a Nestorian bishop, in his book concerning the magian religion, declares that, "according to their doctrine, (i.e., the magi,) Zerva, the chief of all the gods, produced Hormisda and Satana.* This word *Satana* seems very like the name of the Christian devil, *(Satan,)* and very probably in the sequel we shall behold the devil among the Persians.

*(To be continued.)*

* Fabric Bibl. Græc., vol. xiv., p. 137.

## REMARKABLE PROOF OF THE SUPERIORITY OF EDUCATION OVER PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT,

### AS IT REGARDS THE REFORMATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL.

THE maxim, that "prevention is better than cure," is as true in theory as its reduction to practice would be beneficial to society. The state, instead of enacting wise laws, calculated to prevent the formation of vicious habits on the part of its children, has hitherto been content with the institution of measures, whereby, crime when committed shall be punished. This is one of the many anomalies which are to be found in the present state of society. But, truly, it is not the best way to reform ignorant and vicious individuals. The causes of crime should be removed, and salutary instruction imparted, and then the effects would be no longer observable. Man is a restless, active being; and, if his attention be not turned to those things which are excellent, it will undoubtedly be concentrated on those which are injurious. The legitimate object of all punishment is the reformation of the offender, and the good influence which his punishment is supposed to exercise on society at large. "We must make him" (Dr. Dodd) "an example," was the sentiment uttered by that royal madman, George III. But the apparently good effects resulting from the infliction of corporeal punishment are exceedingly questionable. It is probable, that the evil generated by such proceedings vastly preponderates over the good. The best way to reform a vicious character is to remove the incentives to crime—

> "To pour the fresh instruction on his mind,
> To breathe the enlivening spirit, and to fix
> The generous purpose in his glowing breast."

In proof of this general assertion, take the following story, related by Abulfaragius, and quoted by Enfield, in his abridgment of Brucker's History of Philosophy, lib. v., c. i., p. 426.

"A distinguished place among the Arabian philosophers is due to *Jacobus* Al-Kendi, of Bassora. His father was prefect of Cufa under Muhamed Mohdi and Rashid; whence it appears that Al-Kendi flourished in the caliphate of Al-Mamon; that is, at the beginning of the ninth century. He devoted himself to learning and philosophy in the school of Bassora, and attained such distinction among his contemporaries, that he was called, by way of eminence, the philosopher. After the manner of the age, he yielded implicit submission to the authority of Aristotle, and was chiefly occupied in interpreting and illustrating his writings. He did not, however, confine himself to these studies; for we find his name mentioned among the mathematicians and astronomers of the times; and his medical writings, which are still extant, prove that he had made no inconsiderable figure among the Arabian physicians. Abulfaragius, speaking of Al-Kendi, relates a memorable instance of his moderation towards a malicious adversary. Whilst this philosopher was visiting the schools of Bagdat, which was at this time the chief resort of the learned, his attempts to promote the study of philosophy, and to reconcile the doctrines of Islamism with the principles of reason, gave great offence to one of the interpreters of the Koran, who, doubtless, began to be afraid lest the increase of knowledge should expose the absurdity of the vulgar superstitions. This bigot publicly expressed the most vehement indignation against Al-Kendi, and accused him of impiety and heresy. Al-Kendi, however, instead of restraining the fury of his persecutor by violence, as through his interest with the caliph he might easily have done, generously attempted the more gentle method of subduing his malignity by enlightening his understanding. Having detected the design which this Abu Maashar (that was the zealot's name,) had formed upon his life, he employed against him no other weapons than the monitions and precepts of philosophy. Well knowing the power of wisdom to meliorate the temper, he found means to engage a preceptor to instruct him, first in mathematics, and afterwards in philosophy. The consequence was, that the man who had not long before

inveighed with savage ferocity against Al-Kendi, soon became sensible of his folly, and offered himself as a pupil to the philosopher whom he had persecuted. Al-Kendi received him with the most meritorious condescension, and his convert became an ornament to his school. In fine, on account of his virtues no less than his learning, Al-Kendi is entitled to an honourable rank among philosophers."

The above story speaks volumes on the superiority of instruction over punishment, as it regards the reformation of offenders. We will therefore simply ask the question, and leave it to be solved by our readers, whether it would not be better if society were to educate the rising generation, and place around youth such arrangements as would conduce to the formation of a superior moral character, than leave them to grow up in ignorance, surrounded with vicious associations, and then punish them when they have committed crime.

## SOCIALISM CONSIDERED AS THE MORAL REGENERATOR OF MODERN SOCIETY.

*(Continued from page 68.)*

But the evils we have mentioned, as springing out of the operations of individualism, are not the only evils attributable to it. It is, in short, the prolific source of moral mischief and political oppression. It not only blasts the blossom of benevolence in the bud, withers and dries up the springs of generous feeling, but it also embarrasses legislators, and obliges them to enact laws which, in many instances, are of an oppressive and sanguinary character. The moral badness and evil consequences of some of these laws should not be attributed so much to the ambition, cupidity, and party spirit of legislators, as to the system which compels them thus to legislate. They are obliged to make laws

for the many and not for the few; and no law which they can enact will suit the view of all parties, or prove in its workings beneficial to all classes of society. If the good it produces preponderates over the evil, the legislator is justified in pronouncing it a wise and well-concocted measure, and *vice versa*. Now, it frequently happens that legislators are obliged, by the peculiar circumstances in which they are placed, to enact laws which tend to lessen the amount of human happiness and retard the progress of real knowledge. As the government of the country is supported by the revenue, drawn from the consumption of exciseable articles, it is absolutely necessary that certain restraints should be placed on the cupidity of individuals who would otherwise evade the statutory regulations. These regulations are sometimes so strict that they repress industry and enterprise, and drive capital and skill from the field of useful labour, instead of causing them to be embarked in mercantile speculation. But if society was based on proper principles—if men were properly trained and educated—if the state was really (as it ought to be,) the mother of all born within it, such frauds would not be perpetrated, and therefore there would be no necessity for the enactment of those preventive measures which so often prove detrimental to the well being of some class or party. But abandoning speculation, let us adduce facts. In proof of these general assertions, we quote the following remarks of a judicious author,* on the subject of the malt acts, as they stood in 1833.

"Malting is, in itself, a very simple process. It consists in wetting the barley till it begins to sprout, and then checking the vegetative process suddenly by the heat. This produces a saccharine substance in the grain, which is the essence of malt."

"Before any person can commence business as a malster, he must take out a licence, renewable annually. But the mere possession of a licence does not authorize him to take a single step in the way of his business. Before attempting to construct, use, or alter cisterns, frames, kilns, or utensils of any sort, he must give a

* Vide An Attempt to show the Justice, &c., of an Income Tax; appendix, p. 63. Lond., 1833.

written notice to the next exciseman. Neither is it enough that this functionary should be privy to his plans. The form and fashion of all the principal implements which the manufacturer may have to make use of is fixed by statute. Though he were to discover that he might either expedite his business or improve the quality of his malt, by making an alteration in his machinery, he is prohibited from doing so. The law has prescribed the sort of implements the manufacturer shall use, and however ill contrived, clumsy, or costly, he dares not change or amend them. We could easily excuse the regulations about cisterns and so forth, were the manufacturer allowed to use them, when once constructed, as he may think proper. But the malster can do nothing without giving twenty-four hours previous notice to the excise. And it is fixed (7 and 8 George IV., § 21,) that no grain shall be put into the cistern except between the hours of eight o'clock, A. M. and two o'clock P. M., though it may be taken out of the cistern any time between seven A. M. and four P. M.

"The malster must cover his barley with water forty hours, and not more than fifty-five hours, or forfeit a penalty of £100; or else he must, before wetting, intimate to the officer that he intends to immerse the grain sixty-five hours; but should he afterwards, on observing the effects of the wetting, think it expedient to draw off the water a little sooner, it is not in his power—it being specially enacted that grain put into a cistern, under the notice in question, shall continue to be covered with water for and until the expiration of the sixty-five hours as aforesaid; and any malster who should, in order to save his grain from being spoiled, take it out before the specified time, is for every such offence to forfeit and lose the sum of £100. (§ 24.)

"A malster is entitled to change the water upon his grain; but he must previously intimate his intention to the officer, specifying the hour when he intends to draw off the water, taking care that it shall be between eight o'clock A. M. and two P. M.; on condition, however, that the grain be again completely covered with water, within an hour from the period when it was begun to be drawn off."

"If the exciseman imagine that the grain is closer

in the cistern than it ought to be (for even the degree of its density is fixed by statute), he may measure it; and if he report that there is an increase of one twentieth part over the statutory allowance, the malster shall for every such offence forfeit £100. (§ 33.)

"It is ordered (§ 29,) that if any malster shall use more than one cistern, he shall empty and take all such corn or grain from and out of all such cisterns, at one and the same time. If he should neglect this rule, and empty one cistern before he begins emptying another, he will be visited by the penalty of £200. When one cistern or a number of cisterns have been emptied, no more cisterns can be emptied in the same place, until after a period of four days, or ninety-six hours, have elapsed. This regulation is also enforced under a penalty of £200."

Our author goes on to describe a variety of other statutory regulations respecting malt; and then sums up the whole in these words: "The regulations thus briefly described may, to state their operations in a few words, be said to have, at one and the same time, the effect of unnecessarily fettering the operations of the malster, of deteriorating the quality, and adding to the price of his malt; and of putting him wholly in the power of the officer of the excise. The consequence of such a state of things is, that many most respectable persons and much capital have been driven from the trade, that fraud and corruption pervade all its departments, and that the business of malting is infected with all those abuses which inevitably beset every business conducted on fictitious and contradictory principles."

Fictitious and contradictory indeed are the principles, on which not only the malt trade, but almost all other trades are conducted. There is little that is reasonable or in accordance with the social principle in man in the competitive system. The whole is artificial, the legitimate offspring of cupidity, ignorance, and superstition. If a discovery should happen to be made in the arts or sciences, its author is not unfrequently allowed to languish in obscurity and indigence, unless he is patronized by the great, or is possessed of an independent fortune; and his discovery is suffered to remain, like himself, unnoticed and unknown. If the

avarice of a capitalist should happen to be aroused by the fame of this discovery, and he have a fair prospect of money being put into his coffers by its reduction to practice, it will probably be thrown into operation. If not, it will be lost to the world, recorded perhaps on the pages of a few literary and scientific journals, but performing no good service to society at large. How different would be the fate of genius, if socialism prevailed! The public, having time and capital at will, would soon concur in any project likely to advance the general welfare. Thus scientific improvement would advance with rapid strides, and those oppressive enactments which now banish capital from the field of industrial enterprise would only be known as things which had once existed. Accounts of them would probably be preserved in the public libraries as monuments of the irrationality of the whole world; but, practically speaking, they would be known no more.

Now socialism may be considered as the moral regenerator of modern society, because it is calculated to subvert the system which produces such sanguinary results. Embracing wise and beneficial arrangements relative to the four great departments of the science of society—viz., the production of wealth, the distribution of wealth, the formation of character, and government—it bids fair to overturn every opposing system. But the revolutions it may occasion will be bloodless and peaceful. The widow's tear, the orphan's shriek—

"The shock of battle and the din of war's alarms"—

form not either the companions of its course, or the consequences of its progress. Surrounded with that moral magnificence which genuine philanthropy alone can confer, it has gone forth to the world on its errand of mercy, proclaiming peace and goodwill to men. Mercantile competition, with the numerous and fearful evils it engenders, must wither at its touch, and shrink from its presence. In short, it will never cease battling with vice, poverty, and wretchedness, until they be eradicated from the world, and the human family formed into one fraternal brotherhood, united by bonds which are never to be broken.

*(To be continued.)*

# PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

## NO. III.

## *On the true Standard of Morals.*

As the saintly advocates of superstition so frequently and violently declaim against the moral turpitude and baseness of socialism, it is in some measure necessary that the advocates of that system should endeavour to remove a little of the vast heap of mental rubbish which has been generally associated with those ideas men have formed respecting the source of moral obligation, and those rules of propriety which ought to influence the conduct of a rational being throughout life. This is a subject of vast importance, and a right understanding of it may be productive of the most solid advantages. By obtaining a correct knowledge of the true theory of morals, we shall improve our understandings, refine our tastes, and be enabled to appreciate the true merits of those ecclesiastical tirades which are so often levelled against the supposed immorality of social reform.

The advocates of priestly imposture and ecclesiastical despotism frequently appear stultified with a sort of pious horror, when they hear of a theory of morals in connection with socialism. According to their opinion no individual can be truly moral unless he recognizes the truth of the principles which they advocate; unless he bends the neck of his reason to their galling yoke; unless he permits them to feel his spiritual pulse, and persuade him that he is morally diseased throughout all the ramifications of his mental constitution—"that the whole head is sick and the whole heart faint—" and that "from the top of his *caput* to the soles of his feet there is nothing but wounds, and bruises, and putrifying sores;" unless he allows them to attempt a cure by administering spiritual pills of sawdust and asafœtida, secundem artem, to mend his spiritual appetite, until "*hic jacet* finishes what *recipe* began." It

is therefore highly important that all socialists should endeavour to obtain a correct notion of a true theory of morals, so that they may be enabled to weigh in the balance of a sound judgment the accusations of their malignant adversaries.

The principles of social morality, though their existence has been coeval with that of humanity, are, nevertheless, of modern date, as it respects their systematic adjustment and combination. If these principles are true, there never was a time in the whole range of man's existence wherein they did not exist, nor can there ever be a period in his history wherein they shall cease to be. Hence we are warranted to predicate of them both modernism and antiquity:—antiquity as it respects their real existence, and modernism as it respects their recent combination into a system.

Now, this apparent novelty with which socialism is invested, at once tends to retard its progress and accelerate its course. By attracting the attention of the public, it causes a knowledge of the principles to be more generally diffused; and by opposing the love of the antique, which is so natural to some minds, it, in some measure, militates against its own advancement. There is such a thing as habit, and men from its influence are often disposed to adhere to ancient institutions and opinions in preference to those which are characterized by freshness. *Ensor* observes, that "so late as the time of Pausanius, in a temple of Hercules, at Hyetts, the god was represented, according to ancient usage, by a rude stone. Juno, at Samos, had a like substitute; and the Orchomenians adored even the graces under the same uncouth and barbarous form. This reverence for antiquity will sometimes continue after another superstition has become the law of the land. At Cyprus," according to Pococke, "the women make an annual procession to the sea, in remembrance of Venus emerging from that element; and the Catholic Welsh," according to Hume, "had a great wooden idol called Garvel Gatherin, so late as the sixteenth century."*

* Principles of Morality, p 91.

Burke, in his Essay on Taste, remarks "that men are more inclined to belief than incredulity; because by incredulity they part with what they reputed knowledge. To desire ignorant men to question their opinions is more intolerable than to require their belief in the greatest absurdity. To affirm boldly, gratifies the multitude; when something is decided they think something is done." Thus they deceive themselves, and render their habits inveterately vicious. Men persevere in error, lest, by embracing more correct opinions, they should be compelled to reflect on their own mistakes. Locke, in his Essay on the Human Understanding, has remarked that, "had men leisure, parts, and will, there are few that dare shake the foundation of their past thoughts and actions, and endure to bring on themselves the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error."

Now this reverence for all time-hallowed institutions and doctrines, and the popular tendency to credulity to which we have alluded, become signally manifested when religion or morality is the theme of discourse or contemplation. If the conduct of an individual varies in the slightest degree from the ordinary and received standard of morals, that conduct is considered by many immoral, indecorus, and profane. If the sweep of an individual's judgment, and the keenness of his intellectual vision, enable him to detect the defectiveness of the ordinary standard of morals, and the consequent folly and impropriety of a rigid conformity to it, that is a consideration which seldom enters into the calculations of those who set themselves up for universal censors. Having erected a standard of propriety for themselves or their party, or having received some crude and defective code of morals from their rude and unpolished ancestors, they deem any departure from it an unwarrantable crime, and stigmatize, with the most unblushing effrontery, its perpetrator with immorality and licentiousness.

These remarks are peculiarly applicable to those men who brand the socialists with blasphemy and moral degradation. Trained from infancy to manhood to regard certain dogmas as divine, habituated to believe all

the assertions and maxims of the priests as true, they are disposed to censure those actions which do not accord with those maxims, and to repudiate as unorthodox, unsound, and dangerous, any system of morals which does not dovetail into the one they have adopted. From these or similar causes springs that outcry which has been raised against the supposed immorality of socialism, by its bitter opponents. The socialists, say the "oracles of fanaticism," are an immoral set of men. Their objects are "to proscribe religion, extinguish the affections which spring out of consanguinity and the domestic relations, destroy property by merging it into a common fund, annihilate civil government, unnerve the arm of industry, and quell the heart of commercial enterprise; and, in short, resolve society into its constituent elements, and reduce man to a level with his compeers of the jungle and the wilderness." This passage, which I have given, *mutatis mutandis*, in the language of the Rev. Dr. Styles, no doubt appeared the very beau ideal of modern eloquence to its reverend author. But it has one fault, and that a very serious one, a fault which is sufficient to damn, in the eyes of all sensible men, the finest piece of composition that ever was produced by the genius of a Homer, a Cicero, or a Demosthenes—that fault is, a total want of truth, it being, on the part of its reverend author, either a downright stupid blunder, or a gross and wilful libel.

It is not our intention, in this essay, to reply to these charges, *seriatim*, but to trace them to the cause we have specified. They have been put forward again and again, by the opponents of socialism, and as often refuted as put forth. The men who thus caricature the principles of the socialist are either sincere in their opposition, or, if they are not sincere, they find it their interest to rail, and rant, and roar (and do anything and everything but speak the truth,) against a system which is rapidly undermining their credit, their ill-gotten affluence, and their power. With such insincere opponents we will hold no controversy. The measure of their deceit will ultimately prove the measure of their punishment. We do not envy them the possession of feelings which, while they afford in the moment of

triumph a thrill of mad and unhealthy pleasure, at the same time debase the character and render their possessors contemptible in the eyes of the wise and good. But as it respects the opposition of those who, in sincerity and truth, deem our system erroneous and immoral, we confidently affirm that it springs from the cause we have mentioned, viz., an observed departure from established usages and time-hallowed codes of morals.

There is one virtue (if it deserves the name,)—at least, one quality, in most instances held in high estimation, which our most bitter enemies are obliged to acknowledge we possess. I allude to that firmness of purpose, that decision of character, which is usually termed moral courage. It requires a considerable share of this, to enable individuals to publicly question the truth of those dogmas which have received for centuries the popular acquiescence. It is much more easy to allow your frail bark to glide noiselessly down the stream of life, than to stand up in all the dignity of your moral manhood, endeavouring to stem the current of error, and battling with the winds and waters. To acquiesce in the popular belief is companionable, and very often produces a harvest of golden advantages. But to select for yourself a solitary labour—to break over the boundaries of prescriptive delusion—to laugh at the petulance of timid friends, the calumnies of a hireling priesthood, and the clamour of the vulgar,—requires a high degree of fortitude, and an exemplary elevation of character. This the socialists have done. The priesthood, surrounded as they are and have been with wealth and power and popularity, are opposed to our projects. Yet, in spite of all their opposition, in the very teeth of their most bitter calumnies, their studied evasion of inquiry, their dogmatism and ecclesiastical thunder, we have succeeded in establishing and organizing a system which is destined to overturn every rival, and ultimately sway its mild and beneficent sceptre over the entire population of the globe. And surely it required some energy of character, some amount of moral courage, to be equal to this task!

The conqueror who abandons for a time his native

home, and ploughs the briny waters, or visits foreign countries, for purposes of conquest, to increase either his fame or his dominions, requires not half the amount of moral energy required by the socialist. When the passions of mankind beat in unison with our enterprizes, and their prejudices become enlisted in our favour, it is then comparatively easy to perform deeds of high and valorous daring; but when those prejudices and passions run counter to our projects, it is absolutely necessary that we should possess courage, coolness, and fortitude, in order to make sure of their accomplishment. Now the conqueror, who combats the most gigantic difficulties, is placed in the former position, and the socialists in the latter. The warlike monarch marches to battle either from a restless love of adventure, or to increase his territorial possessions by the spoliation of another's, or from some other cause. His subjects in arms behold his actions, and applaud his prowess. The fame of his victories is echoed from shore to shore. He receives in return for his labours the adulation of the courtier, the esteem of the soldier, the gratitude of his country, and even the admiration of his enemies, His cupidity and ambition are both gratified by the increase of his riches and power. When he returns from his toils he is sure to meet with a flattering reception from his own subjects; in addition to which, the poet, the orator, and the historian, combine their talents to perpetuate his fame. Here are a train of circumstances adapted to stimulate the hero to deeds of violence, conquest, and bloodshed. But with the socialist the case is reversed. The trophies which he acquires are of a moral and peaceful character. He has to encounter popular fury, indignation, and resentment. Misrepresentation and abuse are the rewards he may expect from the multitude for his benevolent exertions to remove their burdens, and better the condition of a suffering population. The free expression of his opinions is considered a mark of a depraved heart. His conscientious adherence to what he deems the truth, is exhibited as the symptom of a defective judgment; and his direct and open avowal of the benign principles of socialism,

renders him a fit object at which to let fly the arrows of religious persecution. Surely it requires moral courage, and a high degree of fortitude, to enable an individual in such circumstances to stand up and boldly and bravely battle with existing errors.

When individuals declare that the standard of morals adopted by the socialists varies considerably from the received and ordinary standard, they scarcely know what they say, nor do they appear to understand the morality of which they discourse. It cannot be said, with truth, that there is any standard of morals which is universally received by men in preference to all other standards. If we take nature for our guide and text book in this affair, we shall very probably be able to find one simple rule to which every action of the human being should be conformable; but if we take as our guides the writings of moralists, we shall find little but endless controversies, and wild and vapid speculation. Even among Christian divines there is an immense variety of opinion on this subject. One party contending that the true test of sound morality is the will of the deity, as revealed in his word; and another maintaining that there is a certain necessary difference between actions which, apart from all considerations relative to the divine will, make some actions vicious and others virtuous, some desirable and others the reverse. Now, before our enemies can consistently charge us with immorality, they ought to definitely settle the question, prove some particular theory of morals to be the only true and just one, and then ascertain whether our actions are conformable thereto or not. But this has not yet been done; and therefore the charge of immorality, so frequently urged against us, is vague and indefinite—either the result of ignorance, or gross and calumnious misrepresentation.

It has been observed by Belsham, that the only valuable end of existence is happiness. "This is plain; for no person, if he had it in his own option, would accept of existence but upon conditions of a preponderance of happiness. Who, for example, would desire, or, if he could avoid it, would submit,

to exist in a future state, if he had not reason to expect that it would be a state of preponderant felicity?"

"Suppose that existence in misery should be offered to any being, as a necessary means of good to others. No one, I am persuaded, would accept of the proposal who did not expect that the delightful consciousness of his generous feelings would counterbalance the misery to which he exposed himself." But, as has been well observed by the author before quoted, "this is contrary to the hypothesis which assumes the supposition of unalleviated misery."

"Experience assures us that, by a law of our nature, preponderant misery ultimately resolves itself into an excess of clear, unalleviated misery. So that all suppositions ultimately terminate either in pure misery or happiness, which are therefore the only cases which need to be considered. Now, whatever some may have imagined, or however incorrectly they may have expressed themselves upon the subject, no axiom can be more indubitable than this, that existence in pure, unalleviated misery cannot be the object of rational choice."*

*(To be continued.)*

## SOCIALISM CONSIDERED AS THE MORAL REGENERATOR OF MODERN SOCIETY.

*(Continued from page* 120.*)*

THERE cannot be a stronger proof of the march of social science, than the strong opposition manifested towards it by its enemies. If the cause of social reform was likely to die a natural death very soon, the

* Belsham's Men. Phil., p. 370.

abettors of superstition, and the advocates of things as they are, would gloat over the prospect of its final ruin with silent exultation, and sing in anticipation *Te Deums* at its funeral. In short, if we had no opposition, we would be likely to grow faint-hearted, because we would naturally consider that our cause was on the decline, and that our enemies despised it as a falling foe. But when we behold them on the move, active, and stirring—when we see them banding together for purposes hostile to socialism, and listen to the echoes of their voices as they ring through the long drawn aisle or gloomy chapel, in denunciation of social reform, we read in such proceedings our onward progress, and consider them as the certain indications of the high station and commanding attitude which our cause has assumed.

We cannot rightly divine the reasons why we should be pursued with such indignation and malice; why we should be denounced as immoral and flagitious; why we should meet with such coldness from the world, and such rebukes from our friends and relations, especially when the genuine objects of socialism are taken into account. It is, in some measure, necessary that these should be perpetually explained and enforced by the propounders of social opinions, in order that the public may become acquainted with our real designs, and not be led astray by the misrepresentation of our adversaries.

Now, the objects which the genuine socialist has in view, and for the accomplishment of which he incessantly labours, may all be comprised in the following propositions:—

First. The institution of measures calculated to facilitate the production of wealth.

Second. The institution of measures calculated to produce a more equal distribution of the wealth thus produced. And

Third. The institution of measures whereby the rising generation shall be made to possess a superior moral character, and thus the aggregate of human happiness be increased.

We have already stated these things at the commence-

ment of our inquiry, and it is necessary to recur to them again, for their further elucidation.

Wealth is defined by Scrope to be any "purchasable commodity." This definition appears to us incorrect, and wholly of a conventional nature, implying that value in exchange is indispensably necessary to constitute anything an object of wealth. "Value in exchange," observes Thompson, "is not necessary, though it almost always attaches to the idea of wealth: for small communities have been happy by labour in common without any exchanges. Would not woollen cloth be wealth, though every man made his own coat? Without value in exchange, an article ever so much an object of desire to him that owns it, and produced by ever so much of his labour, can have no marketable value: it will not in a market be exposed for sale to those who have no desire for it: but that does not make it less an object of wealth to him who desired it on account of its usefulness, and who wisely employed himself in fabricating it for his own convenience." The same author remarks that without labour there is no wealth. "Labour is its distinguishing attribute. The mere agency of nature constitutes nothing an object of wealth, its energies being exerted equally and in common in the production of all the means of enjoyment, whether objects of wealth or not."

There are many things which are useful to man, and without which he could not exist, which cannot be denominated articles of wealth. The atmosphere which surrounds this terraqueous globe, and which is indispensably necessary to all the living things on its surface—the sunlight which gives life and beauty and freshness to the landscapes which spread around us—the water which we find in nature without the employment of labour in its production,—all these things, and many more of a similarly useful character, are not objects of wealth. Why? Because labour has not been expended on their production. They are the free and spontaneous bounties of nature. They exist in, above, beneath, and around us, and no more exertion than that of appropriating is required to make them our own. Wealth may therefore be defined

to be anything that is useful to man, and in the fabricating of which labour has been employed.

The several things produceable by labour which minister to human enjoyment, may all be classified under two heads.

First. Those which gratify the natural, and,

Second, Those which supply the artificial, wants of civilized men. The former division embraces food, clothing, and a comfortable habitation; and the latter involves the same things only on a much more extended, refined, and luxurious scale. The design of socialism is to institute measures whereby these articles shall be produced in greater abundance, of a better quality, and with less labour than usual. The means to effect this desirable object, are the unlimited application of the principle of co-operation, the establishment of communities of united interests, and the useful employment of the various talents and abilities which may be possessed by the members of the community. Now we do not attempt to deny that society at present wears somewhat of a co-operative aspect. Indeed, the principle is necessary either to a greater or a less extent, to conserve the weal of any commonwealth or society of men. Without it human beings would degenerate into solitary savages, isolated each from the other, and subjected to all the inconveniences of rude and barbarous life. "The system of the division of labour," observes Scrope, "might be equally called the combination of labour, since its effect is the co-operation of many labourers to produce one common result. In fact, wherever this system has made any considerable progress, the society assumes emphatically a co-operative character. Every member is dependent on the aid of others for everything that he does and for everything that he enjoys. The ploughman cannot turn a furrow without the aid of the wheelwright and smith. These can do nothing without that of the timber-merchant, the miner, and the smelter. These again must be assisted by the rope-maker, the powder-manufacturer, the engineer, the carrier, and several others: while all depend upon the baker, butcher, mealman, grazier, &c., for their supplies of food, and on the cotton and cloth

weaver, the flax and wool grower, the tailor and the importer of cotton, &c., for their supply of clothing. All society is, in fact, one closely woven web of mutual dependence, in which every individual fibre gains strength and utility from its entwinement with the rest. But, while all the members of society co-operate for a common purpose—the increase of the general welfare, each individual is still strictly occupied in pursuing his own exclusive interest in whatever way he likes best."

"And here," continues our author, "is to be seen the vast superiority of the principle of freedom over that of compulsion—of that system of co-operation which springs naturally and spontaneously from the natural wants of man, over that artificial, forced, and premeditated system of co-operation which of late has been put forward by the *erratic and visionary philanthropist, Mr. Owen, and some of his followers.*"

Hear this, ye advocates of social reform, and tremble beneath the denunciations of the intellectually despotic Mr. Scrope. But, hold! There is no necessity for trembling. His denunciations are not so very terrible, when we afford them an impartial scrutiny, and compare the position he assumes with the real facts of the case.

Now labour, according to Mr. Scrope, is in the present state of society free, and in communities of united interests it would not be free, but be "compulsory, forced, and premeditated." The conclusion drawn from these assumptions is, that, as liberty is preferable to bondage, the present state is preferable to that which the socialists wish to see established.

Labour is only free in the present state of society in a much less degree than it would be in a community. Man must labour, whether in community or out of it. The only freedom, therefore, which the labourer enjoys, in the present state of society, is that of ceasing to work altogether, and so starving, or that of changing his avocation for one that is more advantageous and agreeable. The freedom to cease from working altogether is seldom taken advantage of, unless there be an acquired independency, or some other means of support; and the other sort of freedom cannot possibly

be enjoyed by the major portion of our labourers and operatives. Under the present arrangements of society, they are trained to one peculiar calling, and to that calling they must adhere, simply because they can obtain a livelihood in no other way. It is true there are exceptions, but we are now speaking of the majority, and not of those few gifted individuals who are qualified to pursue many avocations. Now many employments are altogether unsuited to the constitution of the workman who may be employed. An individual whose business requires much stooping may contract a disease in the chest or lungs, or some other important organ of the body. This disease might be cured by his pursuing some other avocation, but this he cannot do. He is bound to the trade he has learned by the iron chain of necessity, and the consequence, in too many instances, is, that he is swept off the stage of being into a premature grave. View the haggard features of those craftsmen who are compelled to toil through the short period of their existence, breathing an unwholesome atmosphere, inhaling the most noxious effluvia. Behold, their forms, which were once athletic and muscular, have become gaunt and bony; their arms, which were wont to be stalwart and sinewy, have shrunk in their dimensions, and are now comparatively nerveless; their cheeks, which once glowed with the blush of health, are now pale or sallow; and their eyes, which once sparkled with all the fire and animation of youth and vigour, have become dull in their sockets: in short, their whole appearance declares their occupation to be unhealthy. Would these men continue in such circumstances, if they could better themselves? Would they prefer the effluvia of art to the bracing winds of heaven, and the mole-like occupation of burrowing in the earth perpetually to the prospect of the clear, blue sky studded with ten thousand worlds, and the wide landscape of universal nature? Yet these men are compelled to toil on till death, which is free labour with a vengeance.

*(To be continued.)*

## ALBERT

### A TALE.

The blue streams wand'ring down the distant mountain,
Seem cloth'd in shining vests; the redbreast sings
His lively carol; and each sparkling fountain,
(Fed by an unknown host of hidden springs,)
Glows in the sun. I'll therefore take a flaunting
Through earth and heaven, borne on my muse's wings;
I'll make her sing; and if she proves refractory,
I'll send her to a cotton manufactory.

There for her crimes I'll set her to a spinning
On one of Alfred Hammersmith's steel spindles;
Nor shall I let her cease till she stops sinning
Against the bard;—my very brain-fire dwindles,
When she the day in her own way is winning;
But when she's condescending, and enkindles
The fire within, O, heavens! what a great rout
There's in my head and bosom too. "No doubt."

I ponder then upon the silent streams,
The barking torrent, and the tempest's howl—
The lightning's vengeful bolt, the evening's beams,
Reddening the valleys, whilst the mastiff's growl
Floats on the breeze, and pierces till it seems
Like the dread cry of those fierce beasts which prowl
Through Mexico's dark forests, when the night
Secretes them from the Indian hunter's sight.

I ponder too on those deep searching glances
Which some one cast on me six months ago.
I really don't know why a look entrances
The heart and all the tender passions so—
But this my curiosity enhances,
Because the maid is wise I cannot know
The cause of her disquiet; but I've got
A notion that I say things I ought not.

And so I will return to my muse,
I left her spinning, in a cotton factory,
Thread to make linings for a pair of shoes,
Some of which went to form a Jew's phylactery;
I mean to tear her from those dank dull stews—
I call them dull, although for a refractory
Muse they are excellent—the spindles' chiming
Might set the dullest poet's muse a rhyming.

Lo I behold her perfectly enraptur'd
With her new birth. How can I think of trying
To force her from it? for a muse, when captur'd,
Must have her wings clipp'd, else she would be flying
Away. Besides, my cranium might be fractured,
If, whilst describing some poor lover dying,
She flapped her wings. Elves break men's bones with charms;
And why should not a muse wield the same arms?

Without her aid I thus proceed to rhyme:
The sun's bright daughter, dewy, fresh, and fair,
Peeped o'er the hills, and from her own blue clime
Shed peace upon the world—the lark in air
Hailed her return with songs—the blackbird's chime
Rang through the woods so sweetly, that old Care
In a splenetic humour took to flight,
For fear she should be murder'd before night.

"But who the melodies of morn can tell?"
'Tis Beattie asks the question, and not me;
I do not deem it quite unanswerable,
For Thompson, Tasso, Byron, Beattie,
And he who sung of the fierce pains of Hell,
And of the dire apostate's misery,
Could sing of morning's charms in stanzas sweet,
And, lark-like, with a song her rising greet.

Campbell and Elliott, Dryden and Montgomery,
Have sweetly sung of morn. I do not praise
Them, for such praise would be accounted flummery,
Coming from one so little vers'd in lays
Of love, of war, of sound sense, or of mummery:
This last-named article in these last days
Oft decks the poet's song, the parson's sermon,
But shines conspicuously 'mid beer-shop vermin.

Return we to our tale. The morn arose,
And clothed the wide world in a robe of dew;
Brighten'd the stream which murmurs as it flows
Through the green vale; the distant mountains blue
Were lit with sunny glances, bright as those
Which a fair damsel once upon me threw,
Seizing thereby my fond heart as a prize,
All blasted with the lightning of her eyes.

A few grey clouds were o'er the blue sky floating,
Adding fresh beauties to the rural scene;
And—but excuse me; if I thus stay quoting
The charms of morn, and singing of its sheen,
My tale will ne'er begin—I have been doting
Not to begin it sooner: so I ween
We had as good say Albert rose and dress'd,
And wander'd forth to view the morning's vest.

The newly-risen yellow morning sun
Pour'd on his head a genial flood of lustre,
Which fill'd his heart with joy; the birds began
Around the elm's wide waving boughs to cluster:
If my muse had been there, she might have spun
A wondrous tale; but now I dare not trust her,
Because, as I have said, she hath deserted
Me, and with cotton spinners basely flirted.

And Albert gazed upon the purple sky,
The sun-lit river, and the freshened world;
The dewy-fretted flowrets caught his eye,
So did the vapours which in columns curl'd
Over the valleys; then he heav'd a sigh,
Just as a troop of morning zephyrs hurl'd
Those misty light fantastic wreaths away,
Which shrouded like a mask the face of day.

I wonder what he sigh'd for—he was happy,
In having many things which others want;
No one could say his conduct had been shabby,
For conscience could not prick him on this point;
Besides, he usually used good rappee;
And other snuffs, which shopmen often vaunt
Of, as the best preservatives of health,
But say so merely to increase their wealth.

He had four steeds, a neat and well stocked farm,
Two servant girls, as kind as they were pretty,
A house to screen him from the wintry storm,
A mother too, (I think her name was Betty;)
He had six feather beds all soft and warm,
And, as the best of all, he had no debt. He
Had many other things which I wont mention
Because they don't deserve a bard's attention.

Yet still he sighed when he beheld the breezes
Dashing the mists away, though such a sight
Rarely a tottering invalid displeases;
Who knows they brace the nervous system tight,
And free man from a number of diseases,
Which soon would land him in the realms of light
Or darkness, were he not to breathe the air
Of morning, which makes people fresh and fair.

He sigh'd, the reason why I cannot tell;
And yet I'll humbly offer a conjecture—
Love disappointed forms the lover's hell.
Here my young muse steps in to give a lecture
On moral feelings, asking if 'tis well
To speak thus; but I'll very soon detect her
Garbling my song. If so, I'll say, you wretch,
Begone, or I shall send you to Jack Ketch.

Grant that he loved—we then proceed to found
A tale upon this gentle supposition.
A disappointed lover has bad ground
To hope for present peace in a condition
Which I found sad once, when I lov'd a maid not sound
But false, who like most other maids was wishing
To have more young hearts captives in her chain,
That she might plague them all with greater pain.

He lov'd, and she he lov'd was fair and young,
And pure as breezes blowing from the south,
Dark curls in clusters round her white neck hung,
And dimpling smiles play'd round her rosy mouth,
To which even love's fair god had often clung,
Drinking deep draughts of happiness. In truth,
She was a *nonpareil*—a charming girl,
With teeth as white as a fine Persian pearl.

Her slender form was symmetry personified;
Her eyes were soft and blue; the bright'ning flush
Of health was on her brow; and conscious pride,
When she gaz'd on her beauty, spread a blush
O'er her warm cheek. Her heart had oft been tried
By lovers, who declar'd her frowns would crush
Their happiness for ever, and destroy
Their blissful visions of connubial joy.

The streamlet shining like a bed of crystal—
The east suffused with morning's rosy hue—
The wild bee trampling on the flow'ret's pistil,
All wet and drooping with the summer's dew—
The curling clouds of spring, which softly distil
Their precious burdens on the earth for you
And me,—were never half so beautiful,
As that same village maid, so young, so dutiful.

She was so pure, so very pure and good,
That surly wintry breezes, wildly blowing
From the cold, frosty north, would scarce be rude
Enough to kiss her lips, when she was going
Towards God's temple, in a pious mood.
She cull'd instruction from each flow'ret growing,
And only had one fault which makes me fret—
It was,—she sometimes acted the coquet.

"To see her was to love her." Byron stole
This phrase from somebody: I don't know who—
But that's no matter. Ice from the North Pole
Would almost melt beneath a glance or two
Of her soft, sunny eye, through which her soul
Beam'd to deceive young Albert. It is true
She first declar'd she loved; then from him parted,
And left the hapless youth quite broken-hearted.

When first he met her, shadowy night had flung
A mantle of deep darkness o'er the earth;
The stars burn'd bright, the breezes scarcely sung
A lullaby, the nightbird's warbling mirth
Rang through the wooded vales; and Albert's young
And inexperienced bosom felt a dearth
Of something it had never felt or known
Before, when maids as fair before him shone.

He felt a strange and deep sort of embarrassment
Over his heart and all its powers stealing,
And to relieve it he began to compliment
The lady on her beauty: hallow'd feeling
Glow'd in his virtuous breast, and he seem'd fully bent
On op'ning all his soul to her; but sealing
His bosom secrets up he thought was better:
He did so, and next morn receiv'd a letter.

There's magic in the op'ning of a note
  Sent by a young and lovely female writer,
Which makes the playful fancy sweetly float
  On Hope's smooth sea; and if, perchance, th' inditer
Should say 'twas love dictated what she wrote,
  The breast expands, the spirit grows much lighter,
Joy smooths the heart's bed, bids all sorrows cease,
And fills the bounding bosom full of peace.

A sun embellishing a cloudless sky—
  A cold moon garnishing the mists of night
With silv'ry fringes, pleasing to the eye—
  A Condor pluming its dark wing for flight—
A mountain rearing its broad bosom high
  Above the lowborn vapours, which are white,—
Are scenes which do not half so pleasing prove,
As one kind letter from the maid we love.

Albert dismiss'd the messenger who brought it,
  And then perus'd what ran thus, "Dearest friend,
Last night, when you were gone, (who would have thought it?)
  All-pow'rful passion made my bosom bend
To its resistless sway. I ne'er have sought it
  Till now—I mean your heart; and so I've penn'd
These lines to you, requesting you to roam,
At nine o'clock, to night, towards my home."

Night came—they met; the cheerless western wind
  Blew loud and drear around her father's dwelling.
The youth clasp'd her white hand; his ardent mind
  With soft, unutterable hopes was swelling—
Hopes which the fair enchantress had design'd
  To blast, as light'ning blasts, by simply telling
Him, with a dark'ning frown, she could not love him,
Because he did not serve the powers above him.

This I acknowledge was a pretty way
  To break connections with an old acquaintance;
And I have heard some people sagely say,
  It sav'd them both from tears and deep repentance;
And though it rais'd a momentary fray
  In Albert's breast, I'm very sure, some years hence,
When recollection fades, he'll thank his stars
That e'er he served in Cupid's bloodless wars.

Let that be true or not, they'll no more meet:
The silent moon was witness to their parting;
And she from her blue palace smil'd most sweet,
As if to allay the deep and deadly smarting
Which Albert's lorn heart felt. I think it meet
To inform my readers, that the stars were darting
Their baleful influences on the maid
Who thus a lover's confidence betray'd.

And Albert view'd her love-inspiring form,
As it receded slowly from his sight;
Then burst in his young heart the silent storm
Of disappointed hope and passion, quite
Enough to make him loathe the bright, the warm,
Winter fireside, and all that gives delight
To mortals, who, perhaps, for seventy years,
Are made the sport of joys, griefs, hopes, and fears.

A storm gathering on an Alpine hill—
A bolt of light'ning flashing through the air—
An earthquake's roar, which makes the bosom thrill,
And fires the soul with horror and despair—
A shipwreck'd man—a maid with a cross'd will—
A scolding wife—a load of carking care,—
Are awful things, which bards delight to dwell on,
As much as thirsty trav'llers love the melon.

But these, all dark and dreadful as they are,
Seem nothing when contrasted with the anguish
Which a forsaken youth feels when the war
Of passion and despair makes his heart languish
For months, or years, unless some friendly star
Rains balm upon his soul, and helps to vanquish
That hateful, low'ring, grim, old tyrant, Grief,
Who robs us of life's comfort like a thief.

Physicians say that passion sentimental
Produces often, in the constitution,
A host of nervous pains, all detrimental
To human happiness: a revolution
In kingdoms, or a landlord's lacking rental,
Seldom occasions half the dire confusion
Which reigns and rages in a young man's breast,
When thwarted love his spirits hath depress'd.

But Albert's passion was not quite so strong
As that which Darwin says fair ladies feel,
When some young lover, who has woo'd them long,
Proves false, and deepens wounds he ought to heal.
Still, he felt finely lash'd by misery's thong,
Which lashes all—alike the heart of steel,
And heart of tenderness, the loveliest thing
Of which an unpretending bard can sing.

O, tenderness! there's music in thy name!—
O, tenderness! there's beauty in thy tears!—
O, tenderness! thy soft and holy flame
Brightens the visions of our youthful years!
Without thee earthly pleasures would be tame,
And every kindly feeling which endears
Man to his fellow man would fade and droop,
Like an old, squalid virgin in a hoop.*

But Time, the disappointed lover's friend,
Hath heal'd poor Albert's lacerated heart—
Despairing Love hath long since ceas'd to rend
Peace from his bosom, and the poisonous dart
Of anguish is extracted. Thus I've penn'd
Part of his story, and must now depart
To see a friend, who doubtless hath some notion
How thwarted lovers steer o'er Life's rough ocean.

## A DISSERTATION

### ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE CREATION AS TAUGHT BY MODERN CHRISTIANS, PRIESTS, AND THEIR ABETTORS.

*(Continued from page 113.)*

THE learned Mr. Maurice, in his elaborate work on Indian Antiquities, has endeavoured to prove that the doctrine of a trinity, and many other doctrines current among religionists, were prominent features in the primeval religion of mankind. In performing this task, he has certainly, as we have before remarked, rendered mankind an especial service. If the performance of a

* Alluding to the hoop petticoats which were worn long ago.

miracle, or the utterance of a prophecy with its subsequent fulfilment, be necessary to authenticate the mission of a man who pretends to be inspired, what proof have we that ever the deity revealed to the primitive inhabitants of the earth those doctrines which are commonly supposed to have been of divine origin? The Jewish prophets, or pretenders to supernatural foresight, finding in their days such doctrines firmly established among the people, might easily pretend to supernatural powers, and, by adopting the popular notions, stamp them with the fiat of orthodoxy. But, to pursue these remarks any further, would be foreign to the subject of this dissertation.

It appears, upon the whole, that the doctrine of creation was known to the ancients, and formed a prominent feature in their systems of philosophy. We find it, or something tantamount it, in almost every oriental country; sometimes put forth by the priests without any disguise, and at other times concealed beneath the garb of symbol and mystery. We could support these statements by an immense mass of proofs, drawn from the writings of antiquity and the works of Christian divines, if the limits of our publication permitted its insertion.

It is rather a perplexing circumstance to Christian theologians, that the doctrines and opinions of the Christian church should coincide so beautifully and closely with the paganism of ancient times. "It is very possible," observes a modern writer, "that the moral doctrines of two races of people, totally unconnected, may be the same, or nearly so, because the true principles of morals must be the same: there can be only one true morality; and each, without any connection, may originally discover the truth. But it is evidently impossible that such artificial regulations and peculiar opinions as will be pointed out, could have been adopted by two races of people without some very intimate connection existing between them. Justin Martyr observed the striking similitude, and very easily explained it. He says, the evil spirits, or demons, introduced the Christian ceremonies into the religion of Mithra. Though this explanation of cere-

monies and doctrines existing long anterior to Christianity might be very satisfactory to the ancient and venerable fathers of the church, it will hardly prove so to modern philosophers." Our author goes on to remark, that "it cannot be expected that he should go through the whole of the ceremonies of each religion, and show that in every individual instance they exactly agreed. The unceasing exertions of Christian priests to conceal the truth, and the change arising from various other causes which we know always take place in long periods of time, in every religion, and indeed in every sublunary concern, renders such an expectation unreasonable and absurd; but it is presumed that the circumstances which will now be pointed out, in addition to what has already been stated, will leave no doubt on the mind of any reasonable and unprejudiced person, that the religions under consideration were originally the same."

"In contemplating the different and often contradictory circumstances of the religion of the ancient Persians, it is impossible not to observe the striking similarity both of its doctrines and discipline, or practices, to those of their eastern neighbours of India, on one side, and their western neighbours, the Christians of Europe, on the other. That religion appears to have been a connecting link in the chain; and probably in this point of view it will be regarded by every unprejudiced person, when all the circumstances relating to it are taken into consideration. Like almost all the ancient systems of theology, its origin is lost in the most remote antiquity. Its foundation is usually attributed to a sage of the name of Zoroaster; but, in order to reconcile the accounts given of him with anything like consistency, or with one another, several persons of this name must be supposed to have lived."*

The notion of a creator, associated as it necessarily is with the notion of creation, arose from the contemplation of the planetary bodies. Perceiving the sun to be the "prime cheerer of this lower world," the dispenser of life and heat to the vegetable and animal

* Anacalypsis, b. iii., c. i., p. 109.

worlds, they would be disposed either to consider it a deity, or the most magnificent emblem of the deity with which they were acquainted. The learned Mr. Bryant's opinion is, that all the ancient religions terminated in the worship of the sun; and the manner in which he endeavours to prove this is, by showing that all the names of the deities were derived from or compounded of some words which originally meant the sun. It is exceedingly probable that the God of the Jewish scriptures was the same body which dispenses his cheering rays to the utmost bounds of the solar system. "The reader has been already informed," observes Maurice, "that the first object of the idolatry of the ancient world was the sun. The beauty, the lustre, and vivifying warmth of that planet, early enticed the human heart from the adoration of that being who formed its glowing sphere, and all the host of heaven. The sun, however, was not solely adored for its own intrinsic lustre and beauty; it was probably venerated by the devout ancients as the most magnificent emblem of the shechina which the universe afforded. Hence the Persians, *among whom the true religion for a long time flourished uncorrupted*, according to Dr. Hyde, in a passage before referred to, asserted that the throne of God was seated in the sun. In Egypt, however, under the appellation of Osiris, the sun was not less venerated than under the domination of Mithra in Persia."*

In the sacred scriptures the sun is often spoken of; and it is a very common practice with the priests, in translating such passages, to leave the word which denotes the sun untranslated. "Thus they use the word *messiah*, or *anointed*, as they find it best serves their object. Thus again it is with the word El, in numerous places. For instance, in Genesis xxviii. 19; "and he called the name of the place Bethel," instead of he called the place the house of the sun. The word *beth* means house, and El, sun."†

*(To be continued.)*

* Maurice, Indian Antiquities, vol. iv., p. 605.
† Sir William Drummond's Œdip. Jud., p. 250.

## PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

NO. III.

### *On the true Standard of Morals.*

*(Continued from p. 128.)*

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SINCE, then, happiness is the chief end of existence, utility must be the standard of morals; i. e., every action which does not increase the sum of happiness in some way or other, must be immoral; and *vice versa*. I feel persuaded that there is not a single action which men commit, and which the common sense of mankind approves as moral, but which will, upon examination, be found to be conducive in some measure to the general welfare. Even the sufferings which a martyr may voluntarily endure, may effect this object. The flames of a disgraceful persecution may be quenched by his death, and his example may be the means of stimulating others to rational inquiry and to the performance of noble deeds. In short, there is no action which can with strict propriety be denominated moral, unless it is adapted to promote, either immediately or remotely, the increase of happiness.

A great deal has been said and written upon morality and virtue to little purpose. Perhaps the readers of this essay may feel disposed to affirm the same of its author. Be that as it may, I can scarcely forbear from making some quotations from approved works on the subject, and the first that strikes my attention is the dissertation concerning the fundamental principle of morality, or virtue, written by Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle, and prefixed to his translation of Archbishop King's Origin of Evil. "Though all writers of morality," observes he, "have in the main agreed what particular actions are virtuous, and what otherwise, yet they have, or at least seem to have, differed very much, both concerning the criterion of virtue—viz., what it is which denominates any action virtuous; or, to speak more properly, what it is by which we must

try any action, to know whether it be virtuous or no—and also the principle or motive by which men are induced to pursue virtue.

"As to the former, some have placed it in acting agreeably to nature, or reason; others, in the fitness of things; others, in a conformity with truth; others, in promoting the common good; others, in the will of God, &c. This disagreement of moralists concerning the rule or criterion of virtue in general, and, at the same time, their almost perfect agreement concerning the particular branches of it, would be apt to make one suspect, either that they had a different criterion (though they did not know or attend to it,) from what they professed, or (which, perhaps, is the true as well as the more favourable opinion) that they only talk a different language, and that all of them have the same criterion in reality, only they have expressed it in different words.

"And there will appear the more room for this conjecture, if we consider the ideas themselves about which morality is chiefly conversant; viz., that they are all mixed modes, or compound ideas, arbitrarily put together, having at first no archetype or original existing, and afterwards no other than that which exists in other men's minds. Now, since men, unless they have these their compound ideas, which are signified by the same name, made up precisely of the same simple ones, must necessarily talk a different language; and since this difference is so difficult, and in some cases impossible, to be avoided; it follows that greater allowance and indulgence ought to be given to these writers than any other; and that if we have a mind to understand them, we should not always take their words in the common acceptation, but in the sense in which we find that particular author which we are reading used them. And if a man interpret the writers on morality with this due candour, I believe their seeming inconsistencies and disagreements about the criterion of virtue would in a great measure vanish; and he would find that acting agreeably to nature or reason (when rightly understood,) would perfectly coincide with the fitness of things, the fitness of things

—as far as these words have any meaning—with truth, truth with the common good, and the common good with the will of God."

If, therefore, the advancement of the common good be consistent with the will of heaven, he who does not endeavour to promote the happiness of man, acts both irreligiously and immorally. And if it can be proved that socialism tends to advance the common good, he who opposes it, according to the standard of morality assumed, must be an immoral character.

In settling this question, it is necessary that we should define terms. The following definitions, therefore, of virtue and vice, I quote from Belsham's Mental Philosophy.

"Virtue, in propriety of language, is applied only to voluntary qualities; namely, action, affection, habit, and character; and expresses what is excellent and worthy of choice."

"Vice, in propriety of language, is applicable to the same qualities, and expresses something which renders them ineligible, and worthy of being avoided.

"Actions are volitions carried into effect.

"Affections and habits are tendencies to action either natural or acquired.

"Character is the sum total of affections and habits.

"Virtue is the tendency of an action, affection, habit, or character, to the ultimate happiness of the agent.

"For happiness being the only consideration which renders existence valuable, the tendency to it is the only quality which renders any disposition or action eligible.

"Vice is the reverse of virtue; it is the tendency of action, affection, habit, or character, to produce ultimate misery, or to diminish ultimate happiness.

"An action or affection, accompanied with the most exquisite gratification, may nevertheless be vicious, as it may tend ultimately to diminish happiness, or to produce misery.

"Conversely, actions or affections, the performance or exercise of which may be accompanied with great

present pain, may nevertheless be highly virtuous, as they may ultimately be productive of the greatest happiness.

"Natural qualities, such as beauty, health, deformity, sickness, and the like, though productive of pleasure and pain, are neither virtuous nor vicious, because they are involuntary."*

These are Mr. Belsham's definitions; and, so far as they go, appear to me to be tolerably correct. The only objection to his theory which is worth noticing, is that urged by Dr. Price, in his Review of Morals, p. 183, where he says, "Any the most pernicious and horrible effects will become just and fit to be produced by any being, if but the minutest degree of clear advantage or pleasure may result to him from them:" which is saying that, according to this definition of virtue, injustice, treachery, malice, and the like, would be virtues, if their tendency, in any given instance, was to produce the happiness of the agent; and justice, faithfulness, sincerity, and benevolence, would be vices, if they could be proved, in any given instance, to diminish the happiness of the agent. So that the moral value of an action depends not upon its nature, but its tendency.

To this specious but unphilosophical objection Belsham answers, "Agreed. If absurd principles be true, absurd conclusions will follow. Injustice, malignity, and the like, never can, in the present state of things, tend to happiness. It might with equal propriety be alleged, that if even pain should become pleasure, it would cease to be an evil."

Having now stated what we conceive to be an approximation to a true theory of morals, we shall briefly notice what some celebrated writers have said upon the subject. Dr. Clarke maintains "that the eternal necessary differences in things obvious to all whose understandings are not depraved, lay a firm foundation for different relations, and for the fitness of certain actions to these relations."† The congruity of the

* Ment. Phil., p. 372.
† Clarke at Bayle's Lect., fol., vol. ii., pp. 79—88.

action to the circumstances or relations in which the agent is placed, is virtue—its incongruity, vice.

"These eternal necessary differences lay an obligation on men to act virtuously, separate from any consideration of the will of God, or any expectation of advantage or disadvantage annexed by natural consequence or positive appointment."*

Against this theory of virtue and moral obligation, it may be and has been objected—

First. "That if the fitness or unfitness of actions means anything different from their tendency to happiness or misery, the expression is unintelligible."

Secondly. "That it is a mere *petitio principii* to assert, that the perception of fitness constitutes an obligation paramount to all other considerations, or even any obligation at all, to the practice of those actions which are denominated fit."

Thirdly. "It makes virtue and vice perfectly arbitrary, as depending on the imagined perception of an imaginary congruity or incongruity. It is in vain to say that these fitnesses are self-evident; for in that case they would be undisputed, which is contrary to fact."

Fourthly. "It is a very gloomy system of morals. For virtue consisting in fitness, and the obligation to virtue being paramount to that of interest, and sometimes even inconsistent with it, a moral agent may, by the practice of virtue, diminish his own happiness and that of others, and the supreme being himself may have an end in view distinct from and inconsistent with the happiness of his creatures."†

Dr. Hutcheson, in his Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue, defines moral goodness to be "a property apprehended in some actions, which produces approbation and love towards the actor, from those who receive no benefit from the action; and supposes a moral sense implanted in our natures, which, independent of any argument, leads us to perform virtuous actions ourselves, or to approve them when performed by others." Now this theory assumes the moral sense to be in-

* Clarke, at Bayle's Lect., fol., vol. ii., pp. 79—88. Belsham's Ment. Phil.

stinctive, which, in my humble opinion, is contrary to fact.

The moral sense is that faculty or state of mind which excites an instantaneous approbation of what we perceive to be true and virtuous, and an instantaneous disapprobation of what we conceive to be false and vicious, whether such things be perceived in our own conduct or that of others.

The existence of this principle we learn by observation and experience, but that it is innate and instinctive is exceedingly questionable.

"The consciousness of it in ourselves," observes Belsham, "its early appearance in children, who almost invariably speak truth until they learn the contrary, the universality of its existence in all ages and countries, and the general uniformity of its dictates, are the principal arguments to prove that the moral sense is instinctive.

"But the diversity and even contrariety of its dictates, in different ages and countries, is an insuperable objection against this hypothesis. Instinct is uniform and universal: but the moral sense in one age and country approves, and in another reprobates, the exposing of children or old people, concubinage, slavery, incest, and such things."

The moral sense, being that faculty which approves of excellence and reprobates its converse, varies in its dictates in proportion as our ideas of right and wrong vary. The ideas men form respecting right and wrong vary in proportion to their education, the country they have been reared in, and the religious opinions they have been taught to believe. It is a monstrous aberration of the human intellect, to suppose that our ideas of right and wrong are innate—that they are born with us, and form part and parcel of the human constitution. What appears to the Englishman to be truth and justice, appears to the savage of other climes the reverse; and *vice versa*. The moral sense, therefore, and the notions we form of right and wrong which are included in it, result from our education, and are wholly the effect of those associations which operate on man from infancy to his dissolution.

"From the first dawn of reason," observes a modern writer, "the child is taught by precept, example, and motive—by praise and blame, promise and threatening, reward and punishment—to do what is called right, and to abstain from what is called wrong. Hence, to the word right is naturally and gradually annexed the idea of something that is to be encouraged and practised—to the word wrong, the reverse."

"The perception of right and wrong is acquired by instruction. The tendency to practise the former and avoid the latter is generated by discipline; i. e., by placing a person in circumstances and exposing him to impressions which shall lead him to pursue the one and abstain from the other."

But, before we can satisfactorily establish this conclusion, we must have a bout with the Corypheus of religious metaphysicians—the celebrated Bishop Butler. This shrewd and subtle sophist assumes the principle, "that men possess a power of reflection upon actions and characters, and that we naturally and unavoidably approve some as excellent and condemn others as vicious. This faculty is moral reason, or moral sense. The objects of this faculty are objects and principles, as truth and falsehood are of reason; and that it is accompanied with a real though inexplicable sense of good and ill desert."

To this statement it may be replied, that Bishop Butler, with all his shrewdness, mistakes an acquired for a natural principle, and that on this supposition it is impossible to satisfactorily account for the varieties of the sense of good and ill desert which are to be found in the world. We have before said, that what is called instinct in animals is universal. Now, if conscience, or the moral sense, be universal—if it belongs essentially to man—if it be not an acquired but an instinctive faculty, then we shall be forced to conclude that there are a multitude of such faculties; i. e., that one nation has one variety of this faculty, and another nation another variety; and that in these nations there are subordinate varieties; and so on, *ad infinitum*.

In short, religious metaphysicians never prate so un-

intelligibly as when they talk of conscience, or the moral sense, being an instinctive faculty.

We might, if the limits of our publication permitted, notice the theories of Hume, Wollaston, Browne, Rutherforth, and Adam Smith. But our space is drawing to a close, and we have not yet accomplished the task we imposed on ourselves at the commencement of this essay.

The standard of morality which the socialist assumes, or, rather, the rule to which he wishes to see all human actions conformable, is simply this—that every individual shall promote, or endeavour to promote, to the utmost of his power, the happiness of all other individuals, without regard to their sect, cast, country, or colour: which is saying, in effect, do all the good you can, and refrain from every evil—let no difference of opinion prevent the interchange and exercise of your benevolent affections—let no peculiarity of faith prevent you from embracing in the arms of an expansive charity, the whole brotherhood of man.

To this it may be objected, that any action, however good it might be to the rest of mankind, if it prejudiced the particular interest of its perpetrator, would be immoral, and ought not, therefore, to be done. To which we reply, that when men are placed in proper circumstances, they will find their interest closely linked with the interest of others; and, therefore, whatever promotes the general good, proportionately promotes the happiness of each individual. At present, indeed, such is not the case, unless we take into account ulterior consequences. The interest of one man is opposed to the interest of others. If, therefore, he promote his own interest, it must be in opposition to and at the expense of that of others. But this must be taken in a limited acceptation, as applied solely to those actions wherein wealth is concerned. But, even in the present state of society, the weal of an individual is linked to a certain extent with the weal of the commonwealth. If an individual commits an action which subtracts from the sum of public happiness, and which makes his own bosom thrill with a

vicious satisfaction, he experiences a reaction from society, from public opinion and a variety of other causes, which at once testifies that the interest of one is the interest of many; and that it is the duty of every one to act so as to increase the general welfare, and thus promote his own.

But, further, this rule should be considered as having relation to the production of permanent happiness, and not mere temporary gratification. To ill educated and ill trained men, the possession of certain things, and the performance of certain actions, afford a degree of pleasure, which ultimately merges into pain. The beastly drunkard derives a sordid gratification from the drinking of intoxicating liquors, and the degrading society of his gin-loving companions. The charms of universal nature are nothing to him, without his pot or his glass. The landscape may glow around him in all the beauty of a summer's efflorescence, but he has no taste for its beauty. The worlds of taste, philosophy, and literature, may open their inexhaustible stores, and the ocean of knowledge spread its calm and placid billows before him, wooing him to the voyage; but to all he is insensate. Steeped up to the lips in sensuality and inebriation, he stalks through life a melancholy specimen of what man may become by the influence of irrational arrangements.

Now, this individual feels a pleasure from his excesses. But will any one attempt to say that that pleasure is of a rational or ennobling character? Though he gratifies his own loose appetites, he also subtracts from the happiness of his family and the happiness of men in general. Society is robbed of his useful services sooner than it would be, for disease not unfrequently cuts short his existence.

Here, then, is an individual, whose happiness is in some measure disjoined from the general welfare. But, mark the result. He soon becomes pale, or sallow, and emaciated. The fire forsakes his eye, the flush of health his cheek, and the nerve and vigour his frame. Delirium tremens, horrors, blue devils, and a host of evils, seize on him as their lawful prey. Ultimately, the strength of his constitution becomes wasted, and a

disease in the chest, a galloping consumption, or a burning fever, hurries him off the stage of time into an early grave.

In addition to these evils, he has to experience a host of others, in the shape of strong and compunctious visitations. His wife and family distressed, his fortune daily diminishing, his respectability and moral character on the decline, are so many circumstances which fill him with the most biting anguish, in his sober and solitary moments. Is it not evident, that if this individual had acted in accordance with the morality of socialism, he would have enjoyed a happiness more rational, more noble, and more extensive, than can possibly be derived from the sordid and beastly practice of drinking to excess intoxicating liquors? We have only selected the drunkard as an example, from an immense mass of similarly immoral characters. The murderer, who destroys the life he cannot give—the sensualist, who revels in lust and obscenity—and, in short, every selfishly immoral character, might be made the basis of an argument tending to prove that happiness should be pursued by men only in accordance with the rule assigned.

But the superiority of socialism is evinced not merely by its code of morality, but by the means it proposes for the bodying forth of that rule in the lives and practice of individuals. In this respect it differs from almost all other systems. Christianity, or, rather, what is called Christianity, delivers the precept, but neglects the institution of those practical measures which lead to its fulfilment. "Thou shalt do no murder—thou shalt not steal—thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother"—and thou shalt perform a variety of things, and God will be pleased with you, and avert his wrath, and bless all your efforts—is the language of the Christian system. Here are precepts to be recognised as coming from heaven, for the due performance of which a reward is to be given. But there is nothing said about the training of youth, so as that they should not commit such actions—nothing said about the removal of those circumstances and associations which so frequently give birth to such sen-

guinary results. It is true it has been said by an *eminent moralist*, "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." But whether it be on account of the suspicious character of Solomon, or that they do not deem this part of his works inspired, the religious world appear to have forgotten that there is such a precept in the Bible. Instead of instituting measures for the proper education of youth, they are stuffing the people with tracts and Bibles. Instead of uniting with the people to do away with poverty and suffering, they are squandering their means in the equipment of missionary ships and missionaries, for the publication of the gospel in foreign countries. Instead of uniting their efforts to promote charity and peace and goodwill among men, they spend their time railing against infidels, and hurling spiritual thunderbolts at the heads of the socialists. Now, would it not be better if these men, who have an extensive influence over the public mind, would combine their efforts to remove poverty and suffering from the world? and then, after they have thus prepared the way, if they think proper, let them pour in their balm of Gilead.

As long as competition continues, immorality will not cease to be. As long as men are suffered to grow up in ignorance, they will yield to those evil temptations which are peculiarly adapted to overcome the uneducated and unreflecting. Competition is the parent of deceit, and the crime of theft results from the evil arrangements of society. It may therefore be inferred from the whole, that, in order to make sound morality extensively prevalent, we must better the physical condition of the people.

Let it not be supposed that we are slandering the poor. A poor man may be as purely moral in his conduct as one who has a larger fortune. But the natural and general tendency of poverty is to fit the agent for almost any action, no matter how immoral.

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And now, brethren, allow us to observe, that while we, as socialists, hold these views in theory, we should

not be neglectful of them in our lives and conversation. Let us give the lie to the calumnies of our enemies, by the purity of our motives and of our actions. While others spend their time in denouncing their fellow-beings, and hurling in anticipation millions to perdition, assuring their followers that an infinitely merciful God will ultimately do this in reality, let it be our business to labour incessantly for the removal of vice and the enforcement of the duty of benevolence—not that localized sympathy which some individuals feel, but that noble and generous feeling which mocks at the trammels of a party, and overleaps all sectarian distinctions. Thus, as our numbers increase, our cause will triumph; and finally the loud chorus of liberty and happiness will burst from myriads of happy voices, the denizen of a fair and renewed world.

## SOCIALISM CONSIDERED AS THE MORAL REGENERATOR OF MODERN SOCIETY.

*(Concluded from page* 133.*)*

Now, in a community of united interests, if an occupation should be found prejudicial to the health of an individual, he could abandon it, and engage in one more congenial to his constitution. The socialists therefore would possess, under their contemplated arrangements, all the advantages of the present co-operative system, without any of its disadvantages, or at least with few of them. The same, yea, a much larger amount of personal freedom, will be experienced in community as in competitive society. An individual may go back to the old world, if he think proper; and if at any time socialism should universally prevail, then, he can change his occupation, and remove from one community to another. What, then, is there in the application of co-operative principles, that is "*vi-*

*sionary and erratic?*" Literally, nothing! But it was erratic and visionary in Mr. Scrope to say, that "the present constitution of society was the best that could exist."

If co-operation was universally acted on, a vast amount of individual labour would be saved. There is an old saying, and a true one, "Many hands make light work." Beside, a number of individuals, united in the bonds of amity and friendship, would cheer each other in the performance of their respective duties. Time would not fly so tardily, nor would labour be so toilsome, when the labourer wrought in association with agreeable companions. Supposing, then, that men had even to work more under a purely co-operative system than they do at present, they would possess advantages which would counterbalance the increase of labour. But how vastly must we enlarge our calculations respecting these advantages, when we take into account the immense saving of time and toil and sinew which would result from the application of machinery! The gigantic powers of wind, water, and steam might all be brought to bear on the productive powers of nature; and even those elements which at present so frequently prove destructive to man, might be made subservient to his welfare, and subject to his dominion.

Having thus shown that labour cannot be said to be free, but rather compulsory, in the present state of society, we proceed to exhibit another feature of socialism; viz., its denouncement of competition.

The spirit of rivalry and mercantile competition has been a fearful curse to the civilized world. Whatever benefits may have resulted from it, are vastly counterbalanced by the evils it has produced. It has stimulated men to the commission of many deeds which statesmen approve of, and which the populace applaud, but which, when scrutinized by the stern moralist, appear degrading to humanity. If it has induced men to extract from the bosom of the earth metallic substances, and caused them to be formed into innumerable machines, instruments, and curiosities, the lighteners of our toil, and the ornaments of our habitations,

it has also sown in the heart the seed of evil passions, and rendered the bosom callous to the calls of humanity. If it has raised lofty and splendid buildings for the aristocracy of our land to inhabit, it has also caused the poor to reside in poverty-stricken and badly ventilated habitations; and it has given rise to a number of artificial distinctions between man and man, as absurd in theory as they are pernicious in practice. If it has stimulated some men to noble inquiries, which have ended in notable and beneficial discoveries, it has also kept others back from prosecuting the same undertaking, and conferring on society, perhaps, still more valuable benefits. If it has caused the earth to be tilled, increased the spirit of commercial enterprize, and covered the ocean with stately and gallant vessels, it has also confined the enjoyment of the good thus created to a few, armed those vessels with the instruments of thunder, and turned their force against human life and happiness. Now, all the good which it may be supposed to have originated, could have been enjoyed without it; but the evils it has produced are incalculable. It has rendered man a foe to his fellow-man, placed his interest in opposition to the interest of others, and generated in his bosom avarice and the lust of power. It has prompted the monarch to invade the territory of his neighbours, and bade war raise its gigantic and iron foot to trample on the corses of millions, and sow the earth with ruin and desolation.

Now, one reason why socialism may be considered as the moral regenerator of modern society is, that it tends to subvert the competitive system, and institute one better adapted to secure the enjoyment of happiness by all. In a community of united interests, wealth would be produced more freely and in greater abundance than is the case at present. The energy of each individual would be directed to one common object—the increase of the public good. The wealth produced by the joint labour of all would be enjoyed by all, and proper measures would be instituted for the development of those moral and mental faculties which so eminently distinguish man from the brutes of the forest.

But socialism is excellent, not merely on account of the means it proposes for the increased production of wealth, but also on account of the means it proposes to institute for its distribution.

In the present state of society, wealth is unequally distributed. One class of society rolls in affluence and splendour, while another is exposed to all the miseries of want and degradation. There is wealth enough for all. Even with our limited powers of production, we can supply the wants of the whole population, if the wealth produced was properly distributed. It is sheer nonsense—downright, moonstruck madness, to talk of a redundancy of population, when the food-producing powers of nature are as yet but imperfectly developed, and the science of agriculture as yet in its infancy. But can it be denied that many individuals are suffering from want, and that not merely the idle and the dissolute, but very often the sober, honest, and industrious citizen. The pressure of some unforeseen calamity may fall upon him like a thunderbolt, and himself and his family be reduced from a state of comparative affluence to one of the most extreme and heart-rending misery. In such a case, there is but small relief to be expected from the community of which he forms a part. Seldom does he experience the look of friendship, and banquet on the smiles of affection, when he becomes poor. There are, it is true, exceptions, but these by no means invalidate the rule. If—like the elastic bough, which, bent by the tempestuous blast, regains its upright position as soon as the power which bent it is withdrawn—he should ever happen to occupy the same station in society he was wont to fill, it must be by his own exertions; and out of the thousands who make the attempt, how many fail! All this misery and evil springs from the spirit of competition, and the passions it engenders in the bosom, which, like canker-worms, nip the flower of happiness in the bud.

And here let us not be misunderstood, when we speak of the distribution of wealth. The phrase is in some measure improper. All we mean by it, however, is, that the wealth created by the labour of all shall be enjoyed by all; and that, instead of one half of

society living on the labour of another half, all shall labour according to their several talents and capacities. We do not mean to allot certain days, as some suppose, wherein the fruits of the earth shall be equally divided among the labourers, leaving them to make what use of them they think proper. No. Such an idea is the farthest in the world from the ideas we form respecting a community of united interests. There will be no individual accumulations, no private property—all will be merged in one common fund, from whence the wants of all shall be adequately supplied. This is what we mean when we use the phrase, distribution of wealth.

Now, a number of individuals, thus banded together for one common object, would soon be able to find time and means for the culture of the mind, the study of philosophy, and the pursuit of everything great and good. A proper education might be given to youth—their constitutions might be rendered robust, and their intellectual faculties developed, on a truly gigantic scale. The bickerings and animosities so prevalent in the world would be unknown. The day fast approaches wherein this mighty change shall be effected. The signs of the times—the starving condition of multitudes in the agricultural and manufacturing districts of the kingdom, the progress we have already made, and, above all, the strong opposition manifested towards our cause by our enemies—are sure and certain indications of the coming triumph of socialism. And let it not be supposed that this triumph will be like the triumph of a conqueror, who wades through seas of blood to satiate his ambition, and who builds his greatness on the cemeteries of nations. Such proceedings receive not our sanction. We use no weapon but truth. We encourage no violence. The triumph we contemplate shall be of a peaceful character—moral and bloodless—the triumph of truth over falsehood, peace over war, joy over sorrow—a triumph which shall be echoed from hill to hill, and from shore to shore, by kindreds and tongues and multitudes of people.

## A DISSERTATION

### ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE CREATION AS TAUGHT BY MODERN CHRISTIANS, PRIESTS, AND THEIR ABETTORS.

*(Continued from page* 144.*)*

"Ai was situated between Bith-Aven (read Bith-On,) and Bith-El; and these were temples of the sun, under his different titles of *On* and El."*

Speaking of the word *Jabneel*, Sir William Drummond says, "*El* in the composition of these Canaanite names does not signify *Deus*, but *Sol*."†

"Thus *Kabzeel* literally means the congregation of the sun."‡

"*Mesai-El*, appears to be a manifest corruption for אל-משיח, *Messiah-El*, the anointed of El, the male infant who rises in the arms of *Virgo*, who was called JESUS by the Hebrews—that is, ישע, the saviour—and was hailed the anointed king, or the Messiah."§

"Carmel, the vine of *El*, or of the sun."‖

"*Migdal-El Horem*, the station of the burning sun."¶

"*Amraphel*, *Ammon*, or the sun in Aries, here denominated Amraphel, *Agnus*, *Mirabilis*."**

"*El Tolad* signifies the sun, or the god of generation."††

"In all the above-named examples, the word *El* ought to be written *Al*. In the original it is אל, *Al*; and this word means the god Mithra, the sun, as the preserver, or saviour."‡‡

But not only among the Jews, but among almost all nations, the sun was an object of worship. The planetary bodies, moving to and fro in the heavens, could

* Sir William Drummond's Œdip. Jud., p. 221. † Ibid., p. 270. ‡ Ibid., p. 272. § Ibid., p. 280. ‖ Ibid., p. 334. ¶ Ibid., p. 338. ** Ibid., p. 76. †† Ibid., p. 286.

‡‡ Anacalypsis, vol. i., p. 71.

not fail of attracting the attention of mankind. Rude and barbarous nations would naturally conclude that the orb whose cheering beams clothed the earth with verdure, and produced the grateful vicissitude of seasons, was a deity. Perceiving that the regeneration of nature followed his appearance in certain signs, they would naturally conclude that he was a creator; and in process of time this notion would be refined on, and ultimately assume the shape of the doctrine we are discussing.

Any person who takes the trouble of looking into Sir William Jones' Dissertation on the Gods of the Ancient heathens, published in the Asiatic Researches, will at once perceive that all the gods of antiquity are traceable to one, and that one the *sun*. Ceres, Bacchus, Apollo, and all the other deities of those rude ages, may be traced to the solar star, which is not only the source of vegetation, but was also the source of religion.

There appears to be a striking similarity between the religions and the gods of all countries. Bacchus was worshipped in the British isles. This is stated by Dionisius Periegites,* who lived in the time of Augustus Cæsar. Strabo says that there was an island near to *βρεταννια*, where Ceres and Proserpine were worshipped with the same rites as in Samothrace.† "Strabo lived in the time of Augustus and Tiberius, and he drew his information from Artemodorus, who lived in the time of Ptolemy Lathyrus, about one hundred years before Christ. The worship of the Cabiri was supposed to have come originally from Phœnicia. Sammes has proved that when Artemodorus lived, none of the Greeks had been in Britain."‡

It is so well known that the religious rites of Samothrace were similar to those of Ceres and Proserpine, that few will be found to dispute it. Mr. Pictet, of

* V. 365.

† Lib. iv., p. 137, ed Causabon. Insulam esse prope Brittanniam in qua Cereri et Proserpinæ sacra fiunt, eodem ritu quo in Samothraciâ

‡ Higgins, Celt. Druid., c. v., s. x., p. 166.

Geneva, in his valuable work on the connection between the gods of Ireland, Samothrace, and Phœnicia, endeavours to explain the nature of the Cabiric worship. He says that the Irish chain of divinities ascended by a regular gradation of gods and goddesses, till it reached the first cause; and that these divinities formed a species of chain by which they were all connected together.

The following is Mr. Pictet's list of Irish divinities:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Aesar | Axire Anu-Mathar, the first Ith. |
| 2 | Ain { Moloch Molk e | |
| | Ain { Fan | Eo Ain-Anu, the second Ith. |
| | Ain { Taulac, or Taudladh | |
| 3 | Cearas | Ceara. |
| 4 | Lute, or Lufe | Aedh Aodh. |
| 5 | { Geamhar | Cann. |
| | { Dins | Ceachd. |
| | { Tath | Brighit. |
| 6 | Neith | Nath. |

Baal *Alla* Aleim.
Samhan—Mediator.

"The first, beginning," observes Higgins, "at the bottom of the series, is *Aesar* easar aesfhear, or aosfhear: he is called God, or fire intelligent; *Dia*, or *Logh*. Mr. Vallancey says the word *logh* means the spiritual flame, and identifies itself with the logos of the Greeks. In a vast number of languages, standing for some idea relating to fire is to be found the word *aesar*, which in Irish literally means, to kindle the fire. In Chaldean, *aza*, to illuminate; *asa*, fire. Sanscrit, *osch*, fire or heat. By many of the ancient philosophers fire was considered as the primitive element. It is unnecessary to say anything of the fire of the *magi*, or of the numerous appearances of God to Moses and the Israelites."

Selden remarks, "Although you may truly say with Origen, that before our Saviour's time Britain acknowledged not one true God, yet it came as near to what they should have done as most other, either Greek or Roman; as by notions in *Cæsar*, *Strabo*, Lucan, and the like, discoursing of them, you may be satisfied. For although Apollo, Mars, and Mercury were wor-

shipped among the vulgar Gauls, yet it appears that the Druids' invocation was to one *all-healing, all-saving power.*"*

"As fire was supposed to be the first principle of all things, it was also supposed, by a peculiar refinement, to be the destroyer; whence probably first arose the idea of the destroyer and the creator being identified. The primitive fire was supposed to have an insatiable appetite for devouring all things. According to Maximus Tyrius,† the ancient Persians threw into the fire combustible matters, crying, *Devour, O Lord!* It is remarkable that in Irish, easam, or asam, signifies to create, or make: *Aesar* then would be the creator. *Aesar* was also connected with the power of magic, and was called a magician."

"Aesar, considered as the source of movement, was at the same time the author of a duality, or opposition, and of discord; whence in Irish comes the word *asard*, dispute, and *asardoir*, a quarrelsome person. Some have thought that this was the Hesus, or Esus, the god of war of the Gauls; but with more probability he has been taken to be the *Aesar* of the Etruscans, the name of God according to Suetonius. The *Aeswar*, or *Eswara*, or *Iswara*, of India, furnishes some interesting analogies. It is said in the Bhagvaat Geeta '*Aeswar* resides in every mortal being, and puts in movement by his supernatural powers all that maunts on the wheel of time.'

"Aeswar is considered as the first mover—a signification well enough agreeing with the attribute of the Irish *Aesar;* and the name of Isa, or Iswara, also signifies lord and master, and also the creative power. This power was given by the different sects of religion to *Bramha*, *Vishnoo*, and *Seeva.*"

"It may be observed, *en passant*, that except when God is said to have appeared to the ancient patriarchs in the human character, he always assumed the appearance of fire. And all the early fathers of the church considered him, from these circumstances, to consist

† Max. Tyr., dis. xxxviii.

* Selden, Drayton's Poly-Albion Col. Reb. Hib., vol. iv., p. 9.

of a certain refined or etherial fire, or spiritual flame.'

"Aesar is represented symbolically by the act of lighting fire; i. e., putting in play the primitive movement for the creation of beings. The first month was called after him. March, with the Romans, was the first month. The Chaldeans called March Adar, the Syrians Odar, which, in their mode of speaking, was pronounced *Azar* or *Ozar*.

"The Gauls had a god called Hesus: was this from the Greek ζωω? or the Hebrew יהוה; *Iso?* or both? In Hebrew, if ה e were the emphatic article, then the word would be literally the preserver. *Hesus* was also often the destroyer; in Gaul, Mars. *Iswara* was also in India the destroyer delighted with human sacrifices."*

Thus we may perceive that there was a very striking similarity between the characters of all the imaginary gods of antiquity. All are traceable to the sun, the universal lord, from whose worship has descended, to our times, the various mummeries of religion. The theologian may wince at this, and cry out, abominable; the lordly bishop may skulk beneath the protection of the law, to evade discussion: but ultimately "*the truth will out;*" and then shall men perceive how they have been imposed on by the craft of bishops, priests, and their satellites.

Sir William Jones has, I think, sufficiently proved that the *Ganessa* of India and the Janus of Rome are identical. The same similarity is observable between the *Esmun* of Phœnicia and the *Saman* of Ireland, both signifying the sun, the source of heat and life. Again, *Veit* corresponds with the Hindoo *Naut* and the Neith of the Egyptians.

| *Irish.* | | *Hindoo.* |
|---|---|---|
| Saman | *with* | Samanaut. |
| Bud | — | Bood, or Buddha. |
| Can | — | Chandra |
| Omph—that is, *he that is* | — | Om, or Aum. |
| And Esar | — | Eswara. |

* Vide Celt. Druid., pp. 166, 167.

Sir William Jones observes, that Colonel Vallancey, whose learned inquiries into the ancient literature of Ireland are highly interesting, assures me, that Chrishna in Irish means the sun; and we find Apollo and Sol considered by the Roman poets as the same deity. I am inclined to believe that not Chrishna or Vishnau, but even Bramha or Seeva, when united and expressed by the mystical word *Om*, were designed by the idolaters to represent the solar fire."*

Thus, to whatever part of the globe we turn our attention, we find traces of the worship of the heavenly bodies. And it would have been well for mankind if this religion had not been refined upon by priests. The first notions of religion among all savage nations are rude and barbarous; but as civilization advances these notions become more refined. Wrathful demons are supposed to exist; and this tenet is impressed on the mind with all the fervour and eloquence which the priests can muster. Here lies the secret of their trade. The wrath of these beings must be appeased by prayers and sacrifices; the priests must be the sacrificers, or they must teach the people what they are to do. The people must pay them well for their services; and thus the interest, the passions, and the self-love of this order of men combine to make them, as they ever have been, the pests and the deceivers of the people. But the day is fast approaching, when all this mummery shall "dissolve, and, like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a wreck behind." Men appear to be gradually bursting the trammels which have been thrown around them by ignorance and superstition. The day-star of knowledge now faintly irradiates the world; but soon the sun of truth will arise, and, by the brightness of its rising, disperse the clouds which have so long been gathering on the human understanding.

*(To be continued.)*

* Asiat. Res., vol. i., p. 262.

## OF THE TRUE ORIGIN AND NECESSITY OF MARRIAGE CEREMONIES.

(From Madan's Thelypthora, vol. iii., p. 309.)

THE invention of marriage ceremonies is as great a proof of the depravity and corruption of human nature, as the invention of written *bonds* and *obligations* under hand and seal; they alike prove that they are the effects of that necessity which mankind laboured under to secure themselves against the villany, treachery, and deceit of one another. If the *world was what it ought to be*, no obligation beside that of conscience would be necessary for the security of men with regard to any kind of bargains which they could make with each other. The man who lent another a sum of money, though without any other witnesses to the transaction than the parties themselves, would be perfectly secure—perhaps more so than he is now, with a bond duly stamped and sealed and delivered by the hand of the obliger, in the presence of witnesses. If we ask, whence arose those voluminous securities, known in our law by the names of marriage settlements, mortgage deeds, and specialities of various kinds? it may be answered—"from men being afraid to trust one another without them."

The very same principle first gave birth to outward marriage ceremony; the simple institution of heaven would have been as sufficient to have bound the parties to each other at this hour as it was in the days of innocence, had not the corruption of human nature destroyed the influences of justice, mercy, and truth within the human soul. The adventitious circumstances of *human* ceremony, on this account, became necessary; and, as the world increased, and villany of all kinds augmented, the means of security against it has at all times exercised the invention of legislators, and employed the vigilance of the executive power, in order to obviate the mischievous effects of it.

But what a strange thing would it be to hear that a bond on paper, stamped with a stamp of such a value,

and sealed and delivered in the presence of witnesses, and not the sum of money lent, raised the duty in the obliger's conscience to pay it! and what a conscience must that man have who looks upon an outward security as the only reason for acknowledging a just debt! Yet this is the language of mankind with respect to marriage. The debt of justice, arising from the command of God, is easily set aside, and nothing is looked upon as obligatory but the outward bond. To say that this is less a mere civil contract than the other, is saying what is not true, and is the great advantage which has been taken of men's understandings in the business of marriage, to the no small emolument of those who have taken it, and to the distress and destruction of millions who have suffered by it.

## CASES

### WHEREIN INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH IMPIETY FOR RIDICULOUS REASONS.

Pierre Brissot, M.D., who died in 1522, ventured to maintain that a pleuritical patient ought to be bled on the side affected; but the King of Portugal issued a decree to the contrary: and afterwards, in 1529, the followers of Dr. Denys persuaded the Emperor Charles V., that Brissot's method was an attack upon religion, being an impious and mortal doctrine, as injurious to the body as Lutheranism is to the soul. (Vide *Bayle's Dict.*, art. "Brissot," note B.)

Vesalius, who died in 1564, was accused of impiety before the Inquisition, for having dissected a body, in which, according to his accusers, life was not extinct. (Vide *Biog. Univ.*, tom. xlviii., p. 309.)

The Bishop of Exeter, in the present age, accuses the socialists of atheism and blasphemy, because they profess themselves ignorant of what the bishop himself says (whenever he repeats the Athanasian creed) is incomprehensible.—Welcome back, ye shadows of ignorance and monkish barbarism! and all hail, thou glorious inquisitor-general!

# PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

NO. IV.

## *On the Causes and Effects of a Belief in Supernatural Agents.*

"It is owing to superstition that men roll themselves in the dirt, thrust themselves into dunghills, observe Sabbaths, throw themselves on their faces, seat themselves before the temples, and practise absurd prostrations."—*Plutarchus on Superstition.*

THERE is a disposition in the human race, while they remain in a state of ignorance, to attribute everything which appears to them inscrutable to a supernatural cause. The general experience of mankind sufficiently attests the truth of this assertion. Wherever men have been found in a state of barbarism, they have almost invariably been characterised by this disposition. The few savage tribes which may be pointed out as exceptions to this general rule, by no means destroy its validity. We are not sufficiently acquainted with their manners and customs, their language and institutions, to be able to state positively that they entertain no belief in a system of supernaturalism. In the lowest state of brutality and ignorance in which it is possible for men to be, the understanding may be so wrapped in clouds as to prevent even the small exertion of the reasoning faculty which the acknowledgment of a supernatural cause requires. However, among tribes a little more elevated as it respects their intellectuality, almost every phenomenon which they cannot understand is referred to the agency of supernatural beings. The untutored savage, upon beholding the movements and mechanism of a watch, proclaims it to be under the guidance of an animating spirit; and the North American Indian, when he beholds the lightning flashing athwart the blackened heavens, prostrates himself before it, and adores it as a divinity. The peasant of more civilized and polished climes, too,

upon hearing the thunder peal from the clouds, is influenced by his religious feelings to believe it to be the voice of the deity, who speaks in wrath, and who is supposed to walk upon the winds, control the raging of the waters, and bid the tempest cease to bellow with his nod. In short, the manifestations of this feeling or tendency to a belief in supernatural agency, are to be found in almost all ages and all countries. A large portion of the machinery of poetry has not only resulted from it, but also contributed to impress it more deeply on the human mind.

But though this characteristic of an ignorant humanity is, or may be, perceived in every quarter of the globe, there are nevertheless some tribes of men, among whom, so far as our observation has extended, it is not observable. As, therefore, some deny and others affirm the existence of supernatural agents, it shall be our business, in this essay, to prove—

First, That one portion of mankind do not believe in the existence of anything supernatural; i.e., something above and beyond nature.

Secondly, We shall specify a few of the causes which, either separately or combined, produce an opposite opinion: and,

Thirdly, We shall endeavour to point out a few of the effects which have resulted from a belief in the doctrine we are discussing.

Many of the philosophers of antiquity did not believe in the existence of supernatural agents. I deem it unnecessary to prove that many of them believed that *nature* is God. The principal Greek metaphysicians who can be supposed to have thought otherwise, are Pythagoras, Thales, Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Plato.

The stoics, despite of their canting about the wisdom, providence, &c., of the deity, were notorious for a belief in the corporeality of God. They believed him to be fire, warmth, or animal spirit, penetrating into inanimate matter, and producing thereby attraction, vegetation, sensation, and intelligence. They believed in a multitude of inferior divinities, some sidereal, and others even personal. "Most of them,"

observes a modern writer, "from their doctrine of the periodical renovations of the universe, may be accused of supposing that the deity (whom they often call Nature, Jupiter, &c.,) occasionally thickens himself into a world, and afterwards thins himself back again into his own fiery substance."*

The stoics, though they admitted, perhaps, the existence of tutelary deities, cannot be called believers in supernatural agency. According to Zeno and his followers, the world, or nature, is that whole which comprehends all things, and of which all things are parts and members.† The universe, though one whole, contains two principles—one active, the other passive. The passive principle is matter, devoid of qualities; the active principle is reason, or God. Now this was the fundamental doctrine of the stoics concerning nature. But, further, they believed that these two principles were corporeal, since whatever acts or is acted upon must be so. God was believed to be fire, or pure ether, and supposed to contain or comprehend all the vital principles by which individual beings are necessarily produced. This pure ether, or fire, was supposed to be active, while matter, or the other principle, was supposed to be passive. Fire, operating on the passive matter, produced all things; and though this active principle, according to the stoics, produced all things with consummate skill, in proportion to the forms it contained, they nevertheless believed it to be corporeal. I do not see, therefore, with clearness, how the stoics can be said to have been believers in the existence of supernatural agents. Their deities, whether supreme or inferior, were all parts of one great whole, and that whole the universe, or nature. But a supernatural being, or agent, is one that is above nature, beyond nature, or that would continue to exist, were nature to cease to be.

It is certain also that Strato of Lampsacus believed all things to be God, and consequently rejected a belief

* Vide third appendix to Plutarchus and Theophrastus on Δεισιδαίμονιας, translated, 1828, by Julian Hibbert.

† Laert., lib. v.

in supernatural agency. Cudworth, who has written a most erudite but unsatisfactory volume on the proofs for the being of a God, is obliged to confess that Strato was an atheist. *Velleius*, an Epicurean atheist, in Cicero, when speaking of the different kinds of atheists, gives such a character of *Strato* as makes him appear to have been a sort of "atheistical theist," or divine atheist. He speaks to this effect: *Nec audiendus ejus auditor* STRATO, *is qui physicus appellatur: qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quæ causas gignendi, augendi, minuendi habeat: sed careat omni sensu,* &c.*—which may be translated thus: "Neither is Strato, commonly called the naturalist, to be heard, who places all divinity in nature, as having within itself all the causes of generations, corruptions, and augmentations, but without any sense." Cudworth, after citing this passage from Cicero, says "that Strato's deity was therefore a certain living and active, but senseless nature. He did not fetch the original of all things, as the Democritic and Epicurean atheists, from a mere fortuitous motion of atoms, by means whereof he bore some slight semblance of a theist; but he was a downright atheist, for all that, his God being no other than such a life of nature in matter as was devoid of sense and consciousness, and also multiplied together with several parts of it. He is also, in like manner, described by Seneca in St. Augustine as a kind of mongrel thing, between an atheist and a theist. *Ego fero aut Platonem, aut peripateticum Stratonem quorum alter Deum sine corpore fecit, alter sine animo?*† *Shall I endure either Plato or the peripatetic Strato, whereof the one made God to be without a body, the other without a mind?* In which words Seneca taxes these two philosophers as guilty of two contrary extremes: *Plato*, because he made God to be pure mind, or a perfectly incorporeal being; and *Strato*, because he made him to be a body without a mind, he acknowledging no other deity than a certain stupid and plastic life, in all the several parts of matter, without sense.

* De Nat. Deorum, lib. i., p. 13. † De civ Dei, lib. vi., c. xix.

Wherefore this seems to be the only reason why Strato was sometimes reckoned among the theists, though he were indeed an atheist, because he dissented from that only form of atheism then so vulgarly received; viz., the system of Democritus and Epicurus. Strato attributed a kind of life to nature and matter."*

That Strato rejected a belief in supernatural agency is further evidenced by a passage in Cicero's Academical Questions. *Strato Lampsacenus negat operâ Deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum quæcunque sint docet omnia esse effecta natura nec ut ille, qui asperis, et lævibus et humatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta hæc esse dicat, interjecto inani; somnia censet hæc esse Democriti, non docentis sed optantis:*† —which is thus translated by Cudworth: "*Strato denies that he makes any use of a God, for the fabricating of the world or the solution of the phenomena thereof*, teaching all things to have been made by nature; but yet not in such a manner as he who affirmed them to be all concreted out of certain rough and smooth and crooked atoms, he judging these things to be nothing but the mere dreams and dotages of Democritus—not teaching, but wishing."‡

From these quotations we are warranted to infer that Strato and his followers rejected the doctrine of supernatural agency. His deity was merely a supposed principle diffused through all the universe, and not a being or agent superior to nature.

It is uncertain whether Leucippus and Democritus were believers in the existence of supernatural agents. It is probable that by attributing an internal principle of motion to the indivisible particles of matter, they endeavoured to account for the phenomena of nature, without supposing the existence of supernatural causes. Though Democritus either entirely rejected the notion of deity or allowed him no share in the creation and governance of the world, he, nevertheless, admitted the existence of the popular divinities, who were supposed to inhabit the ærial regions. But this popular doctrine was pro-

* Cudworth's Intellect. Syst., b. i., chap. iii., p. 107, fol. edit.
† Acad. Quæst., lib. iv. ‡ Intellect. Syst., p. 108.

bably admitted by Democritus to conceal his impiety, and screen himself from persecution. These divinities, according to Democritus, were in form similar to men, but of a larger size and superior nature. He taught that they sometimes make themselves visible to favoured mortals, enabling them to predict future events. These divinities, though composed of subtle atoms, and less liable to dissolution than men, were, nevertheless, supposed to be mortal. Democritus was therefore, to all intents and purposes, a corporealist, and not a believer in supernatural agency.

We might cite many more authorities confirmatory of the notion that many of the ancient philosophers believed nature to be God, and by consequence rejected a belief in the doctrine we are discussing. But we pass on to show, that in the middle ages several individuals embraced the opinion of Strato of Lampsacus.

In the thirteenth century, David of Dinant believed all things to be God. Albertus Magnus mentions one Alexander, an Epicurean philosopher, who held the same opinion. So did Amalricus, whose dead body was dug up and burnt in the year 1208. Peter Abelard was accused of the same thing; and various individuals who followed him as their master, we have reason to suppose, adopted this opinion. It is impossible to hold this doctrine and be a consistent believer in supernatural agency. For if "God be all things and all things be God," there can be no being or agent superior to, or above nature. Yet this doctrine, as we have seen, was cherished by many of the ancient philosophers, and forms, in modern times, one of the most prominent features of the philosophy of Spinoza.

*Pietro Della Valle* mentions certain Mahometans who call themselves *Ehl Eltakik*, men of truth and certainty, who believe that there is nothing existent but the four elements, which are God, man, and everything else. *Bayle*, in his Historical Dictionary, quoting this author, observes that he says, "These people believe in no other God than the four elements. They believe there is no rational soul nor another life after this; but that every man is but a mixture of the four elements, of which he is compounded during this life, joined and

animated by that strict union which keeps them connected together, and which, upon his death, is dissolved and dispersed among the four simple elements, and consequently returned to God out of which it was created. They believe the same with regard to everything else in the earth and in the heavens; in a word, that the four elements are the whole of everything, even God and man; and consequently the elements must be eternal, and the world with all its vicissitudes and changes eternal also."*

Bespier, in his Remarks on Ricaut's Present State of the Ottoman Empire, mentions another sect of Mahometans called Zindikites, who come near the Sadducees, and have their name from them. They do not believe in a providence, nor in the resurrection of the dead, as Giggoius showeth upon the word Zindik. One of their opinions is, that whatever is seen, whatever is in the world, is God.†

Thirdly, There are individuals now in existence who do not believe in supernatural agency, and this in barbarous as well as in polished countries.

Alexander, in his Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa, observes that, "notwithstanding some people maintain that there is no nation without religion, however faintly it might be traced in their minds, yet, after much diligent inquiry, I could not discover the slightest feeling of devotion towards a higher and invisible power among the hill Damaras, neither had they any fear of an evil influence, as they believe in nothing but what they see.

"Who gives you your food?" inquired Mr. Alexander.

"We get our living from the air—from the seasons," answered an old Damara.

"Why don't you keep sheep or goats, that you might live better than you do?"

"We have been afraid of losing them; we wished to keep them, but we thought the Boschmans would

* Pietro Della Valle, Trav., tom. iii., p. 394, as cited by Bayle Hist. Dict., vol. v., art. Spinoza.

† Besp. Rem. on Ric. Ottom. Emp., p. 648.

rob us of them. Now we think we are strong enough to defend ourselves and our property against the Boschmans, and we must try and get flocks."

"When you die, what becomes of you?"

"When we die we are buried, and are then no better than the beasts."

"Are you afraid to die?"

"Yes, very much, and we are afraid when we see people ill, because we think it may be our turn next—we try not to think of dying."

"Who do you think made the sun and moon, and all you see about you in the world?"

"We do not know; we are a stupid people; we never think of this; what is the use of thinking of it? no one ever told us anything about these things; and how could we know anything about them?"*

If this account be correct, it is evidently possible for men to be in a rude and barbarous condition, and yet evince no belief in supernatural beings. But as we have before remarked, we know too little about the language, manners, and customs of such tribes, to justify dogmatism on the subject.

It would be easy to fill a volume with quotations tending to show that various individuals in both ancient and modern times, living in different quarters of the globe, among polished as well as among barbarous and uncivilized nations, have been quite free from supernatural fears. The universality of the phenomenon cannot therefore be attested, and consequently no argument in favour of supernatural agency can be built on such a precarious foundation. Yet we frequently hear individuals affirming that the tendency to adore invisible and imaginary beings is universal—that it is an instinct of our nature, and is to be found wherever man exists, whether it be beneath the heat of the torrid zone, or shivering amid the snows of Labrador. They affirm, further, that this universal tendency to worship, however it may be clouded by ignorance or imposed on by cunning, is a manifest proof of the existence of some supernatural being; and if this be denied, they

* Alex. Trav. in Africa, vol. ii., chap. vi., p. 140.

require us, with an air of triumph, to account for the universality of the tendency.

Now it may be replied, that the universal belief of mankind in any particular doctrine is no proof of the truth of that doctrine, no more than the universal unbelief of mankind would be a proof of its falsehood: and that, even supposing the universal belief of mankind in supernatural agents proved the existence of such agents, that proof, as has been shown, in the present case, is wanting. The desire to adore cannot exist but in connection with a belief in the thing, or being which the man is disposed to adore. We may affirm with confidence that no man, however barbarous he might be, ever bowed down and worshipped in sincerity and truth that, which relatively to him appeared a nonentity. The desire to adore implies a belief in the thing to be adored; but the belief is not universal, and therefore the desire is not universal; for though it may be possible for the belief to exist without the desire, it is impossible for the desire to exist without the belief.

But even granting such reasoners their premises, we may deny their conclusions. The most that the universal belief of mankind can do, by way of proving the truth of any opinion to which it may relate, is simply to raise a presumption in its favour, or render it probable that, there are certain analogies in nature which powerfully arrest the attention of men and inspire them with a belief of its truth. As, however, some men deny and others affirm the existence of supernatural beings, we shall endeavour to specify a few of the causes which probably have given rise to the latter opinion.

The first cause that arrests our attention is the relation between cause and effect in the physical world.

When we look abroad on the mighty theatre of the universe, we behold many things which we can neither comprehend nor explore. Sound philosophy teaches men that they know but little, however much they may know when contrasted with their fellows. The *arcana* of nature are, in many instances, incomprehensible to the loftiest intellect. That the human faculties are

limited in their nature and operations is a truth attested by universal experience. This consideration, however mortifying it may be to human pride, can scarcely be disputed. Beings thus limited, are taught by experience that all effects are produced by adequate causes. "We feel an innate conviction," observes Bruce, "that all the events of life and all the changes in nature are effects produced by adequate causes. It is true there are many natural appearances for which we can assign no cause; but we are so far from concluding that they took place of themselves, that we cannot rest satisfied until we assign them one of our own invention. *This propensity was the origin of the various modes of superstition.* The great business of philosophy is to discover the real causes of the operations of nature; and the whole benefit to be derived from it depends on our propensity to rely on the efficacy of these natural causes. We also make a clear distinction between what precedes and what occasions any change. We believe that lightning is the cause of thunder, although it is not always followed by it; because we have ascertained this fact by reasoning: but no man supposes night to be the cause of day or day of night, although they attend each other in perpetual succession."*

From that period of infancy wherein the child becomes capable of discerning and faintly analysing the things that occur around him, he grows more and more conscious of the certainty of the fact that every change must have an adequate cause. This conviction grows with his growth and strengthens with his strength. Every day's experience roots it more deeply in his mind. If his playthings are removed, he learns by experience that some person has removed them. If his clothes are taken off or put on, his parents or nurse perform the operation. Repeated experiments of this kind create in him a conviction that for every change which takes place in the world there must be some specific cause. When he arrives at years of discretion, and his thinking powers become more perfectly developed, he begins to speculate more deeply on the various appearances of

* Bruce on the Being and Attributes of God, p. 87.

nature. The conviction we have been describing attends him in all his speculations. And though he may be unable to point out the specific cause of any phenomenon which he beholds, he, nevertheless, most potently believes that there is something which has produced it. In the world of art, he frequently beholds machines and devices which evidently exhibit the marks of human design, and which, he is convinced by experience, are not produced spontaneously by nature—these he at once concludes to be the workmanship of a human designer. Reasoning by analogy, he endeavours to ascend in thought to the very source of existence, until having wandered as far as his imagination can carry him in the regions of illimitable speculation, he suddenly stops, and virtually affirming that he cannot grasp the idea of an infinite succession of causes and effects, he avows his belief in the finity and non eternity of the universe, declares it to be an effect produced in time by some supernatural being, who called into existence by his simple fiat

"This earth,
"And all the fair variety of things."

Having thus become a believer in the existence of one supernatural agent, he cannot consistently refuse to believe in the existence of others. If the existence of a personal agent distinct from and superior to nature be once admitted—if this being be invested with every imaginable perfection and attribute—then the possibility of there being other spiritual existences, produced by his power and sustained by his goodness cannot be consistently denied. These existences may be supposed subordinate and inferior to the supreme existence, and by the help of a lively imagination, their number may be increased without end. Hence the ancients peopled every grove, stream, and mountain, with imaginary beings. The operations of nature were personified, and a presiding demon was allotted to each. Dreams, sleep, the seasons, in short, every observed terrestrial phenomenon had its respective god, and each god had his respective votaries. These deities were amazingly multiplied by the superstitious Greeks and

Romans; for men, having once imagined the existence of supernatural agents, knew not where to stop, but kept on peopling the earth, the air, and the heavens, with the creations of their fancy.

Jupiter was supposed by the Greeks to be supreme master of all other divinities. "Ζευς touched the mountains, and made them quake for fear." A thousand arguments might be adduced, tending to prove that some of the ancient heathens, amid all their idolatries and mummeries, believed in the existence of one supreme *Numen*, to whom all the inferior divinities, who were supposed to preside over the respective departments of nature, were subordinate. The tutelary deities of the ancient pagans appear to have occupied the same places in the world of speculation, as are now occupied by the angels and archangels, saints and martyrs, cherubim and seraphim, of the professors of the Christian faith. No argument can, therefore, be drawn from the multitude of ancient gods and goddesses, against the supposition that some of the ancients acknowledged the unity of the deity; for though they personified the causes of almost every phenomenon, they nevertheless believed these deities to be inferior to Ζευς, or Jupiter, "the one first, one greatest, only lord of all."

It is almost certain that the Greeks borrowed many of their notions from the Egyptians; and a story related by Herodotus seems to indicate that the Egyptians possessed some knowledge of, or rather belief in, an invisible spirit. "Those who worshipped at Thebes, sacrificed a ram; and they say the rite originated from the following incident. The Egyptian Hercules, according to tradition, was very anxious to see Jupiter, who was for a considerable time averse to his petition; but at length, Hercules being very urgent, Jupiter skinned a ram, and, putting on the skin, exhibited himself to Hercules under that form; whence the statues of Jupiter were carved with a ram's head."* This tradition probably originated in some enthusiast conceiving, in a moment of ecstacy, that the divinity had exhibited himself in the form of an animal.

*(To be continued.)*

* Herod., lib. ii., chap. 42. Greg. Hist. Mor. Ess., p. 89.

# A DISSERTATION

## ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE CREATION AS TAUGHT BY MODERN CHRISTIANS, PRIESTS, AND THEIR ABETTORS.

### *Further Proof that the Doctrine of Creation is to be found among all Nations.*

*(Continued from page* 166.*)*

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We have, in the preceding papers, given many proofs of the antiquity of the doctrine of creation. Since these were written, several papers in the fifth and sixth volumes of Valpy's Classical Journal, have fallen under our review. These papers confirm some of the opinions we have already mooted. Trusting, therefore, to the accuracy of the quotations contained in that celebrated work, we add the following extracts to our preceding remarks. From these extracts we learn that the notion was not only credited in some form or other by the Greeks and Egyptians, but has been cherished by almost all nations. The advocates of the doctrine contend, from this circumstance, that it must have some foundation in fact; and that because all nations believe it, it must therefore be true. But no criterion of truth can be adopted of a more variable and uncertain character than that of opinion. We shall, however, endeavour to account for these traditions when we come to discuss the question metaphysically. At present, our only object is to prove that the notion either is or has been universal (i. e., that with a few exceptions all tribes of men have entertained it); and to infer from this fact that Moses, supposing he taught the doctrine, cannot (even though inspired) claim the merit of originality.

That this curious notion prevailed all over the world will, I think, be evidenced by the following quotations:—

"*In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth:*

"*And the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters,*" *&c.* —Genesis i. 1, 2, to 25.

In the beginning, says Orpheus, the heavens were made by God, and in the heaven there was a chaos, and a terrible darkness was in all the parts of this chaos, and covered all things under heaven. Orpheus, however, did not conceive the heavens and the earth to have been in one mass; for, as Shuckford * quotes from Syrian, the heavens and the chaos were according to Orpheus the principia out of which the rest were produced. Anaxagoras, as Laertius informs us, began his book;† all things were at first in one mass, but an intelligent agent came and put them in order; and Aristotle gives us as his opinion ‡ that all things remained in one mass for a great length of time, but an intelligent being came and put them in motion, and so separated them one from another.

In the beginning of time all things were in a state of confusion, heaven and earth were in a shapeless mass, and had one and the same form. But when corporeal beings were created, the world appeared in the order and harmony which now prevails. The air was convulsed and agitated, its lighter and its fiery particles ascended, and became the receptacle for the sun and the starry host of heaven. The gross and material parts adhered together, and formed the earth, which is continually whirling about. The moisture exuded and became the sea. For a time, the ground was unfit for tillage or any purposes of life, but the warmth of the sun soon invigorated the soil, which became rich and fertile: as the poet says,

> "Of one vast form, confused and uncreate,
> Was once the Universe. The earth and heavens,
> Then men and trees, and beasts and winged fowl,
> Each in their course, in swift succession sprung."
> *Euripides Menalippe.*

* Shuckford Con. vi. Pref. † Aristot. Metaph., p. 2.
‡ Aristot. Phys. Ausc., lib. viii., c. 1.

The Sintosju, or adherents of the Sinto religion, the most ancient system of sacred worship in Japan, pay such respect to the last article of their religious creed, which relates to the beginning of all things, that they take special care not to reveal the same to their disciples, till each hath obliged himself by an oath, signed with his hand and seal, not to profane such sacred and sublime mysteries, by discovering them to the ignorant and credulous laity. The translation from the original text of this mysterious doctrine is contained in the following words, taken out of a book which they call *Odaiki*. "In the beginning of the opening of all things, a chaos floated, as fishes swim in the water for pleasure. Out of this chaos arose a thing like a prickle, moveable, and transferable. This thing became a soul or spirit; and this spirit is called KUNITOKODATSNO-MIKOTTO." *Kæmpher's Japan*, vol. i., p. 208.

The third volume of Pezron's Zendavesta, contains the following curious account of the creation from the Cosmogony of the Parses. "We are informed that when the deity Ormisda set about the production of things, the whole was performed at six different intervals. He first formed the heavens; at the second period the waters; and at the third the earth. Next in order were produced the trees and vegetables; in the fifth place were formed the birds and fishes, and the wild inhabitants of the woods; and in the sixth and last place he created man; this was the most honourable of all his productions.

"The notion which the Chepewyan Indians entertain of the creation, is very singular. They believe that at the first the globe was one vast and entire ocean, inhabited by no living creature, except a mighty bird, whose eyes were fire, whose glances were lightning, and the clapping of whose wings were thunder. On his descent to the ocean and touching it, the earth instantly arose, and remained on the surface of the waters.—This omnipotent bird then called forth all the variety of animals from the earth, except the Chepewyans, who were produced from a dog, and this circumstance occasions their aversion to the flesh of that ani-

mal, as well as to the people who eat it. The tradition proceeds to relate that the great bird having finished his work, made an arrow which was to be preserved with great care and to remain untouched; but the Chepewyans were so devoid of understanding as to carry it away, and the sacrilege so enraged the great bird that he has never since appeared.—*Carver's Travels*, p. 143.

In the poem of the Voluspa, which forms part of the Edda, we find the following description of chaos and the creation. "In the day-spring of the ages, there was neither sea nor shore, nor refreshing breezes, there was neither earth below, nor heaven above, to be distinguished. The whole was only one vast abyss, without herb and without seeds. The sun had then no place, the stars knew not their dwelling places, the moon was ignorant of her power. After this there was a luminous, burning flame towards the south, and from this world flowed out incessantly into the abyss, that lay towards the north, torrents of sparkling fire, which, in proportion as they removed far away from their source, congealed in their falling into the abyss, and so filled it with scum and ice. Thus was the abyss, by little and little, filled quite full; but there remained within it a light and immoveable air, and thence exhaled icy vapours. Then a warm breath came from the south, melted those vapours, and formed of them living drops, whence was born the giant Ymer.—*Mallet's North. Antiq.*, vol. i., p. 105."

Mr. Maurice,* in his Dissertations on *Indian Antiquities*, asserts it as his opinion, that it is from some perverted notion of the spirit of God moving on the face of the waters, that in all the engravings, descriptive of the Indian Cosmogony, Brahma is represented floating on the abyss, upon the leaf of the sacred Lotos. Thus, in that spirited and beautiful ode of Sir William Jones to Narayena, which, literally translated, he observes, means the *Spirit moving on the water*, we find the following remarkable stanza. It will be remembered that Sir William, in this passage, professes to give the principles of the Indian Cosmo-

* Vol. iv., p. 69.

gony, as he found them displayed in the two most venerable Sanscreet productions of India, the Menumsvriti,* or Institutes of Menu, and the Sree Bhagavat.

"First, an all potent, all pervading sound,
Bade flow the waters, and the waters flow'd,
Exulting in their measureless abode,
Diffusive, multitudinous, profound;
Then, o'er the vast expanse, *primordial wind*
Breath'd gently till a lucid bubble rose,
Which grew in perfect shape an egg refin'd,
Created substance no such beauty shows.
Above the warring waves it danc'd elate,
Till from its bursting shell, with lovely state,
A *form cærulean* fluttered o'er the deep,
Brightest of beings, greatest of the great;
Who, not as mortals steep
Their eyes in dewy sleep,
But, heavenly pensive, on the *Lotus* lay
That blossom'd at his touch, and shed a golden ray."†

The following account of the Banian History of the Creation, is from Picart's Religious Ceremonies, vol. iii., p. 277.

"The great God, being alone, bethought himself how he might make his excellency a power manifest to others; for this cause he made four elements as the ground-work of this mighty frame, viz., the earth, air, fire, and water, which four elements were at first all mingled together in a state of confusion, but the Almighty separated them in the following manner. First, it is said, that by some great cane, or like instrument, he blew upon the waters, which arose into a bubble of a round form like an egg, which spreading itself further and further, made that clear and transparent firmament which now compasseth the world about. After this there remaining the earth, as the sediment of the waters, and some liquid substance with the same, the Lord made, of both these together, a thing round like a ball, which he called the lower world, the more solid whereof became the earth, the more liquid the sea; both which making one globe, he, by a great

* Supposed to have been composed about the 12th century before Christ.

† See the whole of the Hymn in the Asiatic Miscellany, p. 24.

noise or humming sound, placed them in the midst of the firmament, which became equidistant from it on every side. Then he created a sun and moon to distinguish the times and seasons. The elements being thus disposed of, each of them discharged its several parts, the air filled up whatsoever was empty; the fire began to nourish with its heat; the earth brought forth living creatures, as did also the sea. And the Lord conveyed to these a seminal virtue, that they might be fruitful in their several operations; and thus the great world was created."

*(To be continued.)*

## THE NEWSPAPER PRESS.

THE greater part of our newspapers are manifestly corrupt, being obliged, from the mercantile speculation of publishing, to support a party, at all haps and hazards, and often at the expense of truth. This remark is particularly applicable to the *Times* and the *Age* newspapers. The Times is a perfect *Gnatho*, and may exclaim, in relation to the Tories,

"*Quicquid dicunt laudo—id rursum si negant, laudo id quoque*
*Negat quis? Nego. Ait? Aio. Postremo, imperavi egomet mihi,*
*Omnia assentari. Is quæstus nunc est multo uberrimmus.*"
*Ter. Eun., Act II., Scene 2.*

"Whate'er they say, I praise it; if, again,
They contradict, I praise that too: does any
Deny? I too deny:—Affirm? I too
Affirm:—and, in a word, I've brought myself
To say, unsay, swear, and forswear at pleasure—
And that is now the best of all professions."
*Colman.*

# THE LANGUAGE OF FLOWERS, FRUITS, &c., *Used by the Turkish Ladies in the Harems.*

BY M. HAMMER.

FEW of our readers, we believe, are ignorant, that there exists a certain mysterious language of love and gallantry, which expresses by means of flowers the most delicate and tender sentiments. All the information which we have hitherto acquired on this subject, chiefly derived from romances, or books of travels much resembling romances, seemed so vague and imperfect, that we resolved to rectify it by examining its very source. The celebrity which this language has obtained in Europe, is due to Lady Wortley Montague—other travellers had mentioned it, before her, and their accounts of it had excited the curiosity of her correspondent, who requested on this subject the information communicated by her ladyship in the fortieth letter.

Nothing can be more true than the general groundwork of her letter, and the sixteen phrases, which compose the amorous espistle, are translated with sufficient accuracy.

Let us then examine this language of the Turkish HAREMS, and endeavour to appreciate its real merit and its claim to celebrity. We know nothing that resembles it among the other Oriental nations, from Persia to China, or from Tartary to India. The Persians have in their poetry personified the rose, to make it the nightingale's mistress; and the enamoured bird, on the approach of spring, relates his tale of love to the blushing flower. Among the Indians, flowers are consecrated to the divinty, and form the attributes of various gods; but neither the Persians nor the Indians have ever employed these flowers in the composition of a language, although they are so frequently mentioned in the Erotic poems of the former, and the religious hymns of the latter, and although the glowing imagination of the Arabians often personifies them, and supposes flowers to converse with each other in regular dialogues.

It is then in Turkey alone, and even there only in the *harems*, that we find this mysterious language, which is equally limited in copiousness, as in the sphere where it is used. A little reflection will suffice to show that such an idiom can never be brought to that degree of perfection which Lady Wortley Montague describes, that it must always continue a mystery, and of course that it can never be a sure medium of correspondence between the *harems* and those without their precincts. A language understood by all the world, could not, by any means, answer the purposes of two lovers, whose lives would be forfeited on the slightest discovery of a mutual understanding. So extremely difficult is it for common mortals to hold any communication with the interior of *harems* guarded by eunuchs, that we may class among *Eastern Tales* all the successful adventures of this kind related by vain-boasting travellers. But let us suppose that, by an extraordinary combination of good fortune and discretion, a lover should find means of corresponding, in spite of walls and eunuchs, with the lady of his affections, would he employ a visible language, the secret of which is not only in the porter's hands, but known to all the eunuchs, and all the fair rivals who might see the nosegay?—or, if this language was not generally understood, how could the lover imagine that his mistress, lately arrived perhaps from the frontier of Circassia, or of Abyssinia, should comprehend his meaning? It appears, then, that this language of flowers does not constitute, as we have generally believed in Europe, a love-cypher for billet-doux between men and women who wish to carry on a secret correspondence, nor do the females of the harems use it, whenever they risk their lives by forbidden communications. It is almost entirely unknown to men, both to those most devoted to the fair sex, and in other respects of highly cultivated understandings, and those whom a depraved taste renders insensible to the charms of female beauty.*

* A well-informed Turk at Constantinople, from whom the author of this memoir requested some information on the flower-language, was extremely offended, and replied with indignation, that he was not a woman's slave.

This language, however, does exist in a certain degree, and in the *harems* among the women themselves. It has been invented by them in the leisure hours of their solitary life, and they use it either as a mere amusement, or as a cypher to express the violent affections which they frequently entertain for one another. Separated from the world, reserved for pleasures of a single man, vegetating in the most profound idleness, and tormented with desires which a burning climate and a warm constitution inspire, they have given to objects constantly before their eyes—flowers, fruits, perfumes, and trinkets—significations and meanings, as we have done to simple colours, and by these they are enabled to convey declarations of attachment as glowing and impassioned as that which Sappho expressed for her fair friend to whom she inscribed that inimitable ode,

> "Blest as th' immortal gods is he
> The youth who fondly sits by thee," &c.

It was necessary, therefore, to apply for information on the subject of this language to females—and from the Greek and Armenian women, who have access to the *harems*, we obtain what is now communicated to our readers.

That we may comprehend the genius of this language, we must enter into some details on the idea which forms its principle, and illustrate them by examples. The few which Lady Wortley Montague has quoted, are not sufficient to give a clear and precise notion of its system. The genius of it does not consist, as one might naturally suppose, in seizing the relations which a fanciful imagination may find between flowers and fruits, and the thoughts or sentiments which it is their object to express. The idea of such perfection never entered the romantic heads of those fair triflers who invented this language.

They contented themselves with employing certain words which rhyme to the names of different fruits and flowers; and the rhyme being once chosen and determined, they have arranged, in their own manner, the whole proposition, ending with the rhyme given,

so that this language is not composed of simple words or phrases, but of entire propositions, of which a flower or a fruit recalls the sense by the word which chimes with the name—thus, for example, seeing the pear *(armoude)* they take no trouble in seeking any relation between this fruit and any idea or sentiment whatsoever, but they have chosen, among many words which rhyme to it, *amoude*, signifying "hope;" and then filling up the whole phrase, they say, "*Armoude, Ver bana bir omoude*, or, *Pear, give me hope*," and this becomes a received and established sentence in the language. The Turkish tongue abounds in rhymes and furnishes many for all the names of flowers, or of any other object which may be chosen; but all rhymes, are not admitted into the flower language, only one or two at most, and it is a knowledge of these rhymes, and of the propositions adapted to them, which constitutes an acquaintance with it. The images which it presents, as well as the rhyme, render this language soetical; and it is hieroglyphical, by the signs which it uses to express not only simple ideas, but a whole peries of passionate sentiments. The dictionary of it cannot be voluminous: in fact we do not know that any exists, although, during a risidence of several years at Constantinople, we made every necessary inquiry. The whole treasury of this language does not much exceed a hundred signs and received phrases, and we present some of them to our fair readers as we learned them from the Greek and Armenian women who had frequent opportunities of visiting the interior of the harems.

*Specimen of a Dictionary of the Languages of Flowers, Fruits, &c. &c.*

*Ibrishim, Allaha kaldi ishim.*
Organsin, I have resigned my destiny to God.

*Iplik, Surgoune dek sana kostik.*
Thread, Faithful even in exile.

*Armoude, Ver bana bir omoude.*
Pear, Give me hope.

*Ezhderha kani, Janimun jani.*
Dragon's blood, Soul of my soul, thou art my flame, my only passion.

*Aktchè, gorursem seni jureghim oldi baghchè.*
Silver, The sight of thee changes my heart into a flourishing garden.

*Indji, Sen guzellerun gendgi.*
Pearl, Thou art the treasure of fair ones.

*Para, Oldi yureghim yara.*
Money, My heart is all one vast wound.

*Bal, Gonulumi al.*
Honey, Take my heart.

*Portukal, Boyour bir hafta bizde kal.*
Orange, Remain eight days near me.

*Pool, Derdume derman bul.*
Jonquil, Cure me, my dear girl.

*Chai. Gunduzlerumun gunechi ghedja lerimun aji.*
Tea, O thou! my sun, and thou! my moon, thou hast given light to my days and brightness to my nights.

*Darchin, Olursen gorurim khardjin.*
Cinnamon, Ah, if thou diest, I bury thee, O! cruel fair.

*Selvi, Daima severim seni.*
Cypress, I adore thee eternally.

*Sunbul, Ikimiz bulbul.*
Hyacinth, We breathe out our lamentations like nightingales.

*Shahpoi, Ikimiz bir boi.*
Violet, We are of the same stature.

*Sheker, Yureghim seni cheker.*
Sugar, My heart sighs for thee.

*Satche, Sen sin bashime taje.*
Hair, Thou art the crown of my head.

*Sari. Chekerim ah ou zari.*
Yellow, I sigh and languish.

*Karenfil*, Violet—*Ghanche gul*, Rose-bud.

*Karenfil sin kararun yok,*
*Ghanche gul sin timarun yok,*
*Ben seni chokden severim,*
*Senun benden khaberun yok.*

To the violet we may compare thee,
Or to the rose just ready to blow;
I have adored thee a long time,
But thou seemest to disdain my love.*

*Kaisi, Bulmadim senden ejisini.*
Apricot, Thou art the highest prize.

*Kestanè, Gözlerun mestanè.*
Chesnut, Thine eyes are sly theives.

*Gool, Ben aglarim sen ghul.*
Rose, I weep, laugh thou!

*Kehrubar, Sende gozum war.*
Yellow Amber, All looks are directed towards thy throne.

*Mavi, Hazze ederim Seni.*
Blue, I worship him as a God.

*Merjan, Weririm sana bu jan.*
Coral, My soul is in thy abode.

*Mersin, Mevlam seni bana wersin.*
Myrtle, May Heaven bestow thee on me!

*Nar, Yureghim yanar.*
Pomegranate, My heart is burning.

*Havayi, Al benden haiati.*
Aurora coloured, Take away this life which distresses me.

*Yasemi, Sen sev beni, benda seni.*
Jessamine, Love me truly, my passion equals thine.
—*From Valpy's Classical Journal, No.* 17.

* This strophe has been given by Lady Wortley Montague; there is not any other so long in the language of flowers—a rose bud and a violet are declarations of love which has been long slighted.

## PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

NO. IV.

### *On the Causes and Effects of a Belief in Supernatural Agents.*

(*Continued from p.* 180.)

THE second cause which may contribute to the production of the belief we are considering, is the ignorance of men respecting the real cause of those phenomena they see around them in the universe.

He who analyzes his own thoughts, and reflects deeply on the nature and properties of bodies, will soon discover the littleness of his intellectual powers. Though his knowledge of things may be extensive—though he may be in possession of an intellect as bold, as majestic, and as vigorous as was that of a Newton, a Lalande, or a Laplace, yet still there is an infinite disproportion between the vastness of the field allotted for its operations and the capacity of the intellect itself. The essences of bodies—the mysterious operation of the electric fluid—the manner in which suns and worlds are produced—the secrets of vegetation in the vegetable world, and those of generation in the animal—the wonders of light and vision, and almost all the phenomena of nature, present difficulties to the mind of man when he begins to explore and analyze them Now, the ignorance of men respecting the real natures or essences of bodies, and the true causes of any phenomena they behold, has, in all probability, a very large share in originating a belief in supernatural agency. It is reasonable to suppose that men, perceiving certain changes occurring in the universe, and being unable to ascertain the true cause of such changes, would not rest satisfied until they had assigned them one of their own invention. As man possessed activity, intelligence, and various other attributes and qualities, what more natural than for him to suppose that the

beings his fancy creates are invested with similar characteristics and qualities? It needed only another stretch of the imagination, to make one or many of these beings infinite, and, as a consequence, their several attributes measureless and incomprehensible. But, whether the notion of a universal *Numen* originated in this way, or in some other, it is almost indubitably certain that men have attributed to it the same qualities they find in themselves. Power, revenge, hatred, jealousy, benevolence, justice, and intelligence, are characteristics of humanity, and these characteristics are attributed to invisible beings by many nations.

There appears to be a principle in the human mind, which delights in fiction, laughs at common sense, and overleaps all the boundaries of reason. This principle was conspicuously manifested among the nations of antiquity, especially in Greece. The fertile genius of that people imparted to everything which bore the semblance of mystery "a local habitation and a name." As Gregory observes, "A rite or ceremony, the origin of which was ill understood, was presently furnished with a fable, to account for its institution; a maimed tradition, or sometimes a mistaken etymology, employed the imagination of the poets, and gave rise to a dynasty of gods."* Hence, the love of the marvellous, the perceived relationship between cause and effect in the physical world, combined with ignorance and other causes, (which we shall hereafter specify,) are quite sufficient to account for a belief in supernatural agency, whether it be found in the bosom of a Greek, a Roman, or a Christian.

We have hitherto spoken of men who were comparatively civilized as being under the influence of notions concerning supernatural agency. But these opinions are not confined to civilized societies; they are to be found in savage and rude nations, as well as among people more refined. The barbarian, unable to ascertain the specific cause of every phenomenon, attributes it to the agency of some supernatural being. The sun has long been an object of worship, and very probably

* Hist. Mor. Ess., p. 91.

all religions originated in observations made on the planetary bodies. The extraordinary beauty and vivifying warmth of the central orb of the solar system, could not fail of attracting the attention of mankind. It is certain, however, that the religion of Sabaism—the worship of the heavenly bodies—was once extensively prevalent, remnants of it being found in the shape of fire-towers, druidical temples, &c., all over the world. As a proof that the first notions of religion among barbarous people take their rise from observations made upon the heavenly bodies, we may allude to the natives of Otaheite, who say of the moon, when in its wane, that the spirits are devouring the deity, and that, when it increases, he is recruiting himself.* The Peruvians, according to Robertson, refer the origin of singular things to heaven. Their Incas, the descendants of Manco Capac, were supposed to be the children of the sun. Very probably the sun was adored by them as a deity, and not merely as a symbol of that universal spirit which was supposed by many of the ancients to govern the affairs of the universe. The Mexicans adored divinities of another description; and the contrast between the two systems of worship was bold and striking. The Mexicans offered up human sacrifices, to propitiate the wrath of their imaginary deities; but the altars of the Incas were never stained with human blood. The religion of Mexico was sanguinary and dreary, but that of Peru was mild and tolerant. The Incas remembered the high original from whence they were supposed to have proceeded; and perceiving the sun to be the "prime cheerer of this lower world," they endeavoured to act as the fathers and not as the tyrants of their people.†

The deities of the Mexicans were not supposed to be the mere elements, the sun, or the planetary bodies; but imaginary and wrathful divinities, who delighted in vengeance and blood. Robertson thus graphically describes their religion: "Their religious tenets and

* Cook's Last Voyage, vol. i., p. 166.

† Robert. Hist. Amer., lib. vii.

the rites of their worship are described by the Spanish historians as wild and cruel in an extreme degree. Religion, which occupies no considerable place in the thoughts of a savage," (query) " whose conceptions of a superior power are obscure, and whose sacred rites are few and simple, was formed among the Mexicans into a regular system, with its complete train of priests, temples, victims, and festivals. This of itself is a clear proof that the state of the Mexicans was very different from some of the ruder American tribes. But from the extravagancy of their religious notions, or the barbarity of their rites, no conclusion can be drawn with certainty respecting the degree of their civilization. *For nations, long after their minds begin to enlarge and their ideas to refine, adhere to systems of superstition founded on the rude conceptions of earlier ages.* From the genius of the Mexican religion we may, however, form a most just conclusion with respect to its influence upon the character of the people. The aspect of superstition in Mexico was gloomy and atrocious. Its divinities were clothed with terror, and delighted with vengeance. They were exhibited to the people under detestible forms, that created horror. The figures of tigers, serpents, and other destructive animals, decorated their temples. *Fear was the only principle that inspired their votaries.* Fasts, mortifications, and penances, all rigid, and many of them excruciating to an extreme degree, were the means which they employed to appease their wrath; and they never approached their altars without sprinkling them with blood, drawn from their own bodies. But of all offerings, human sacrifices were deemed the most acceptable. This religious belief mingling with the implacable spirit of vengeance, and adding new force to it, every captive taken in war was brought to the temple and devoted as a victim, and sacrificed with rites no less solemn than cruel. The heart and head were the portions consecrated to the gods. The warrior by whose prowess the victim had been seized, carried off the body, to feast on it with his friends. Under the impression of ideas so

dreary and terrible, and accustomed daily to scenes of bloodshed rendered awful by religion, the heart of man must harden, and be steeled to every sentiment of humanity. The spirit of the Mexicans was, accordingly, unfeeling and atrocious. The genius of their religion so far counterbalanced the influence of policy and arts, that, notwithstanding their progress in both, their manners, instead of softening, became more ferocious." Thus has superstition contributed to the debasement of the mind, and the prostration of all that is great and noble in our species.

The causes we have specified are, in our opinion, sufficient to account for the various modes of superstition which have prevailed in the world. The crude notions which savage nations form respecting the relation between cause and effect, induce them to assign a cause for every specific phenomenon; and their ignorance of the true cause of anything they may behold, combined with fear, the result of the former, inclines them to attribute its production to an invisible and wrathful being. Other passions may operate as well as fear. It is said of the ancient Egyptians, that they worshipped the Nile, and the leeks and onions which grew in their gardens. Gratitude may have induced them to adore the Nile as the emblem of the regenerative power of nature; and the onion may have been worshipped as symbolical of those mathematical circles which were so much used by the ancient astronomers. Maurice, a learned Christian divine, in his elaborate work on Indian Antiquities, has endeavoured to account for the origin of onion-worship in this way.

But, whether these speculations be correct or not, it is certain that ignorant man has evinced a disposition to account for things by supposing that they were produced by supernatural beings. Ensor, in his Principles of Morality, on the authority of the History of Timour Bec, affirms that the Orientals refer the building of Balbec to genii and fairies. "In the same spirit the modern Egyptians attribute the pyramids to giants,* and the caves in the precincts of Thebes to devils;† in

* Norden, p. 111. † Vansleb.

Thibet,* also, every extraordinary production of art is ascribed to the agency of some supernatural being."†

Warton, in his History of English Poetry, observes, that "it was a tradition invented by the old fablers, that giants brought the stones of Stonehenge from the most sequestered deserts of Africa, and placed them in Ireland; that every stone was washed with the juices of herbs, and contained a medical power; and that *Merlin* the magician, at the request of King Arthur, transplanted them from Ireland, and erected them in circles on the plain of Aymesbury," (Salisbury) "as a sepulchral monument for the Britains treacherously slain by *Hengist*."‡

Robertson, on the authority of Herrera, gives a remarkable example of the power and effect of ignorance. When the Spanish adventurers exhibited themselves on horseback to the people of New Spain, they produced great astonishment in the minds of the natives. "At first they imagined the horse and his rider, like the centaurs of the ancients, to be some monstrous animal of a terrible form; and supposing that their food was the same as that of the men, brought bread and flesh to nourish them. Even after they had discovered their mistake, they believed the horses devoured men in battle, and when they neighed thought they were demanding their prey." In Scotland and Ireland, too, there are numberless tales told respecting the mysterious operations of warlocks and fairies; and in the latter kingdom, when an animal happens to die suddenly with apoplexy, the common people attribute its death to the agency of these beings.

These facts, and many more which might be adduced, sufficiently prove that ignorance has a large share in producing a belief in supernatural agency. Fear also, which is the result of ignorance, contributes to deepen the impression. The barbarian knows that animals roar when they are roused by hunger—that the elements are often convulsed around him. He beholds the storm ravage the earth, uproot the long standing forests,

* Turn. Embas. Thib., p. 224. † Ens. Prin. Mor., p. 81.

‡ Warton, Hist. Poet., vol. i., p. 51.

and sweep the surface of our globe with desolation. When tempests career over the ocean, he perceives its billows assaulting the skies, approaching the shore, and threatening to engulph it in oblivion. The whirlwind roars through the desert, and death and ruin follow in its train. The thunder-storm convulses the clouds, the earthquake rocks the ground, and inundations frequently destroy the fairest works of art. The savage stands amid this general desolation, and, shivering with dread, dreams not of searching for the true causes of the phenomena he beholds; but at once attributes them to the agency of supernatural beings, whose wrath must be appeased with prayers and sacrifices.

Virgil, the master of Latin song, after describing in general terms the evil which his hero had suffered through the mindful memory of the cruel Juno, exclaims:

"Tantæne animis cœlestibus iræ!"*

"Petronius," as Ensor observes, "follows his example. To this Horace ascribes his own poetical conversion; and Pope, when speaking of superstition, declares the same truth:

"She, 'mid the lightning's blaze and thunder's sound,
When rock'd the tempest and when groan'd the ground—
She taught the weak to bend, the proud to pray,
To powers unseen, and mightier far than they;
She, from the rending earth and bursting skies,
Saw gods descend, and fiends infernal rise."

In Hawkesworth's Voyages it is said, that the supreme deity in Otaheite is styled the causer of earthquakes. "The Sclavonians," Gibbon says, "adored the invisible master of thunder as their chief god." Ensor† affirms, on the authority of Bouganville, that the Brazilians have no idea or name for God; but they unite a notion of power to thunder, which they call *Tupan*. "The Greeks gave the epithet τερπικέραννος, and the Gauls *Taranis*, to their chief deities." A dread of the wind *Samiel*, a suffocating blast which the Arabs call

* Are so great resentments in celestial souls!

† Prin. of Mor., p. 107.

the angel of death,* or of the other phenomena of nature, very probably originated the notion of an evil spirit. Typhon, *alias* Ahriman, alias Apollyon, alias Satan, alias the devil, is, with alias many other names, the creature of ignorance and fear.

That fear and ignorance originate superstition, is evidenced by the images, vast and disproportioned, which mortals have fabricated for their adoration. We have already alluded to the horrors of the Mexican system of worship. Ogilby, in his History of Japan, thus describes two of the objects of their adoration, or, rather, the symbols of the imaginary and wrathful divinities of the Mexicans.

*Vitziliputzli* sits upon a silver footstool, which stands upon a bier, whose four ends have as many props, with serpents' or adders' heads fixed upon them. The forehead of this idol is painted blue, with two streaks of the same colour athwart his nose running to each ear. His head, like a long billed bird, is crowned with a stately plume of feathers, the tip of the bill being of massy gold. In his left hand he holds a white, round box, and five white plumes plaited crossways over one another, there being in the middle a branch, which signifies victory. On his side hang four arrows, which, according to the opinions of the Mexicans, were sent to him from heaven. The right hand of this idol rests upon a staff in the form of a serpent, painted with blue streaks, and upon his bosom appears the face of a man with glaring eyes, a high and a wide mouth, opening before or near the orifice of his stomach. Various coloured plumes, like labels, chains of pearls, diamonds, and other precious stones, hang round his body, which is veiled with a curtain."

"They no less fear their demon Tezcatlipuca, made of black jet, and clothed in a rich habit: in his mouth he holds a silver spike, in which, sometimes green, and at other times red, plumes of feathers are observable. These distinguished colours the Mexicans were wont to wear at their respective festivals. His ears are decorated with gems of great value, and an

* See, for the fact, Penn. Hindost., vol. i., p. 31.

emerald is suspended from his neck, which covers the greater part of his breast. He wears golden armlets, and has on his naval a costly topaz. He bears in his left hand a fan of gold, being a plate so curiously polished, that it well performs the office of a mirror, on which account the Mexicans called it *lathcaia.* They believe that in this mirror *Tezcatlipuca* beholds all the transactions of the world, and by this he judges, determines, *and punishes or prefers every one, according to their well or ill doing:* therefore he stands ready with four darts, to strike those who commit the highest offences."*

The same author gives a description of a Japanese idol which is still more monstrous than the gods of the Mexicans. Alluding to an edifice in Japan, he says, "Between this and the block house appears the lofty roof of the temple of infernals. Within this temple the Japanese worship an horrible image. His head represents that of a wild boar, with two great tusks sticking out of his jaws, and adorned with a stately crown, full of diamonds and other precious stones. Over his breast hangs a scarf, which is parted in the middle. The idol wears an aspect of terrific grimness, on account of four outspread arms; one of the left of which stands upwards, holding a ring on the longest finger, while another hangs downwards, holding a flower not unlike a lily. The uppermost right hand gripes fast a small dragon's head, spitting fire; the lowermost, a golden sceptre. This idol is seen trampling with his feet upon the belly and thigh of another, which lies along under him. He having his head all hairy, and a pair of ox horns grafted thereon—with an iron chain about his neck, a girdle with great buttons about his middle, a long tail between his legs, and broad garters around his knees, the right arm being stretched out, and the left bended into his side—causes him to present as dreadful a spectacle as the other. These shapes they denominate *Joosie Fiedbak,* and God they call, on the contrary, *Joosie Goesar.* The Japanese honour and worship these resemblances of

* Ogilby's Hist. Jap., p. 91, fol. edit., Lond. 1670.

devils with all manner of offerings, to the end that they might not receive any hurt from them."*

There are several things in this description deserving of consideration. The horns upon the idol's head, and the lily or *lotus* flower which it holds in one hand, identifies it with the *Mythos* which formerly and universally prevailed. The iron chain about its neck, and the long tail between its legs, remind one of the popular idea which men have formed respecting that imaginary being who is said in the New Testament "to go about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour." The ignorant native of Japan would, upon beholding the symbol of the deity he worshipped, naturally believe that there existed a similarity between the deity and his symbol. If ever such a notion of deity was conceived by the human mind, it certainly must have borne a very striking resemblance to the notions some individuals entertain respecting the Christian's devil.

But the effects of this dreary fancy have not been confined to Mexico and Japan. The epilepsy was called sacred by the Greeks.† The natives of the Philippine Islands sometimes murder a slave, in the hopes of effecting the recovery of a person diseased.‡ Edwards, in his History of the West Indies, informs us that the natives of Cuba, Jamaica, Porto Rico, and Hispaniola, had horrid idols, the most common of which were those with the human face distorted. "A proof," observes he, "that they considered them not as benevolent, but as evil powers." Human sacrifices must also be attributed to this characteristic of ignorant man. The Jews burned their sons and daughters in the valley of Hinnom, to which Jeremiah alludes in chap. vii. 32, and which is also mentioned in 2 Kings xvii. 17. The Carthaginians, Danes, Saxons, and all the Scythian nations, practised the same rites, and offered up human sacrifices. The Druids, it appears, were guilty of the same thing. The learned

* Hist. Jap., p. 91, fol. edit., Lond. 1690.

† Hippoc. de Sac Morb, lib. vi., sec. xvi.

‡ Marsden's Sumat. Nat., p. 259.

Godfrey Higgins, in his elaborate essay on the Celtic Druids, has not been able to exempt them from this charge.* In short, in all quarters of the globe, and in all ages, the belief in supernatural beings has been productive of disadvantages.

The evils which have resulted from this dreary tendency, the result of the causes we have specified, are as doleful as they are numerous. Superstition has cramped the finest energies of man. By referring everything which appears *prima facia* mysterious, to the agency of supernatural beings, the mind has been prevented from searching for the true cause of all natural phenomena. But the reign of this misery and vice-producing evil is drawing to a close. The day-star of science, of positive knowledge based on facts, has begun to ascend our moral horizon. The aspect of the times prognosticates a change. Whether the various superstitions which now afflict mankind will speedily decline and become extinct, or continue to desolate our hopes and happiness, are questions which the progress of science must decide. But we have reason to hope, that as the mind moves onward in the mighty march of human progression, it will ultimately burst the trammels which have hitherto despotically bound it, and be enabled to emerge into the light, and to banquet on the blessings of philosophy and freedom.

* Dr. Smith thinks that they never offered any human or animal sacrifices. It is related, however, by Mr. Ledwich, and repeated by Mr. Fosbrook, that under each of the stones of one of the druidical circles a human body was found.—*Collec. de Reb. Hib.*, No. 6. It was also an article of the druidical creed, that nothing but the life of man could atone for the life of man.—*Cæsar*, lib. vi., chap xvi. The striking conformity of this notion with the statutary regulation of the Jews, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," and with the language of Paul, "without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins," must be manifest to all. Mr. King has pointed out an instance of human sacrifice by Einar, thane of Caithness, of Haldanus, prince of Norway, so late as the tenth century. See Celtic Druids, chap. vii., sec. xiii., p. 292; and compare Exodus xxii. 29, Leviticus xxvii. 28, 29, Numbers xviii. 14, 15, Judges xi. 30, 31, 39, Joshua vi. 26, and Kings xvi. 34.

## THE CONDUCT OF HEATHENS VERSUS THE CONDUCT OF CHRISTIANS.

"So lies the snow upon the raven's back."

"THE natives of Hispaniola are said, by many writers, to have been naturally inferior to the natives of Europe, not only in bodily strength, but likewise in genius and mental endowments. This assertion has, I think, been advanced with more confidence than proof. That the mind, like the body, acquires strength by employment, is indeed a truth which we all acknowledge, because we all experience it; and it requires no great sagacity to discover that ingenuity is seldom very powerfully exerted to gratify appetites which do not exist, or to guard against inconveniences which are not felt. If our islanders, therefore, rose in some respects to a degree of refinement not often observable in savage life, it may justly be presumed that, in a state of society productive of new desires and artificial necessities, their capacities would have been susceptible of still farther improvement. That situation alone, without recurring to the various other causes assigned by philosophers, sufficiently accounts for the paucity of their ideas. Men, without anxiety for the future, have little reflection on the past. What they wanted in excited energy of mind, was, however, abundantly supplied by the softer affections—by sweetness of temper and native goodness of disposition. All writers who have treated of their character, agree that they were unquestionably the most gentle and benevolent of the human race. Though not blessed with the light of revelation, they practised one of the noblest precepts of Christianity—forgiveness of their enemies; laying all that they possessed at the feet of their oppressors; courting their notice, and preventing their wishes, with such fondness and assiduity, as one would

have thought might have disarmed habitual cruelty, and melted bigotry into tenderness."*

Among other instances of their generous and compassionate turn of mind, the following is not the least remarkable.

Soon after Columbus' first arrival at Hispaniola, one of his ships was wrecked on the coast. The natives, scorning to derive advantage to themselves from the distress of the strangers, (unconscious, indeed, of the calamities which their arrival was soon to bring upon them,) beheld the accident with the liveliest emotions of sorrow, and hastened to their relief. A thousand canoes were instantly in motion, busily employed in conveying the seamen and cargo ashore; by which timely assistance not a life was lost; and of the goods and provisions that were saved from the wreck not the smallest article was embezzled. Such was their celerity and goodwill on this occasion, says Martyr, that no friend for friend, or brother for brother, in distress, could have manifested stronger tokens of sympathy and pity! Other historians still heighten the picture; for they relate that *Guacanahari*, the sovereign of that part of the country, perceiving that, notwithstanding the efforts of his people, the ship itself and great part of the cargo were irrecoverably sunk, waited on Columbus, to condole with him on the occasion; and while this poor Indian lamented his misfortune, in terms which excited surprise and admiration, he offered the admiral (the tears flowing copiously down his cheeks as he spoke,) all that he himself possessed, in reparation of his loss.

This was the conduct of heathens, unblessed with the light of Christianity. The conduct of the Spanish Christians was directly the counterpart of that of the natives of Hispaniola. The contrast between the two parties is bold and striking. The same author from whom the above is quoted, proceeds: "This benevolence, unexampled in the history of civilised nations, was soon basely requited by the conduct of a band of robbers, whom Columbus, unfortunately, left in the

* Martyr. Herrera. F. Columb., chap. xxvii., p. 32.

island, on his departure for Europe. Guacanahari, however, was covered with wounds, in defending them from his injured countrymen, to whose just resentment the Spanish ruffians at length fell a sacrifice; but their anger was of short duration. On Columbus' return, in his second voyage, their fondness revived; and for a considerable time the Spaniards lived among them in perfect security, exploring the interior parts of the country, both in companies and individually, not only without molestation, but invited thereto by the natives. When any of the Spaniards came near to a village, the most ancient and venerable of the Indians, or the cacique himself, if present, came out to meet them, and gently conducted them into their habitations, seated them on stools of ebony curiously ornamented. These benches seem to have been seats of honour, reserved for their guests; for the Indians threw themselves on the ground, and kissing the hands and feet of the Spaniards, offered them fruits and the choicest of their viands; entreating them to prolong their stay with such solicitude and reverence, as demonstrated that they considered them as beings of a superior nature, whose presence consecrated their dwellings, and brought a blessing with it."

"But I must now leave them to the miserable fate in which it pleased *infinite but inscrutable Wisdom* to permit their merciless invaders to involve them for ever! It may, I think, be safely affirmed, that the whole story of mankind affords no scene of barbarity equal to that of the cruelties exercised on these innocent and inoffensive people. All the murders and desolations of the most pitiless tyrants that ever diverted themselves with the pangs and convulsions of their fellow-creatures, fall infinitely short of the bloody enormities committed by the Spanish nation in the conquest of the new world—a conquest, on a low estimate, effected by the murder of ten millions of the species! But although the accounts which are transmitted down to us of this dreadful carnage, are authenticated beyond the possibility of dispute, the mind, shrinking from the contemplation, wishes to resist conviction, and to relieve itself by incredulity. Such at

least is the apology which I would frame for the author of the American History, (Dr. Robertson,) when I find him attempting, in contradiction to the voice and feelings of all mankind, to palliate such horrible wickedness. Yet the same author admits that, in the short interval of fifteen years subsequent to the discovery of the West Indies, the Spaniards had reduced the natives of Hispaniola from a million to sixty thousand.* It is in vain that he remarks on the bodily feebleness of these poor Indians, and their natural incapacity for labour. Such a constitutional defect, if it existed, entitled them to greater lenity. But the Spaniards distributed them into lots, and compelled them to dig in the mines, without rest or intermission, until death, their only refuge, put a period to their sufferings. Such as attempted resistance or escape, their merciless tyrants hunted down with dogs, which were fed on their flesh. They disregarded sex and age, and, with impious and frantic bigotry, even called in religion to sanctify their cruelties! Some, more zealous than the rest, forced their miserable captives into the water, and, after administering to them the rite of baptism, cut their throats the next moment, to prevent their apostacy! *Others made a vow to hang or burn thirteen every morning, in honour of our Saviour and the twelve apostles!* Nor were these the excesses only of a blind and remorseless fanaticism, which, exciting our abhorrence, excites also our pity: the Spaniards, in many instances, were actuated by such wantonness of malice, as is wholly unexampled in the wide history of human depravity. Martyr relates that it was a frequent practice among them, to murder the Indians of Hispaniola in sport, or merely, he observes, *to keep their hands in use.* They had an emulation which of them could most dexterously strike off the head of a man at a blow; and wagers frequently depended on this hellish exercise.† To fill up the measure of this iniquity, and demonstrate to the world that the nation at large participated in the guilt of individuals, the court of Spain

* Hist. Amer., vol. i., b. iii.

† P. Martyr, Decad, lib. vii.

not only neglected to punish these enormities in its subjects, but when rapacity and avarice had nearly defeated their own purposes, by the utter extirpation of the natives of Hispaniola, the king gave permission to seize on the unsuspecting inhabitants of the neighbouring islands, and transport them to perish in the mines of St. Domingo. 'Several vessels,' says Robertson, 'were fitted out for the *Lucagos*, the commanders of which informed the natives, with whose language they were now well acquainted, that they came from a delicious country, in which their departed ancestors resided, by whom they were sent to invite them to resort thither, to partake of the bliss which they enjoyed. That simple people listened with wonder and credulity, and, fond of visiting their relations and friends in that happy region, followed the Spaniards with eagerness. By this artifice, above forty thousand were decoyed into Hispaniola, to share in the sufferings which were the lot of the inhabitants of that island, and to mingle their groans and tears with those of that wretched race of men.'* After reading these accounts, who can help forming an indignant wish, that the hand of Heaven, by some miraculous interposition, had swept these European tyrants from the face of the earth, who, like so many beasts of prey, roamed round the world only to desolate and destroy; and, more remorseless than the fiercest savage, thirsted for human blood, without having the impulse of natural appetite to plead in their defence?"—*From Bryan Edward's History of the West Indies*, vol. i., chap. iii.

The above extracts speak volumes on the evils arising from superstition, a bad education, and competition. The Spaniards, who were the perpetrators of such monstrous atrocities, had been nurtured in superstition. They were under the dominion of avarice, a passion resulting from competition; and this, combined with ignorance, the result of a defective education, gave rise to the barbarities inflicted on the natives of the West Indies. Though some centuries have passed away since these events happened, the spirit which prompted

* Hist. Amer., b. iii.

them is not yet extinct. The embers of that fire which once desolated Hispaniola, still smoulder among Englishmen. Can it be believed, that in England, famed for its freedom and intelligence, and in the very teeth of the enlightenment of the nineteenth century, a Christian bishop should wish to fan the flames of persecution against the peaceful and unoffending socialists? For the honour of humanity, and for the honour of the well-paid order of bishops, we suppose my lord of Exeter to have been goaded on to the commission of his late deeds by the machinations of the vilest ruffian that ever trod the earth. This satellite of a foolish politician, this lick-spittle of a mitred dignitary of the church, is well known throughout the country; and the writer of these remarks having had the misfortune to be engaged once in a discussion with the said fellow, takes this opportunity of recording his opinion concerning the character of the same. "*A more ill tempered and illiterate and vulgar fellow I have never met with in my life.*" The Bishop of Exeter ought, at least, for the sake of common decency, and for the sake of his own respectability, to have inquired into the character of this man, before he made him his associate. Perhaps it would be uncharitable to repeat the language of Byron:

"A fellow-feeling makes us wond'rous kind."

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## THE EDITOR'S REPLY TO AN ANONYMOUS CRITIC.

SIR,

As you have kindly endeavoured to "remove the load of mental rubbish under which my mind," you say, "is at present buried, and as your letter was anonymous, I have no opportunity of replying to your remarks but that here adopted. If you had not concealed your name, I might have communicated with you personally; but as you have not let me know who

you are, I insert the following defence of the passage which has so roused your indignation, hoping that it may fall under your review. You first observe that no learned antiquarians advocate the opinion contained in the Messenger, No. 7; and, second, that the remarks I have there made are not true.

Now, both of these observations, however they may do honour to your heart, certainly prove you but a smatterer in knowledge, a dabbler in antiquities. The very words of the passage might have corrected your first error, for they imply the existence of two profound antiquarians who believed in the opinion. The passage runs thus:—"The first, beginning," observes Higgins, "at the bottom of the series, is *Aesar*, *easar*, *aesfhear* or *aosfhear*: he is called God, or fire intelligent; *Dia* or *Logh*. Mr. Vallancey says the word *logh* means the spiritual flame, and identifies itself with the *logos* of the Greeks."—*Monthly Messenger*, No. 7, p. 163. Is not this a full confutation of your first observation, viz., "that no learned antiquarians have held the opinion"? You surely will not have the effrontery to say that Vallancey, the erudite editor of the *Collectanea De Rebus Hibernicis*, was not a learned antiquarian. Nor that Godfrey Higgins, the profound author of the *Anacalypsis*, the *Celtic Druids*, the *Apology for the Life of Mahomet*, and other works, did not sustain the same character. If you affirm this, I need only refer you to their works, as a sufficient confutation of your opinion.

Your second critical and learned remark is, "that the observations I have made on the word *logh*, are not true." With all deference to your superior learning and judgment, I beg leave to suggest that I have made no remarks at all on the word, but simply stated a fact; viz., that Vallancey said "the word *logh* meant spiritual flame, and identified itself with the λογος, *logos*, of the Greeks." In relation to this point, therefore, your critique is directly the reverse of the truth. But, as I made no remarks on the word then, I shall endeavour to make up the deficiency now.

"*Leos*, *leas*, *leis*, *lois*, *luis*, *logh*—light, fire, blaze, flame; *luisne*, a blush; *solus*, light; *glus*, light, flame,

blaze; *leisan*, a little flame; *loisge*, burnt; *losg*, blind, i. e., *gan-los*, without light. In the Persian, *lesej*, or *lezej*, signifies blind. The radix is *la*, *lu*, light, fire. The monysyllable *lo*, in the Chinese, denotes fire. Alu, in the Arabic, signifies flame; leza, burning. In the Hindostanee *lu* means flame."*

To a learned and practised ear, which I fear you do not possess, these words appear to be all cognate. But this is not all, for this original word spreads through all the northern and Celtic dialects. Thus, in the Welsh, *llosg* means burning; *llosgi*, to burn; llosgradd, a seraphim that is burning; *golou*, light, blaze; golosgi, burnt, roasted corn; losey, burnt. "In the Teutonic, *laug*, *loug*, *louc*, flame. In the Icelandic, *log*, *loge*, flame. In the Swedish, *loge*, *lœghe*. In the Gothic, *lauh*. In the Saxon, *loge*, *leg*, *lig*. Greek, *phlox*, flame. In the Albanois dialect, *ligune* signifies roasted. In the Congo, *luilu*, heat, flame. In the Tonquin, *lua* signifies in a blaze, on fire."†

If you take the trouble of looking into Owen's Welsh and English Dictionary, you will there find the following words, thus interpreted:

"*Llos*, that has a tendency to take away, that tends to consume; *llosg*, a burning, a heat, an inflammation; *llosgaberth*, burnt sacrifice; *llosgaberthiad*, a burning sacrifice."‡

Mr. Oreilly thus interprets the word *logh*, and some of its derivatives, with other cognate words: "*Logh*, God; *logh*, fire, etherial spirits; *loghmar*, bright; *laiche*, *laichead*, a light, candle, lamp, lightning, flame, splendour; *loises*, a flame; *loisead*, inflamed; *loisge*, *loisg*, burnt; *loisgeach*, of a burning quality; *loisgead*, *loisgneas*, a burning; *loisceanta*, fierce, fiery, blasting."§

Here you may perceive, sir, the word *logh* running through a vast number of languages. Logh means God, and it also denotes fire and etherial spirits. The

* Vallancey's Prospectus, p. 51. † Ibid.

‡ Owen's Welsh and Eng. Dict., sub voc *Llos* aut *Llosg*.

§ Orielly's Irish and Eng. Dict., sub voc *Logh*.

*logos* of St. John is usually interpreted *the word.* The Grecian Mercury was called the word, or λογος; but of this more at some future opportunity.

*Logh* means God, fire, etherial spirits; logos is used by St. John to denote the Christ of the gospel. God is said to be a consuming fire, in the New Testament; and in the Old he is frequently represented as symbolizing his presence by fire. Our trinitarian divines contend that the *logos* of St. John is God, or the Son of God. Now, I simply ask the question, why do the cognates of the word logos run through so many languages, and all stand in some relation to fire, or light, or flame?

Your last observation manifests as consummate ignorance as the others I have refuted. You say, "that if I could prove an identity between the word logos, as used by St. John, and the word logos as used by the Greeks," to which I suppose I may add its cognates in the northern dialects, "you would renounce a belief in the divinity of Jesus." But, sir, allow me to inform you that you need not give up your faith on such conditions. That the word logos was used by the Greeks, and that, too, to designate one of their divinities, (Mercury,) is an assumption which few scholars will dispute. But this mere fact, though it certainly excites suspicion, affords not absolute proof of the identity of the two personages. St. John might have used the word logos to signify his divinity, in contradistinction to the Mercury of the Greeks; as the deist uses the word God to denote his divinity, which is entirely a different being to the divinity to whom the Christian gives the same appellation. John Wesley is reported to have said "it was no harm to steal a tune from the devil." And why may not St. John have thought it no harm to borrow a name for his divinity from the nomenclature of the Grecian mythology?

In conclusion, sir, allow me to observe that, with the best wishes for your welfare, I subscribe myself

Your very humble servant,

J. N. BAILEY.

# A DISSERTATION

## ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE CREATION, AS TAUGHT BY MODERN CHRISTIANS, PRIESTS, AND THEIR ABETTORS.

*Further Proof that the Doctrine of Creation is to be found among all Nations.*

*(Continued from page* 186.*)*

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GENESIS i. 5.—*And the evening and the morning were the first day.*

THE Scandinavian day was divided into twelve parts, to each of which was assigned a distinct name; but in their computation of time they made use of the word *night* instead of day.* Tacitus observes the same thing concerning the Germans.† They do not, he tells us, in their computation of time, reckon, like us, by the number of days, but of nights. In this form all their resolutions and summons run: so that with them the day seems to lead the night. We are also informed by Cæsar‡ that the Gauls consider themselves according to their druidical traditions as descended from father Dis: on which account they reckon every period of time according to the number of nights, not of days; and observe birth-days, and the beginnings of months and years, in such a manner that the day seems to follow the night. It may be remarked that the vestiges of this method of computation still appear in the English language, in the terms se'nnight and fortnight: this mode of speaking is also adopted in many other countries.

GENESIS ii. 7.—*And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.*

* Mallet's North. Antiq., vol. i., p. 358.

† Tacit. Germ., c. 11. ‡ Cæs., Bell. Gall. 6. 18.

The Hindus, like some of the ancient philosophers, suppose that the soul is an animation of the spirit of God *breathed into mortals:* but their manner of expressing this idea is more sublime; for instead of calling it a portion of the divine spirit, they compare it to the heat and light sent forth from the sun, which neither lessens nor divides his own essence; to the speech which communicates knowledge, without lessening that of him who instructs the ignorant; to a torch at which other torches are lighted, without diminution of its light.—*Sketches of the Hindus*, vol. i., p. 261.

GENESIS v. 2.—*Male and female created he them, and blessed them, and called their name Adam, in the day when they were created.*

In addition to the most common etymology given by commentators respecting the word Adam, from Adamah, *red mould*, or *earth*, it may be remarked that in the Sanscreet, the word *Adim* signifies *the first.*—*Maurice, Ind. Ant.*, vol. i., p. 24.

It is from the summit of the mountain called Hammalled, or Adam's Peak, as tradition reports, that Adam took his last view of Paradise before he quitted it never to return. The spot on which his foot stood at the moment is still supposed to be found in an impression on the summit of the mountain, resembling the print of a man's foot, but more than double the ordinary size. After taking this farewell view, the father of mankind is said to have gone over to the continent of India, which was at that time joined to the island; but no sooner had he passed Adam's bridge than the sea closed behind him, and cut off all hopes of return. This tradition, from whatever source it was originally derived, seems to be interwoven with their earliest notions of religion; and it is difficult to conceive that it could have been engrafted on them, without forming an original part. I have frequently had the curiosity to inquire of black men of different casts concerning this tradition of Adam.—All of them, with every appearance of belief, assured me that it was really true, and in support of it produced a variety of testimonies, old sayings and prophecies, which have

for ages been current among them. The origin of these traditions I do not pretend to trace, but their connection with scriptural history is very evident: they afford a new instance how universally the opinions with respect to the origin of men coincide with the history of that event as recorded in the Bible.—*Percival's Ceylon*, p. 206.

The beginning of the Kaly Youg, or present age of the Hindus, is reckoned from about 3102* A. C. They say that there was then a conjunction of the planets, and their tables show the conjunctions. The account given by the Brachmans is confirmed by the testimony of our European tables, which prove it to be the result of a true observation; the particulars of which may be seen by consulting a work of Mr. Bailly *sur l' Astronomie Indienne et Orientale*. The cause of the date given to their civil time he does not explain, but we are by some told that the circumstance which marked that epoch was the death of their new Krishna, who was supposed to be the god Bishnou in one of his avataras or incarnations. Others say it was *the death of a famous and beloved sovereign, Rajah Judishter*. But whichever of the two it may be, the Hindus, considering the event as a great calamity, distinguished it by beginning a new age, and expressed their feelings by its name, Kaly Youg, or *age of unhappiness or misfortune.—Sketches of the Hindus*, vol. i., p. 206.

It is impossible, in reading the above extract, not to be forcibly struck with the singular coincidence of the date of the Kaly Youg with the death of Adam, particularly with respect to the last mentioned cause.

"All the days that Adam lived were nine hundred and thirty years," Genesis v. 5., which makes a difference of a few years only between the two. It may also be observed that Megasthenes, who was well acquainted with Indian history, declares, according to Clemens of Alexandria, that the Hindus and Jews were

* Mr. Bentley makes the Kaly Youg to commence in the 906th year of the world.—*As. Res.*, vol. v., p. 318.

the only people who had a true idea of the creation of the world and the beginning of things.

GENESIS iii. 15. *And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.*

It is the opinion of many writers, that it was in allusion to this history and this interpretation, that serpents have been considered as emblems of power from the earliest antiquity, and become objects of veneration amongst idolatrous nations; and we know that when Epaminondas* would teach his soldiers that they should destroy the whole power of the enemy, if they could once break the Spartans who were at their head, he did this by *bruising the head of a great serpent* before them, and then showing them *that the rest of the body was of no force.—Dr. Darnley, Revelation exam. with Candour*, vol. i., p. 61.

GENESIS iii. 17. *And unto Adam he said, Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake: in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life.*

There seems to have been a notion, which of old prevailed greatly, that the antediluvian world was under a curse, and the earth very barren. Hence the ancient mythologists refer the commencement of all plenty as well as of happiness in life, to the æra of the Deluge. —*Bryant's Myth.*, vol. v., p. 279.

The above quotations are amply sufficient to prove that the notion of absolute creation was received among all nations, or, at least, that an opinion very similar to that now generally received by Jews and Christians so prevailed.

*(To be continued.)*

* Polyæn. Stratag., lib. ii.

## THE MAGNIFICENCE OF THE UNIVERSE.

This earth, and all the huge planets, satellites, and comets comprised within the range of the solar system, bear a very small proportion to that splendid luminary which enlightens our day. The sun is five hundred times larger than the whole, and would contain within its vast circumference thirteen hundred thousand globes as large as our world, and more than sixty millions of globes of the size of the moon. To contemplate all the variety of scenery on the surface of this luminary, would require more than fifty-five thousand years, although a landscape of five thousand square miles in extent were to pass before our eyes every hour. Of a globe of such dimensions the most vigorous imagination, after its boldest and most extensive excursions, can form no adequate conception. It appears a kind of universe in itself; and ten thousands of years would be requisite, before human beings, with their present faculties, could thoroughly investigate and explore its vast dimensions and its hidden wonders. But great as the sun and the surrounding planets are, they dwindle into a point when we wing our flight towards the starry heavens. Before we could arrive at the nearest object in this firmament, we behoved to pass over a space of at least twenty billions of miles in extent—a space which a cannon ball, flying with the utmost velocity, would not pass over in less than four billions of years. Here every eye in a clear winter's night may perceive about a thousand shining orbs, most of them emitting their splendours from spaces immeasurably distant; and bodies at such distances must necessarily be of immense magnitude. There is reason to believe that the least twinkling star which our eye can discern is not less than the sun in magnitude and splendour, and that many of them are even a hundred or a thousand times superior in magnitude to that stupendous luminary. But we cannot suppose bodies of such amazing size and splendour to be merely throwing a useless

lustre over the wilds of immensity. Very probably these retinues of worlds are peopled by myriads of happy beings, and form the abodes of purity and bliss.

These one thousand stars, then, which the unassisted eye can perceive in the canopy of heaven, may be considered as connected with at least fifty thousand worlds, compared with the amount of whose population all the inhabitants of our globe would appear only as the small dust of the balance. Here the imagination might expatiate for ages of ages in surveying this portion of the universe, and be lost in contemplation and wonder at the vast extent, the magnitude, the magnificence, and the immense variety of scenes, objects, and movements which would meet the view in every direction: for here we have presented to the mental eye, not only single suns and single systems, such as that to which we belong, but suns revolving around suns, and systems around systems; systems not only double, but treble, quadruple, and multiple, all in complicated but harmonious motion, performing motions more rapid than the swiftest planets in our system, though some of them move a hundred thousand miles every hour—finishing periods of revolution, some in thirty, some in three hundred, and some in one thousand years. We behold suns of a blue or green lustre revolving around suns of a white or ruddy colour, and both of them illuminating with contrasted coloured light the same assemblage of worlds. And if the various orders of intelligence connected with these systems were unveiled, what a scene of grandeur, magnificence, variety, diversity of intellect, and of wonder and astonishment, would burst upon the view! Here we might be led to suppose that we had a full view of the glories of the universe, a prospect of universal nature in all its extent and grandeur. But although we should have surveyed the whole of this magnificent scene, we should still find ourselves only standing on the outskirts or the extreme verge of nature, or, rather, the centre of a circumference extending in all directions *ad infinitum*. What if all the stars which the unassisted eye can discern be only a few scattered orbs on the outskirts of a cluster immensely more numerous? What if all this scene of

grandeur be only as a small lucid speck, compared with the whole extent of the firmament? There is demonstrative evidence from observation, that this is in reality the case.

Ascending from the milky way to the still remoter regions of space, we perceive several thousands of dim specks of light, which powerful telescopes resolve into immense clusters of stars. Above three thousand of these nebulæ have been discovered: and if only two thousand be supposed to be resolvable into starry groups, and to be as rich in stars as our milky way, then we are presented with a scene which comprises two thousand times twenty millions one hundred and ninety-one thousand, or forty billions three hundred and eighty-two millions of stars; and if we suppose, as formerly, fifty planetary globes to be connected with each, we have exhibited before us a prospect which includes two billions nineteen thousand one hundred millions of worlds. Of such a number of bodies we can form no distinct conceptions, and much less can we form even a rude or approximate idea of the grandeur and magnificence which the whole of such a scene must display. Were we to suppose each of these bodies to pass in review before us every minute, it would require more than three millions eight hundred and forty thousand years of unremitting observation before the whole could be contemplated even in this rapid manner. Were an hour's contemplation allotted to each, it would require two hundred and thirty millions four hundred thousand years till all the series passed under review; and, were we to suppose an intelligent being to remain fifty years in each world, for the purpose of taking a more minute survey of its scenery and decorations, one hundred billions nine hundred and fifty-five thousand millions of years would elapse before such a survey could be completed—a number of years which, to limited minds, seems to approximate to something like eternity itself.

In these profound inquiries the mind seems lost in an unfathomable abyss. We are utterly unable to grasp the numbers of orbs which stud the pathless fields of immensity. O if our fine gentlemen and ladies, who

imagine themselves to be such paragons of perfection both in mind and person, were to inspect these matters, and observe the starry heavens, and ask themselves the question, how much they know about them, methinks it would abase their loftiness, and bring their thoughts into captivity, and produce in them a more humble and amiable spirit.—*Extracted from Dr. Dick's Treatise on the Sidereal Heavens.*

## A DISSERTATION

### ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE CREATION AS TAUGHT BY MODERN CHRISTIANS, PRIESTS, AND THEIR ABETTORS.

*(Concluded from p.* 216.*)*

IT has been proved in the preceding papers, that the doctrine of absolute creation was believed by a large majority of the nations of the earth, and consequently that, in relation to it, the Christian priesthood, or the Jewish priesthood can claim no merit on the score of originality. The question then naturally arises, Did Moses borrow his notion of creation from the traditionary opinions of other nations, or did other nations derive their notions of creation from the writings of the Hebrew legislator? This is a question which, like all other questions respecting the antiquities of nations, is involved in much uncertainty: for whatever may be the number and force of the arguments adduced in favour of the one hypothesis, arguments equally as numerous and powerful may be adduced in favour of the other. The style of a few of the first chapters of Genesis evidently shows them to have been derived from different documents, and afford presumptive evidence of the fact that the book is a compilation of stories which were afloat in the minds of different tribes of men. The impossibility of educing something which is tangible, which has a positive existence, and which is possessed of positive properties, out of absolute nothingness—out of a pure negation, has struck many minds, and affords de-

monstrative evidence of the absurdity of the doctrine we are discussing. The notion of creation then, we have every reason to suppose, was first generated in the human mind by observing the productive powers of nature. These, to ignorant men, appeared so truly wonderful and inexplicable, that they were referred to some unknown cause; and as men and the world they inhabit were supposed to have had a beginning, and as the causes which produced them were unknown, the notion of a great and immense being would very naturally arise. An order of priests would soon follow who, seizing on the popular idea, would soon turn it to the advancement of their own interests. Thus the Egyptian priests had their Isis and Osiris, the Greeks and Romans their Jupiter and a nameless herd of divinities, the Brahmans their Buddha and Bramha, and the Jews their Jah.

The advocates of the doctrine of creation endeavour with all their might to overturn the eternity of matter, knowing well that, if that can be done—if it can be proved that matter has not existed from eternity, the existence of a cause distinct from matter in point of its nature and properties follows as a consequence. Some in their eagerness to attack (query) what has been called atheism, have even went so far as to deny the existence of matter considered apart from mind; arguing that, though what we called matter exists, it exists solely in relation to mind; so that, if all minds were to be destroyed, there would be no such thing as matter in existence. This was the doctrine taught by Berkeley, which has been considered by some philosophers as absolutely irrefutable. Whether it be true or false matters not to our argument. If matter exists solely in relation to mind, if it be merely an idea or conception of mind, then it must ever have existed. For if mind, especially an infinite mind, always existed, the idea of matter always existed in that mind. For if we suppose that there ever was a time when the idea did not exist, we must also suppose the mind or the thinking agent to be ignorant of something at one period of his duration which he knew at another, which is at once denying his infinity; because an infinite intellect must know all things, else it cannot be infinite in point of wisdom. Now it follows from all

this, on the hypothesis of Berkeley, that there never could have been such a thing as the absolute creation of matter, except in relation to finite minds; which would prove too much, and is therefore useless. In this last view of the matter, there must have been a new creation for every mind that has any conception of the doctrine. Supposing, then, that the doctrine of creation has been known to twenty billions of human beings, there must have been twenty billions of absolute creations; which appears to my heretical judgment rather too many.

The advocates of the doctrine of absolute creation endeavour to show metaphysically, that there must have been a time when no finite being or thing existed, and that, consequently, there must have been from all eternity an uncreated substance or being, unlimited in wisdom and power. The argument which they employ for this purpose may be stated as follows:—

All beings must either have existed from eternity in their present form, or there must have been an infinite succession of beings, if matter be eternal. That all beings existed from eternity in their present form is contradicted by the fact, that our own bodies are undergoing perpetual changes; and is, in short, too absurd to be credited. On the supposition, then, that there was no creation, there must have been an eternal succession of beings of a finite character. Now there must have been a time when each of these beings was not; therefore there must have been a time when it was future. The direct consequence of this argument is, that as there must have been a time when each of them was future, there must have been a time when the whole were future. But if there ever was a time when the whole of them were not, then there must have been some cause able to bring them into being, inasmuch as they now exist. This cause must have had power to produce, and skill or wisdom to arrange and diversify the things produced. This skilful and powerful being we call God, or the Creator; and the act of producing all things we denominate creation.

Without objecting to the existence of an infinite, wise, and powerful agent, we contend that the argument before mentioned is unsound. The fallacy lies in

the improper application of the word whole: this word necessarily implying finity in the thing to which it is applied. For example: we divide time into years, months, days, hours, minutes, and seconds. Now, I might argue thus: there was a time when each of these separate portions of time was not; therefore, there was a time when each of them was future; consequently, there was a time when the whole were future; ergo, there was a time when there was no time, a duration when there was no duration—which is a flat and palpable contradiction, and cannot therefore be true. The same argument might be applied to space, and the same conclusions would be arrived at. To apply the word whole to an infinite succession of beings is virtually an absurdity. If we say the whole of the links belonging to a supposed infinite chain, we at once limit it, and, consequently, destroy the supposition of its infinity. When we say the whole of these things are in their proper places, we mean that all of them are placed in their proper positions. Here the word whole implies a limit; namely, that there are no more. The word whole ought to be applied only to those cases wherein finity is expressed or implied. For the instant that we apply it to an infinite succession, or to any thing else implying infinity, we contradict ourselves. If we suppose in the first place an infinite succession of beings, and then say the whole of these beings were once future, we manifestly destroy the former supposition by the latter. If we can imagine the whole of a finite succession of beings, we at once preclude the possibility of that succession being infinite. The argument then so frequently adduced by the priests and by the advocates of the doctrine under consideration, amounts to no more than a miserable fallacy, and is a manifest proof of the weakness of the cause it is brought forward to support.

It is most illogical on the part of bishops and clergymen to reason in this manner. Yet, forsooth, if we believe themselves, they are the only reasonable men—the only men who have truth on their side, and who defend it in a reasonable manner. But what can be more unreasonable than to admit for the sake of argument the supposition of an infinite succession of beings,

and then, in order to prove the fallacy of the supposition, apply to it the idea of a finite or limited succession, and, because there is a discordance between the ideas condemn the supposition?

In these remarks I am not contending for the eternity of the human race, or of any other race of beings, but simply for the eternity of the material of which they are composed. This may have undergone a million or more changes—may have entered into innumerable combinations, and may yet enter into more. It is for the absolute impossibility of creating this material I am contending, and not for the eternity of any one of the combinations into which it may have entered. The fact of a creation having occurred some five or six thousand years ago is not sufficiently attested. Neither mathematical demonstration, nor ocular proof, nor any sort of evidence, except that arising from positive credulity, can be offered in favour of the doctrine. It is true the priesthood have said it happened; but then this order of men have been so much accustomed to the practice of telling untruths, that philosophers in these degenerate days declare they will not believe them. It has been said that geology furnishes proof of the short existence of man on the surface of this globe, and that this, at least, renders the creation of man not only possible but certain. But it should be observed, that to make a compound out of previously existing materials, and to educe those materials out of absolute nothingness, are widely different questions: the former may be true, the latter false. Man may have been made by an intelligent deity, without the matter which enters into the composition of his frame being created. Now we know too little of the agency of matter, of the peculiar affinities, forces, or energies which it may possess under peculiar circumstances, to be able to state positively that there is no possibility of nature being able to generate animals and men. A modest scepticism therefore becomes us amidst so much uncertainty. Future discoveries will perhaps reveal the secret. To create however is to act; to act is to apply force; to apply force, and to apply it to nothing, appears an absurdity. We can form no idea of creation without at

the same time conceiving of the application of some force; the application of force necessarily involves the idea of something to which it is applied: so that the material must have previously existed, which renders the act of creation impossible. If a divine being, intelligent and powerful, really exists, it should be borne in remembrance that, it is not derogatory to his dignity to say that he cannot perform that which involves a contradiction. The doctrine of absolute creation involves a contradiction, and therefore it is absurd and untrue.

## NATIONAL EDUCATION,

### CONSIDERED AS THE MEANS OF PROMOTING UNIVERSAL HAPPINESS.

The whole human race are in pursuit of happiness. The rich, the poor, the low, the lofty, the mechanic and the merchant, the nobleman and the monarch, are all seeking pleasure of one kind or other. For this the adventurous youth forsakes his native home, and wanders through foreign regions, inspecting their curiosities, and making himself acquainted with the manners and customs of their inhabitants. For this the sturdy mariner ploughs the briny deep, and breasts and buffets the relentless tempests. For this the idle and the dissolute squander their precious time; and for this the sober man of business devotes his hours to laborious calculation. In short, all ranks and classes of society are wandering in quest of happiness.

But, though the whole human race are pursuing pleasure, the methods they individually adopt of obtaining it are frequently the reverse of each other. One man derives happiness from bathing in the pearly fountains of literature and science; and another, from the over-indulgence of his sensual appetites. The miser derives a sordid gratification from beholding his amassed treasures—from counting over his coin. Nature presents no landscape to his view so bright, so cheering, and so beautiful, as his individual possessions. The

bold and striking promontory — the verdurous island, worshipped by the waters which surround it—the ragged rock, towering abruptly from the earth, as if in scorn of the things below—the mountain, rearing its gigantic columns towards heaven—the ocean's bosom, heaving in grandeur inexpressible—the peaceful river, gliding majestically along, the emblem of eternity and the source of vegetation—the lake, glowing beneath the shinings of the sun—and the forest, attired in the efflorescence of summer:—in short, all these, united into one rich and variegated landscape, afford not to the miser so much delight as is afforded by the chinking of his gold, or the sight of some miserable cottage which is his own. Wretched being! his pleasures are all of a sordid character. The pleasures which the rest of society enjoy he seldom or never experiences. He is, therefore, though seeking happiness, comparatively miserable. Though surrounded with magnificence, he is poor; though possessed of abundance, he is destitute; and though he has ears to hear, yet he hears not the voice of all-bountiful Nature proclaiming in her solitudes, "Man was born to be happy!" The sight of his fellow-creatures awakens not, in his iron bosom, any lively and generous emotions. The ruling passion of his soul is avarice; hence his desires unvaryingly run out after riches. To gratify the sordid love of gain, he wastes his morning strength and keeps his nightly vigils, and toils on, year after year, with untiring assiduity, acquiring riches, and desiring more. He possesses but few associations in common with the rest of his kind; for, on his part, every high and generous resolve—every mind-ennobling purpose—and almost every hope, blooming with the prospect of a liberal fruition—have been immolated at the shrine of an all-grasping and all-absorbing selfishness. He walks through life, the victim of a constant and tyrannical passion—a shadow of moral worth—a mockery of humanity—and a melancholy specimen of what man may become by the influence of a defective education.

If we contrast this character with that of the spendthrift, we shall find the two as opposite to each other as light and darkness. The one seeks happiness by

amassing gain; the other by spending it. The one deprives himself of almost every comfort; the other can deny himself of nothing. The one shortens his existence by the hardships he voluntarily undergoes for the purpose of hoarding up wealth; the other dilapidates his constitution by the excesses in which he indulges. The two characters, though as opposite as Egyptian darkness and the most vivid sunlight, are nevertheless both seeking happiness. Pleasure, either immediate or remote, is the object they both have in view, though they seek it by different methods. So it is with the whole of society. All that navigate the great ocean of life are in pursuit of gratification. In short, it appears to be the end and aim of all human existences.

Since, therefore, the acquirement of happiness is the prime business of life—since there is an eternal craving for it in every human bosom—is it not highly desirable that all proposed arrangements which appear likely to produce it should be called into immediate operation? It appears to me that a wise and liberal plan of national education would tend to increase the sum of universal happiness. The uneducated man, in general, is incapable of experiencing the pleasures which spring from the possession of knowledge. The sciences may unlock their inexhaustible stores, and pour their inestimable treasures at his feet, but he has no taste for their beauties, and no power to appreciate their value. The landscape may be clothed in all the wild luxuriance of nature; but, as it regards him, it lies charmless though beautiful, and dead while it speaketh. But the case is reversed in relation to the educated. The most elevating pleasures that humanity can feel spring from the proper exercise of a cultivated understanding, and of an imagination that has been chastened and subdued. An acquaintance with literature and philosophy, even though that acquaintance be but partial, is a source of pure delight. The philosophic student digs up happiness from the entrails of the earth, and derives both amusement and instruction from the pebbles on its surface. Nature is to him an interminable mine of intellectual gratification. Chemistry unfolds to him its wonders, and exhibits the constituent elements of organic

and inorganic bodies. Geology enables him to trace the various physical revolutions which have occurred on the surface or in the bowels of the earth; and informs him that other races of beings were its denizens before he was called into existence. Mathematics expand his power of thinking, and open up the pathway which leads to an acquaintance with the pure and sublime science of astronomy. This latter science unlocks fresh fountains of felicity. When the sun has set in glory, and his last red rays have fallen on the lakes and hills, the streams and clouds—when the beasts are retiring from their accustomed pursuits, and all nature appears to be seeking repose—then how cheering it must be to the educated mind to wander from home, and banquet on the beauties of the scene! The moon, arising in the eastern sky, flings her silvery mantle over the landscape. The stars, eclipsed by her brightness, hide their heads, as if compelled to do homage to her superior dignity, while earth and its streamlets roll on, illumined by her lustre, and reflecting her image. The air is balmy and breathes repose, and the heavens are peaceful and serene. What high and ennobling feelings arise in the philosopher's mind, as he scans the heavens, and roams in thought over the immensity of the universe! Overwhelming thoughts of sublimity and vastness—lofty conceptions of the beautiful, mingled with the reminiscences of bygone years, agitate his breast. The appearance of the revolving tenants of the sky call up feelings with which the names (sacred to science) of a Newton, a Cassini, a Galileo, and a Herschell are associated. The history of the heavens lies spread out before him; and he is enabled, in some measure, to behold its future condition in perspective. Where is the individual who will have the temerity to affirm that the astronomer, in such circumstances, does not experience the purest and most elevating delight? And where is the individual, possessed of the least spark of philanthropy, who would not wish to make such pleasures in some measure accessible to all?

A wise, well-adjusted, and liberal scheme of national education, if carried into effect, would place these refined gratifications within the reach of the majority of

men. The people, if rightly trained from infancy to manhood, would have placed in their hands the key with which they might unlock all the stores of knowledge. A taste for the sciences, and for literature in general, would thus be generated in the public mind, and a fine and high-toned morality would be made to pervade all the ramifications of society. Crime would be repressed, if not abolished; vice would become dishonourable, and be held in universal abhorrence; and the full tide of popular opinion would beat on those dispositions and actions which are found to be prejudicial to the interests of a commonwealth. Indeed, the vices of the state, and the difficulties of modern legislation, can never be completely remedied, until the people become educated. The majority of the people are grossly ignorant of matters which are intimately connected with their social and political welfare. The government of a country is acted upon by the force of public opinion; it is, therefore, of vast importance that public opinion should be sound and enlightened. But this cannot occur until a wise and liberal scheme of education be resorted to.

Modern senators are obliged to legislate for the many, and not for the few. Many times measures are enacted which, though well adapted to promote the happiness of the majority, are nevertheless but ill calculated to secure the felicity of a few, who, in consequence of being placed in particular circumstances, are compelled to experience loss by their operation. Now, it frequently happens that a popular clamour is raised by a few individuals against measures which, though prejudicial to their particular interests, are good for the majority. Indeed, laws cannot be made to secure the individual interests of all. By every enactment of the legislature some individual must suffer. As long as society continues in its present ignorant and degraded condition, this must be a phenomenon of frequent occurrence. The present framework of society compels, or at least influences, the legislature of a country to enact laws calculated to promote the further aggrandisement of the rich and the powerful, in opposition to and at the expense of the interests of the poorer classes.

Now the evils which spring from a defective state of our national education, in a political point of view, are these—

First. That the people, being irrationally trained and educated, never dream of attributing such disasters to the system which disposes legislators to concoct such measures, but become inflamed with the most rancorous hatred against the governors of the realm; and

Second. They allow themselves to be led by the nose by every political quack who chooses to practise on their gullibility, or present his political nostrums for their approbation and acceptance.

If the people were educated, they would think for themselves: at present they do not. It is true, exceptions may be found; and, thank Heaven, they are growing more numerous every day: but exceptions by no means invalidate a general rule. The experience of past times proves that the people, in many instances, have been raised to a pitch of demoniacal frenzy—to deeds of bloodshed and of death—by the inflammatory harangues of political demagogues, or the vituperative language of a Tory bigot. Was it education that produced the Manchester massacre, Swing incendiarism, and the Spafields riots? Was it education produced the riots at Bristol, the church and king mobs got up by the government in 1780, the high-church mob which destroyed Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham, and which was lauded to the skies by those patterns of piety and political virtue, the Tories? No, it was ignorance, gross ignorance; and so long as the people remain destitute of educational privileges, so long we may occasionally expect such diabolical scenes.

If the governors of this land wish to elevate the character of the population, let them afford each individual the means of becoming educated. If the people were properly trained from infancy to manhood—if the arrangements contemplated by social reformers were called into existence—if it were not the interest of one class to prey upon the indigence and weakness of others—if the principle of individualism was abolished, and society placed upon an equitable basis—then the government of the country would have no inducement to

enact unpopular and arbitrary laws. The people would then, and then only, possess their rights, and be made virtuous and happy. The vicious and degrading associations which surround them at present would be removed, and, as a consequence, crime would be prevented. Poverty would be unknown, and ignorance would flee before the divine light of science and or truth. In this great and glorious cause—the promotion of educational, domestic, and political reform—the social reformers of Great Britain are engaged. They cannot go back. If friends scorn—if society blandishes—if bigots traduce—they can neither listen to the solicitations of the one, nor be dismayed by the hostility evinced by the other. Their cause is good, their weapon is truth, and their motto is "Onward." Bigotry may assail them with its vituperative tongue, malice may assault their reputation, and malign and misrepresent their principles, and prejudice may open its Cerberean mouth for the purpose of inflicting injury on their cause; but still they are determined to proceed onward, equally regardless of the frowns of their enemies, and

> "The world's dread laugh,
> Which scarce the firm philosopher can scorn."

Their design is to make others and themselves happy, by the institution of rational and scientific arrangements; and nothing shall deter them from prosecuting such a noble and godlike undertaking.

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## ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANCIENTS RESPECTING THE SCIENCE OF ELECTRICITY.

The mode in which some of the physical sciences have originated, is at once simple and curious. A trivial circumstance in some instances has opened the pathway for a brilliant train of discoveries; and, a single fact observed and recorded has, by the subsequent discovery and addition of analagous phenomena, frequently given birth to a science interesting in itself, and useful to society. This observation has been remarkably exemplified in the history of electricity; for, a single fact observed in the earliest ages, and, as far as our information reaches, at first recorded by the Greek philosophers, has led to the discovery and recording of other and analagous facts, the sum of which, along

with the principles and inferences deducible therefrom, we term the science of electricity.

Thales, of Miletus, who flourished about six hundred years before the Christian era, is reported to have described the power developed in amber by friction; in consequence of which, it is enabled to attract bits of straw and other light bodies. It is also said that an attempted explanation of this phenomenon is given as one of his philosophical dogmas. He taught that amber was possessed of a soul, and that magnetic bodies were similarly constituted. Theophrastus, however, was probably the first writer who attempted to describe the attractive power of bodies to each other, distinct from the attractions of gravity and magnetism. He lived B.C. 321; and, as far as our information reaches, has left, in his treatise upon stones, the earliest description extant of this property. He speaks of amber dug on the coast of *Liguria*, which had an attractive power, and intimates that the clearest sort of amber had this property in the highest degree of perfection, and that it would attract iron. The same writer ascribes similar properties to the *Lapis Lyncurius*, formerly considered to be the same as amber, but now believed to be the stone called *Tourmalin*. He says, *ἕλκει γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ ἤλεκτρον· οἱ δέ φασιν οὐ μόνον κάρφη καὶ ξύλον, ἀλλα καὶ χαλκὸν καὶ σιδηρον, ἐὰν ᾖ λεπτος ὥσπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἔλεγεν,"* (*Theoph. de Lapid.*, p. 124, Hill's edit.,) which means that it (*the Lyncurium*,) "possesses an attractive power like amber; and, as they report, attracts not only straws and leaves, but copper also, and iron, if it be in small particles."

The knowledge which the ancient philosophers possessed respecting that division or branch of electrical science which we now term frictional electricity, was exceedingly limited; for, though it may have extended to many facts, it embraced few principles, and was totally devoid of that systematic arrangement which constitutes the basis and glory of modern science. Pliny, who flourished in the first century, appears to have known little more on this subject than his predecessor, Theophrastus. He states of pieces of amber that "attritu digitorum acceptâ, vi caloris attrahunt in se paleas et folia arida ut magnes lapis ferrum;"* which may be translated thus: "Being rubbed by the fingers, and having thereby become warmed, attracts to itself straw and dried leaves in the same manner as the magnet does iron." Priscian and Solinus also mention the properties of amber. Salmasius, in his commentary on the latter author, asserts that "karabe, the word by which amber was known among the Arabs, is said by Avicenna to be of Persian origin, and to signify the power of attracting straws."

But though the knowledge of the ancients on this subject was limited, it perhaps was more extensive than some are disposed to imagine. They might be aware of many facts, and yet not know that these facts had an electrical origin. They might be well acquainted with many electrical phenomena, and yet be destitute

* Plin. Nat. Hist., lib. xxxvii., cap. 3.

of that systematic arrangement necessary to form them into a science. The electrical property of amber is not the only electrical phenomenon with which the philosophers of antiquity were acquainted. They understood the electric shock given by the torpedo, and have left upon record minute descriptions of the sensations occasioned thereby in the human body. It is probable, however, that they did not apprehend any connection between the attractive power just spoken of, and the benumbing power which the torpedo and several other fishes possess. It is now proved beyond a doubt, that the benumbing power of the torpedo is in reality produced by the electric stroke which the creature has the power of imparting to any object with which it may come in contact; and, indeed, this is the method it has of both defending itself and seizing its prey. Aristotle says "that this fish causes or produces a degree of torpidity in those fishes it is about to seize, and having by that means got them into its mouth feeds upon them."* He adds, further, that "this fish hides itself in the sand and mud, and catches those fish that swim over it, by benumbing them; of which," he says, "some have been eye-witnesses." Pliny says, "Torpedo etiam procul & e longinquo, vel si hastâ virgave attingatur, quamvis prævalidas lacertas Torpescere facit et pedes quamlibet ad cursus veloces et alligat & retinent:"† or, "this fish has the power of communicating its benumbing quality, if touched with a spear or a rod; and is able to produce a torpor in the strongest muscles of the body; and, as it were, binds and stops the feet even of the swiftest persons." Galen says that "the torpedo is endued with such a power, that if it be touched by the fisherman with his eel spear, it instantly stupifies the hand, fransmitting this power through the spear to the hand." Plutarch also declares that the torpedo affects fishermen through the drag net; and that were water to be poured on a living one, the person who poured it would be affected; the sensation being communicated through the water to the hand.

Claudian wrote a short poem on the torpedo, in which he states that it can convey its influence from the hook wherewith it happens to be caught to the hand of the fisherman. Oppian goes still further, for he describes (lib. ii., v. 62,) the organs by which this fish is enabled to produce this extraordinary effect. He says "that this effect is attributable to two organs of a radiated texture, which are fixed or grow on each side of the fish." "From the above accounts," to use the language of Dr. Falconer, "we see that the philosophers of antiquity had accurately observed the nature of this extraordinary influence, though they knew not to what general principle it ought to be ascribed. They noticed the sensation and its effects upon the body, the use the fish makes of this property for its defence and support, and that the fish had the power of conveying it through wood, metals, hemp, or flax, and even through water; and, lastly, that this extraordinary power was lodged in organs peculiar to the fish, a fact which the

* Arist. Nat. Hist., lib. xxxviii., cap. 3. † Plin. Nat. Hist., lib. xxxviii., cap. 1.

late accounts of the dissection of the electrical eel farther confirm. It is remarkable, that Pliny ascribes this power of the fish to a certain invisible agency, and calls it by the same name that has been applied by later writers to denominate the electrical influence."* The name here alluded to is *Aurâ*, which, in the Latin tongue, signifies a breath or gentle gale; and which, in the science of electricity, denotes that cool wind which is felt by a person who stands near an electrical machine when it is in vigorous action. The passage to which Dr. Falconer alludes, may be found in *Pliny's Nat. Hist.*, lib. xxxii., cap. 1, beginning with *Quod si necesse habemus fateri, &c. &c.*

The ancients appear to have understood the application of electricity as a medicine. Vossius, on the credit of some ancient authority, (perhaps *Scribonius Largus*, cap. 41,) states that an inveterate headache was cured by the application of a living torpedo to the part which was affected. The same remedy was used for curing the gout. The patient was directed to stand on the sea-shore with a living torpedo under his feet until not only the feet, but the legs, as far as the knees, became affected. Scribonius Largus reports this remedy to have cured Anthero, a freedman of Tiberius Cæsar. Further notices of the application of the electrical influence of the torpedo may be seen in *Dioscorides*, lib. ii., art., *Torpedo, vide edit. Matthioli*, 1560, *in Galen; Simpl. Medic.*, lib. ii.; *and in Paulus Ægineta*, lib. vii., art. Ναρκη.

Dr. Falconer, in the learned dissertation we have already quoted, endeavours to render it probable that the ancients were not unacquainted with the method of drawing down electrical fire from the clouds. He says that this was probably known "to *Numa* Pompilius, the second king of Rome; and that his successor *Tullius* Hostilius perished by his unskilful management of such a dangerous process. Numa Pompilius was a Sabine, a tract comprehended in the ancient Etruria, a country from whence the Romans professedly derived most of their religious rites and ceremonies. Diodorus Siculus informs us that the Tyrheni or Etrusci, Numa's countrymen, were particularly knowing in every circumstance relative to thunder, as a branch of natural history, which they studied very eagerly." Dr. Falconer gives the passage in Greek, but it may be thus rendered into English: "They devoted themselves to learning, especially to the study of natural philosophy; and above all other things, were eager to find out the nature of thunder and lightning. Therefore to this day they are admired by the princes of the world, who seek from them an explanation of the effects of thunder."†

Pliny, as quoted by Dr. Falconer, speaks to the same purpose. Numa was undoubtedly a man of science; not, perhaps, in the modern acceptation of the term, but in a comparative sense. He is reported to have rectified the calendar, and to have brought by intercalation the solar and lunar years to correspond. He also

* Mem. of the Manchester Lit. Phil. Soc., vol. iii., p. 283.
† Diodorus Siculus, lib. v., cap. 2.

had some knowledge of the power of a concave speculum in concentrating the sun's rays and igniting bodies. It was by this means that the vestal fire is said to have been lighted. Livy informs us, (lib. i.,) that Numa built an altar on the Aventine mount to Jupiter Elicius, whom he could draw down from heaven, according to report, for the purpose of consulting with him as to the meaning of prodigies, and particularly about thunder and lightning. According to Plutarch and Arnobius, Numa was not acquainted with the means of procuring thunder, until he applied to the goddess Egeria, who taught him how to draw Jupiter down from heaven. Now we know that flame and lambent phenomena were important elements in all the mythologies of past times. The schechina of the temple among the Hebrews, and the stories related respecting the two manifestations to Moses, may be cited in proof of this observation. To draw down thunder, then, and to draw down the Deity, were equivalent phrases among the mythologists of antiquity. Hence it is said, that when Jupiter was obliged to come to Semele with the characteristics of his presence, he came in flame. Pliny affirms, as he says, on good, authority, that Numa had often drawn down the Deity. The account given by Livy of the death of Tullius Hostillius is as follows. *Ipsum* regem, tradunt, volventem commentarias Numæ cum ibi quædam occulta solennia sacrificia Jovi Elicio facta invenisset, operatum his sacris se abdidisse: sed non rite initum aut curatum id sacrum esse; nec solum nullam ei oblatam cœlestium speciem, sed ira Jovis, solicitati prava religione, fulmine ictum cum domo conflagrasse.* i. e., the king himself, turning over the commentaries of Numa, and discovering there that certain solemn and occult sacrifices had been performed to Jupiter Elicius, shut himself up and began the performance of this solemnity; but from some impropriety in the commencement and conduct of the ceremony, he not only failed of being able to hold converse with celestial beings, but was, through the wrath of Jove, excited in consequence of being importuned with irregular rites and ceremonials, struck with lightning and reduced to ashes along with his palace."

Pliny's account is analagous to that given by Livy. He says that "Tullius Hostilius, whilst he was imitating in an irregular and improper manner, the process of Numa for drawing down lightning, was struck with a thunderbolt." Dionysius Hallicarnassensis declares him to have perished by fire; and, indeed, all the ancient authors, who mention the circumstance, are agreed that he perished during the performance of a private religious ceremony. It is probable that he was engaged in performing some religious ceremony, in the performance of which pointed bodies were made use of; and that the atmosphere being highly electrical at the time, and he unskilful in the management of his apparatus, he fell, like Professor Richmann, a victim to his temerity.

This is rendered probable by the fact that the ancient Etruscans

* J. Livii, lib. i., cap. 31.]

and Sabines, Numa's countrymen, made use of spears in their religious ceremonies. According to Ovid, (*Fast* ii., 477,) they worshipped spears, and are considered by some to have been the inventors of these weapons. Now a spear is a pointed body, and all pointed bodies have a tendency to attract the electric fluid. But in these solemnities perhaps a forest of spears, or what Homer calls Δουροθηκη, might be employed, and not merely one or a few of these pointed bodies. Lucan mentions one *Arruns*, a learned Etrurian, "who collected the fires of lightning which were scattered through the sky, and buried them in the earth."* This passage seems to intimate that the ancients possessed some slight knowledge of the use of conductors, or at least that they were acquainted with the fact that pointed metallic bodies afford a ready passage to the fire of heaven. The ancients originally worshipped in the open air, and moreover on high places. High places are mentioned in many parts of the Hebrew scriptures as the seats of Gentile and idolatrous abominations. The law was also delivered to Moses on Mount Sinai, and the mountain appeared to the Israelites to be on fire, or to be enveloped in flames. This may have literally happened, and yet there be nothing supernatural in the circumstance. "Now," argues Dr. Falconer, "were a forest of spears, with the points upwards, and with the handles of dry wood; or, perhaps, some of the Teribinthinate kind, which are bad conductors, placed upon an elevated situation, they might, if placed within striking distance, exhibit a luminous appearance, and in certain seasons collect electrical fire, sufficient to make a great discharge; and, as I suppose, to destroy any person within the reach of their influence. This is not altogether matter of conjecture. Plutarch says, that balls of fire were seen to rest upon the soldiers' spears; and we know that, in our own times, in the Mediterranean sea, it is common for balls of fire to rest upon the rigging of the ships, which appearances were formerly called by the names of Castor and Pollux; and, in later times, the fires of St. Helmo; and are thought to foretell good weather. Livy speaks of a spear in a house, which burned more than two hours without being consumed. Could this be any thing but electrical?"

It should be observed, that Numa did not build a temple, but an altar, in the open air, to Jupiter Elicius, and that it was situated on a hill; namely, the Aventine mount. But Tullius Hostilius was in some retired part of his house, and alone. It is known that religious ceremonies were sometimes performed on the house-tops; and if Tullius Hostilius was in that part of the house, when performing a religious ceremony, some pointed body near him may have determined the passage of a flash of lightning, which would deprive him of life and set fire to his dwelling.

* Lucan, Phars., i., 606, 607,

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